| Literature DB >> 35409856 |
Yongjun Tang1, Jun Zhu1, Wenchao Ma2, Mengxue Zhao1.
Abstract
Enterprises should bear the main responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions. Disclosing carbon emission information is one of the important ways for enterprises to deal with climate change. Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research sample, we study the impact of external explicit institutional pressure and implicit institutional pressure on corporate carbon information disclosure and analyze the mediating effect of enterprise peer influence in carbon disclosure. The empirical results show that external institutional pressure, namely environmental regulation and Confucian culture, has a significant positive impact on enterprise carbon information disclosure. Enterprise peer influence has a certain mediating effect between external institutional pressure and carbon information disclosure. The government should formulate and improve the carbon information disclosure institution and strengthen external supervision through the joint participation of all sectors of society.Entities:
Keywords: Confucian culture; carbon information disclosure; enterprise peer influence; environmental regulation; institutional pressure
Mesh:
Substances:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35409856 PMCID: PMC8998231 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19074174
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1Relationship among institutional pressure, enterprise peer influence, and corporate carbon information disclosure.
Evaluation index of carbon information disclosure level.
| Dimensions of Carbon Information Disclosure | Carbon Information Disclosure Indicators | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Low carbon development strategy and management | Whether to integrate carbon emission reduction into enterprise development strategy | 1 point for incorporating carbon emission reduction into enterprise development strategy; otherwise 0. |
| Whether to set carbon emission reduction targets | 1 point for setting clear carbon emission reduction targets; otherwise 0. | |
| Risks of carbon reduction | 1 point for disclosing the business risks and economic benefit losses caused by the government’s carbon emission regulation; otherwise 0. | |
| Establish low carbon management organization or system | 1 point for setting up a special low carbon management organization or establishing a low carbon management system; otherwise 0. | |
| Enhance employees’ low carbon awareness | 1 point for carrying out low carbon environmental protection publicity for enterprise employees; otherwise 0. | |
| Integrate carbon emission reduction into reward, punishment, and assessment mechanism | In the rules and regulations of the enterprise, if the reward and punishment management mechanism for carbon emission reduction is clearly formulated, it can be assigned as 1 point; otherwise 0. | |
| Carbon emission accounting | Annual carbon emissions of enterprises | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. |
| Carbon emission classification and accounting standards | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
| Energy consumption of the enterprise in the current year | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
| Whether the enterprise has passed ISO14001 environmental management system certification | 1 point for passing, otherwise 0. | |
| Carbon emission governance | Carbon emission reduction of enterprises | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. |
| Whether enterprises invest in technology, capital, and labor for carbon reduction | The enterprise has carried out technology research and development and project investment for energy conservation and emission reduction, such as the new purchase, reconstruction, and expansion of environmental protection equipment or projects, and low carbon technology innovation activities. 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
| Cost of daily carbon emission reduction | 1 point for the disclosure of sewage charges, greening fees, and other expenses incurred in the process of carbon emission reduction management; otherwise 0. | |
| Benefits from carbon emission reduction. | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
| Government support for carbon reduction | 1 point for obtaining government financial subsidy support; otherwise 0. | |
| Administrative penalties for environmental protection | 1 point for not being punished by environmental protection administration; otherwise 0. |
Definition of variables.
| Variable Type | Variable Name | Variable Symbol | Definition and Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Response Variable | Carbon information disclosure index | CIDI | Natural logarithm of carbon information disclosure score |
| Explanatory variable | Explicit institutional pressure | EIP | Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) |
| Implicit institutional pressure | IIP | Confucian culture, that is, the logarithm of the number of Jinshi in the Ming and Qing dynasties within 100 km of the registered area of listed companies | |
| Mediating variable | Peer influence level of enterprises | PIL | The average value of CIDI after the sample enterprises are eliminated |
| Control variable | Enterprise size | Size | Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period |
| Financial leverage | LEV | Total liabilities at the end of the year/total assets at the end of the year | |
| Total asset turnover | ATO | Operating income/average total assets | |
| Growth rate of operating revenue | Growth | Current year’s operating income/previous year’s operating income-1 | |
| Number of directors | Board | Natural logarithm of board members | |
| Proportion of independent directors | INDEP | Number of Independent Directors/the number of directors | |
| Equity balance degree | Balance | The sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to fifth largest shareholders/the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder | |
| Tobin Q value | Tobin Q | (Current stock market value + number of non-tradable shares) × Net assets per share + book value of liabilities)/total assets | |
| Cumulative years of listing years | List | Natural logarithm of cumulative listing years | |
| Shareholding ratio of institutional investors | INST | Total shares held by institutional investors/circulating share capital | |
| Nature of ownership | OWN | The value of state-owned holding enterprise is 1; otherwise 0 |
Descriptive statistical analysis results.
