| Literature DB >> 35409966 |
Qian Xing1,2, Wenxi Tang1,2, Mingyang Li1,2, Shuailong Li1,2.
Abstract
Volume-based drug purchasing by China's health insurance system currently represents the largest group purchasing organization worldwide. After exchanging the market that accounted for nearly half of the volume of the healthcare system for the ultra-low-price supply of limited drugs, what are the effects on patient and funding burdens, drug accessibility, and clinical efficacy? We aimed to verify the effectiveness of the policy, explore the reasons behind the problem and identify regulatory priorities and collaborative measures. We used literature and reported data from 2019 to 2021 to conduct a stakeholder analysis and health impact assessment, presenting the benefit and risk share for various dimensions. The analysis method was a multidimensional scaling model, which visualized problematic associations. Seventy-nine papers (61 publications and 18 other resources) were included in the study, with 22 effects and 36 problems identified. The results indicated favorable affordability and poor accessibility of drugs, as well as high risk of reduced drug quality and drug-use rationality. The drug-use demand of patients was guaranteed; the prescription rights of doctors regarding clinical drug use were limited; unreasonable evaluation indicators limited the transformation of public hospitals to value- and service-oriented organizations; the sustainability of health insurance funds and policy promotion were at risk; and innovation by pharmaceutical companies was accelerated. The problems associated with high co-occurrence frequencies were divided into the following clusters: cost control, drug accessibility, system rationality, policy fairness, drug quality, and moral hazards. These findings suggested that China has achieved short-term success in reducing the burden on patients and reducing fund expenditure. However, there were still deficiencies in guaranteed supply, quality control, and efficacy tracking. The study offers critical lessons for China and other low- and middle-income countries.Entities:
Keywords: China; health impact assessment; multidimensional scaling; policy evaluation; stakeholder analysis; volume-based drug purchasing
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35409966 PMCID: PMC8999037 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19074285
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1PRISMA flow chart for inclusion/exclusion of documents.
Evaluation factors regarding the effect of volume-based procurement (VBP) of drugs.
| Classification | Description | Frequency | Code |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effects | The price of selected drug varieties drops and the mean cost per patient visit declines | 52 | A1 |
| It saves health insurance funds and gives room for more innovative drugs | 21 | A2 | |
| The distribution links of drugs are optimized | 16 | A3 | |
| The price of unselected varieties falls gradually, and the policy spillover effect is remarkable | 14 | A4 | |
| Promoting industry merger and reorganization, and forcing enterprise innovation | 14 | A5 | |
| Independent quotation for companies saves marketing expenses, reduces transaction costs | 11 | A6 | |
| The monitoring work of adverse reactions is stable, with a low number of reports | 9 | A7 | |
| The effectiveness and safety of selected drugs are consistent with those of original varieties | 9 | A8 | |
| It is the entry point for strengthening medical reform and promoting three-medicine linkage | 9 | A9 | |
| The prescription behavior of doctors is standardized and rational drug use is guided | 7 | A10 | |
| The expected diagnosis and treatment effects can be achieved with low dressing change rate and good compliance | 6 | A11 | |
| The global budget system concentrates funds, shortens enterprise capital turnover | 6 | A12 | |
| The proportion of hospital drugs declines, which forces public hospitals to provide value-oriented services | 6 | A13 | |
| The shortlisted item passes the consistency evaluation and has a quality improvement effect | 5 | A14 | |
| It gives full play to the decisive role of the market in allocating resources | 5 | A15 | |
| Balance sharing within the framework of global budgets can be used for salary system reform in the long term | 5 | A16 | |
| The consumption of selected drugs and original substitutes is increased, which optimizes the drug catalog | 4 | A17 | |
| The selected varieties have sufficient supply and timely delivery | 3 | A18 | |
| The selected varieties are focused on common diseases, with a wide range of beneficiaries | 3 | A19 | |
| Patient demand for drug use is released | 3 | A20 | |
| The consistency of drug use within medical consortia is guaranteed | 3 | A21 | |
| The supply of essential drugs is safeguarded | 2 | A22 | |
| Problems | Excessive price reduction results in the disruption of drug supply, affecting the continuity of drug use | 15 | B1 |
| The coverage of selected drugs is limited | 12 | B2 | |
| Patients have low acceptance | 12 | B3 | |
| The prescription rights of doctors are limited and their response is not positive | 11 | B4 | |