| Variable | Sample Size | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIDI | 4600 | 0 | 2.944 | 1.327 | 0.964 |
| EIP | 4600 | 27.800 | 80.800 | 61.073 | 12.328 |
| IIP | 4600 | 0.693 | 7.403 | 5.484 | 1.597 |
| PIL | 4600 | 1.333 | 11.769 | 5.133 | 2.110 |
| Size | 4600 | 20.233 | 26.063 | 22.465 | 1.274 |
| LEV | 4600 | 0.068 | 0.859 | 0.423 | 0.192 |
| ATO | 4600 | 0.109 | 2.129 | 0.638 | 0.358 |
| Growth | 4600 | −0.399 | 1.337 | 0.144 | 0.276 |
| Board | 4600 | 1.609 | 2.708 | 2.135 | 0.205 |
| INDEP | 4600 | 0.333 | 0.571 | 0.376 | 0.053 |
| Balance | 4600 | 0.037 | 2.800 | 0.681 | 0.585 |
| Tobin Q | 4600 | 0 | 7.788 | 2.076 | 1.296 |
| List | 4600 | 1.099 | 3.258 | 2.361 | 0.551 |
| INST | 4600 | 0.005 | 0.870 | 0.422 | 0.233 |
| OWN | 4600 | 0 | 1 | 0.393 | 0.488 |
Correlation analysis results.
| Variables | CIDI | EIP | IIP | PIL | Size | LEV | ATO | Growth | Board | INDEP | Balance | Tobin Q | List | INST | OWN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIDI | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| EIP | 0.029 ** | 1 | |||||||||||||
| IIP | 0.047 *** | 0.358 *** | 1 | ||||||||||||
| PIL | 0.372 *** | −0.004 | 0.002 | 1 | |||||||||||
| Size | 0.466 *** | 0.083 *** | 0.020 | 0.271 *** | 1 | ||||||||||
| LEV | 0.187 *** | −0.040 *** | −0.057 *** | 0.100 *** | 0.537 *** | 1 | |||||||||
| ATO | 0.104 *** | 0.060 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.100 *** | 0.074 *** | 0.118 *** | 1 | ||||||||
| Growth | −0.049 *** | 0.076 *** | −0.014 | −0.002 | 0.024 * | −0.001 | 0.133 *** | 1 | |||||||
| Board | 0.223 *** | −0.072 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.128 *** | 0.291 *** | 0.187 *** | −0.003 | −0.018 | 1 | ||||||
| INDEP | −0.067 *** | 0.004 | −0.066 *** | −0.024 | 0.017 | 0.012 | −0.038 *** | −0.033 ** | −0.533 *** | 1 | |||||
| Balance | −0.056 *** | 0.051 *** | −0.006 | −0.063 *** | −0.102 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.117 *** | 0.071 *** | 0.018 | 0.008 | 1 | ||||
| Tobin Q | −0.215 *** | −0.013 | −0.012 | −0.179 *** | −0.464 *** | −0.370 *** | −0.005 | 0.003 | −0.149 *** | 0.010 | 0.007 | 1 | |||
| List | 0.288 *** | −0.062 *** | −0.066 *** | 0.249 *** | 0.345 *** | 0.333 *** | 0.119 *** | −0.113 *** | 0.199 *** | −0.053 *** | −0.158 *** | −0.160 *** | 1 | ||
| INST | 0.293 *** | −0.008 | 0.023 | 0.170 *** | 0.447 *** | 0.201 *** | 0.146 *** | −0.049 *** | 0.230 *** | −0.070 *** | −0.219 *** | −0.013 | 0.287 *** | 1 | |
| OWN | 0.273 *** | −0.152 *** | 0.005 | 0.173 *** | 0.374 *** | 0.321 *** | 0.055 *** | −0.123 *** | 0.294 *** | −0.050 *** | −0.253 *** | −0.171 *** | 0.530 *** | 0.418 *** | 1 |
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Test of variance inflation factor.
| Variables | Size | OWN | Board | LEV | List | INST | INDEP | Tobin Q | EIP | IIP | PIL | Balance | ATO | Growth | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VIF | 2.25 | 1.77 | 1.72 | 1.56 | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.50 | 1.41 | 1.23 | 1.18 | 1.14 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 1.44 |
| 1/VIF | 0.444 | 0.566 | 0.580 | 0.641 | 0.648 | 0.649 | 0.668 | 0.710 | 0.813 | 0.850 | 0.878 | 0.892 | 0.919 | 0.943 |
Results of multiple linear regression analysis.