| The recognition degree of doctors is low and they tend to use original drugs in sensitive fields | 10 | B5 | |
| The standards for agreed purchase volume of selected drugs lag behind, and the indicators of different departments are unreasonable | 8 | B6 | |
| There is a problem of raw material replacement, with doubts about drug effectiveness and safety | 8 | B7 | |
| There exist differences in the quality and efficacy of different drug varieties | 8 | B8 | |
| The current bid evaluation standards cannot accurately indicate drug quality | 8 | B9 | |
| Unselected companies are forced to withdraw, leading to a market monopoly | 7 | B10 | |
| Health insurance fund expenditures are at risk of increasing in the long term | 6 | B11 | |
| The delivery rate is low and delivery is delayed at the grassroot level | 6 | B12 | |
| The price of non-selected common drugs in social pharmacies and through other channels is rising | 6 | B13 | |
| Defaults on payment are serious, causing a moral hazard | 6 | B14 | |
| Dosage is increased in clinical use to achieve the drug’s effect | 5 | B15 | |
| The overall cost control effect is not remarkable | 5 | B16 | |
| The purchase volume standards are unrealistic due to false reporting by hospitals | 5 | B17 | |
| The selected prices are relatively high in areas with limited health insurance funds, while low prices are seen in areas with sufficient funds, forming an “upside down” pattern | 5 | B18 | |
| Fixed drug use replaces the scientificity of rational drug use | 5 | B19 | |
| Non-drug healthcare costs are increased | 4 | B20 | |
| Public hospitals suspend the supply of original drugs to reach the agreed consumption of selected drugs | 4 | B21 | |
| It fails to take care of older people, women, children, and patients with special diseases | 4 | B22 | |
| The consumption of key monitored varieties is accelerated, or there may be problems such as antibiotic abuse | 4 | B23 | |
| The drug varieties and dosage forms are incomplete, causing inconvenience for administration by patients | 4 | B24 | |
| Domestic generic drug standards are lower than international standards | 4 | B25 | |
| Due to the indicator limitation of tertiary hospitals, there is a lack of motivation to refer patients to lower-level hospitals, affecting the advancement of the hierarchical diagnosis and treatment system | 4 | B26 | |
| The supply of cheap drugs is disrupted | 4 | B27 | |
| Drugs of the same specification are supplied at multiple prices, and the prices of drugs with the same generic name are considerably different | 4 | B28 | |
| Excessive administrative intervention affects resource allocation, leading to rent-seeking behaviors and causing unfair competition | 3 | B29 | |
| There is a gap between the production capacity of companies submitted for approval in the consistency evaluation and their actual production capacity, leading to weak production. | 3 | B30 | |
| The bargaining power of hospitals is weakened | 3 | B31 | |
| The frequency of allergic symptoms with some selected drugs is higher | 2 | B32 | |
| The strategy of taking only low prices deliberately distorts drug prices and reverses resource allocation | 2 | B33 | |
| Linked price cuts reduce the enthusiasm of companies for research and development | 2 | B34 | |
| Selected companies are conspiring to increase drug prices in the long run | 2 | B35 | |
| Original drugs and biosimilars cannot be replaced horizontally owing to the unique complex spatial structure of biosimilars | 2 | B36 |
Classification of the evaluation factors based on the perspectives of the five stakeholders.
| Stakeholder | Perspective | Factors | Total Frequency | Proportion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health insurance management agencies | Benefits | A2, A3, A4, A5, A9, A13, A14, A15, A16 | 95 | 0.2284 |
| Risks | B3, B5, B6, B8, B9, B11, B16, B18, B22, B23, B25, B26, B29, B33, B34, B35, B36 | 89 | 0.2139 | |
| Public hospitals | Benefits | A7, A10, A13, A16, A17, A21 | 34 | 0.0817 |
| Risks | B3, B6, B14, B17, B19, B31 | 39 | 0.0938 | |
| Doctors | Benefits | A16 | 5 | 0.0120 |
| Risks | B4, B15, B19, B23 | 25 | 0.0601 | |
| Patients | Benefits | A1, A4, A7, A8, A11, A18, A19, A20, A22 | 101 | 0.2428 |
| Risks | B1, B2, B7, B12, B13, B15, B19, B20, B21, B23, B24, B27, B28, B32 | 83 | 0.1995 | |
| Pharmaceutical companies | Benefits | A6, A12 | 17 | 0.0409 |
| Risks | B9, B10, B14, B30, B34, B35 | 28 | 0.0673 |
Figure 2Radar chart of benefits and risks for various stakeholders.
Classification of factors in the three dimensions of health impact assessment.
| Dimension | Perspective | Factors | Total Frequency | Proportion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Drug accessibility | Effects | A1, A2, A4, A18, A22 | 92 | 0.3948 |
| Problems | B1, B2, B12, B13, B20, B21, B27 | 51 | 0.2189 | |
| Drug use rationality | Effects | A10, A17 | 11 | 0.0472 |
| Problems | B15, B19, B23, B24, B36 | 20 | 0.0858 | |
| Drug quality | Effects | A7, A8, A11, A14 | 29 | 0.1245 |
| Problems | B7, B8, B9, B25, B32 | 30 | 0.1288 |
Figure 3Radar chart of effectiveness and problems of health impact evaluation dimensions.
Figure 4The 36-question co-occurrence matrix.
Figure 5Multi-dimensional scale analysis coordinate map.
Characteristics of the included literature.
| First Author | Study Design | Study Region | Assessed Species/Batch | Key Outcome Indicators |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jiang (2021) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | Psychiatric medication | (10)(13) |
| Chen, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Guangzhou, Guangdong | First batch | (6)(7) |
| Wang, et al (2021) | Survey data | Nantong, Jiangsu | First batch | (1)(2)(7) |
| Chen, et al. (2021) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (13) |
| Liu & Wang (2021) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | No designation | (10)(14) |
| Zhao, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Henan | Hypertension medication | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Zhan, et al.(2021) | Survey data | No designation | Entecavir Tablets | (1)(2)(4)(5)(12) |
| Li, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Fujian | Hypertension, diabetes medication | (6)(7) |
| Li & Tang (2021) | Model analysis | No designation | No designation | (11)(12) |
| Liu, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shenzhen | First batch | (13)(14) |
| Fan, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shanghai | First batch | (4)(5) |
| Zhang & Wang (2021) | Survey data | Nanjing, Jiangsu | Hypertension medication | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Wang, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing and 8 other cities | First batch | (1)(3) |
| He, et al. (2021) | Questionnaires and interviews | Beijing and 4 other cities | First batch | (11)(12) |
| Hu (2021) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | Three batches | (1)(2) |
| Wang (2021) | Information overview | No designation | Three batches | (1)(2) |
| Han, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | Clopidogrel | (1)(2)(4)(5)(10)(13) |
| Cao, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | Hypertension medication | (10)(11) |
| Yang, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | Psychiatric medication | (1)(2)(4)(5)(8)(13) |
| Liu, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (1)(2)(4)(5)(9) |
| Yang, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shenzhen | Antibiotic drugs | (1)(2)(4) |
| Chen, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Guangzhou, Guangdong | First batch | (1)(2)(8) |
| An, et al. (2021) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (1)(2) |
| Fu, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shanghai | First batch | (1)(2)(4)(5)(6)(9) |
| Qiu (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | Cardiovascular drugs | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Dong, et al. (2021) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (6)(7) |
| Shen, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Kunming, Yunan | First batch | (6)(7)(9)(10) |
| Tan, et al. (2021) | Questionnaires and interviews | No designation | No designation | (8)(10) |
| Guo, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Taiyuan, Shanxi | Psychiatric medication | (10)(14) |
| Xu, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shanghai | First batch | (4)(5) |
| Xie, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Beijing and 3 other cities | First batch | (8)(13) |
| Zhang, et al (2021) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (1)(2)(4)(9) |
| Yu, et al. (2021) | Survey data | Shanghai | Hypertension medication | (1)(2)(4)(5)(8) |
| Chen, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Shenzhen | First batch | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Li, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Xiamen, Fujian | Hypertension medication | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Tan& Chen (2020) | Model analysis | No designation | No designation | (8) |
| Tan & Song (2020) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (9) |
| Hu, et al. (2020) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | No designation | (11)(12) |
| An, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (1)(2)(6)(13)(14) |
| Du, et al.(2020) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (1)(2)(3) |
| Wang, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Nanjing, Jiangsu | Cardiovascular medication | (1)(2)(5)(8)(13) |
| Xu, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (2)(11) |
| He, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Guangzhou, Guangdong | First batch | (2)(6) |
| Yang, et al. (2020) | Survey data | Beijing | Depression medication | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Yu (2020) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | No designation | (1)(2) |
| Tan, et al. (2020) | Survey data | No designation | First batch | (1)(2) |
| Zhang, et al (2020) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (6)(7) |
| Tang, et al. (2020) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | First batch | (1)(2) |
| Shen (2020) | Model analysis | Shanghai | First batch | (6)(7)(10)(14) |
| Song (2020) | Information overview | Jiangsu | No designation | (1)(2)(11) |
| Jiang, et al. (2020) | Expert viewpoints | No designation | No designation | (1)(2)(8) |
| Jiang (2019) | Information overview | Shanghai | No designation | (11)(12) |
| Shen, et al. (2019) | Survey data | Dalian, Liaoning | Hepatitis B virus medicine | (1)(2)(4)(5) |
| Huang, et al (2019) | Information overview | Chengdu, Sichuan | First batch | (1)(2)(6) |
| Mu (2019) | Survey data | Chongqing | No designation | (1)(3)(13)(14) |
| Meng (2019) | Survey data | Shenyang, Liaoning | First batch | (1)(2) |
| Chen (2019) | Survey data | Beijing | First batch | (1)(6)(7)(13) |
| Wang (2019) | Overviews & interviews | No designation | No designation | (1)(4)(5) |
| Tan & Fan (2019) | Information overview | No designation | No designation | (1)(2)(3) |
| Li & Bai (2019) | Model analysis | No designation | No designation | (8)(9) |
| Zhu, et al. (2019) | Survey data | Zhejiang | First batch | (6)(7) |
(1) Amount of medication used (2) Drug usage (3) Market share (4) Defined daily dose (5) Daily drug cost (6) Average cost per drug (7) Average cost per medical visit (8) Cost saving rate (9) Prescription change rate (10) Incidence of adverse reactions (11) Patient acceptance (12) Physician acceptance (13) Share of generic versions of originator drugs (14) Drug replacement rate.