| Variable | Explicit Institutional Pressure | Implicit Institutional Pressure | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIDI | PIL | CIDI | CIDI | PIL | CIDI | |
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
| EIP | 0.003 *** | 0.016 *** | 0.001 | |||
| (2.93) | (16.01) | (0.75) | ||||
| IIP | 0.023 *** | 0.020 *** | 0.018 ** | |||
| (3.16) | (3.13) | (2.49) | ||||
| PIL | 0.107 *** | 0.102 *** | ||||
| (18.27) | (16.77) | |||||
| Size | 0.295 *** | −0.059 *** | 0.283 *** | 0.301 *** | 0.028 ** | 0.287 *** |
| (21.59) | (−3.81) | (20.62) | (22.19) | (2.18) | (21.03) | |
| LEV | −0.389 *** | −0.277 *** | −0.507 *** | −0.322 *** | 0.279 *** | −0.481 *** |
| (−4.74) | (−3.36) | (−6.49) | (−3.94) | (3.94) | (−6.13) | |
| ATO | 0.041 | −0.158 *** | 0.147 *** | 0.049 | −0.065 * | 0.144 *** |
| (1.01) | (−3.70) | (4.12) | (1.19) | (−1.81) | (4.00) | |
| Growth | −0.164 *** | 0.273 *** | −0.178 *** | −0.188 *** | 0.099 ** | −0.182 *** |
| (−3.80) | (6.19) | (−4.08) | (−4.31) | (2.50) | (−4.10) | |
| Board | 0.191 *** | −0.147 * | 0.197 *** | 0.200 *** | −0.280 *** | 0.202 *** |
| (2.75) | (−1.84) | (2.84) | (2.85) | (−4.05) | (2.88) | |
| INDEP | −0.516 ** | 0.437 | −0.623 ** | −0.559 ** | −0.043 | −0.613 ** |
| (−2.01) | (1.56) | (−2.39) | (−2.18) | (−0.19) | (−2.35) | |
| Balance | 0.045 ** | 0.033 | 0.049 ** | 0.038 * | −0.022 | 0.047 ** |
| (2.20) | (1.61) | (2.35) | (1.87) | (−1.33) | (2.25) | |
| Tobin Q | −0.028 *** | −0.145 *** | −0.007 | 0.000 | −0.003 | 0.005 |
| (−2.60) | (−13.24) | (−0.64) | (0.01) | (−0.37) | (0.46) | |
| List | 0.172 *** | 0.526 *** | 0.133 *** | 0.107 *** | −0.081 *** | 0.121 *** |
| (6.51) | (19.57) | (5.19) | (3.81) | (−3.18) | (4.48) | |
| INST | 0.258 *** | 0.018 | 0.198 *** | 0.241 *** | −0.064 | 0.193 *** |
| (3.94) | (0.28) | (3.06) | (3.71) | (−1.23) | (2.99) | |
| OWN | 0.128 *** | −0.229 *** | 0.097 *** | 0.151 *** | 0.068 ** | 0.102 *** |
| (3.91) | (−6.36) | (3.03) | (4.65) | (2.30) | (3.22) | |
| Constant | −6.571 *** | 1.218 *** | −6.123 *** | −6.644 *** | 3.150 *** | −6.267 *** |
| (−17.58) | (3.10) | (−18.78) | (−17.74) | (9.28) | (−19.23) | |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.345 | 0.854 | 0.310 | 0.355 | 0.895 | 0.312 |
| F-statistic | 78.74 *** | 819.70 *** | 217.68 *** | 74.55 *** | 1631.56 *** | 170.98 *** |
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure 2Test procedure of mediating effect. Note: α1 represents the regression coefficient corresponding to the institutional pressure in model 1 of institutional pressure and corporate carbon information disclosure; β1 refers to the regression coefficient corresponding to institutional pressure in model 2 of institutional pressure and enterprise peer influence; γ1 refers to the regression coefficient of the mediating variable enterprise peer influence in of the mediating effect test of enterprise peer influence on institutional pressure and corporate carbon information disclosure (model 3); γ2 refers to the regression coefficient of explanatory variable institutional pressure in the mediating effect test of enterprise peer influence on institutional pressure and corporate carbon information disclosure (model 3).
Results of robustness analysis.
| Variable | Explicit Institutional Pressure | Implicit Institutional Pressure | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIDI | PIL | CIDI | CIDI | PIL | CIDI | |
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
| EIP | 0.063 *** | 0.192 *** | 0.011 | |||
| (4.78) | (2.67) | (1.05) | ||||
| IIP | 0.071 *** | 0.135 ** | 0.027 *** | |||
| (5.84) | (2.24) | (3.43) | ||||
| PIL | 0.175 *** | 0.179 *** | ||||
| (70.68) | (64.76) | |||||
| Size | 0.295 *** | 1.178 *** | 0.103 *** | 0.303 *** | 1.332 *** | 0.111 *** |
| (21.88) | (15.54) | (9.74) | (18.45) | (14.29) | (8.73) | |
| LEV | −0.385 *** | −2.024 *** | −0.340 *** | −0.321 *** | −1.305 *** | −0.239 *** |
| (−4.68) | (−5.19) | (−5.94) | (−3.44) | (−2.79) | (−3.64) | |
| ATO | 0.036 | 0.767 *** | 0.077 ** | 0.032 | 0.265 | 0.088 *** |
| (0.88) | (3.79) | (2.55) | (0.67) | (1.01) | (2.61) | |
| Growth | −0.174 *** | −0.904 *** | −0.048 | −0.130 *** | −1.059 *** | −0.055 |
| (−4.04) | (−4.05) | (−1.41) | (−2.67) | (−4.24) | (−1.44) | |
| Board | 0.186 *** | 0.828 ** | 0.125 ** | 0.199 ** | 1.315 *** | 0.150 ** |
| (2.68) | (2.11) | (2.20) | (2.37) | (2.75) | (2.26) | |
| INDEP | −0.494 * | −1.501 | −0.303 | −0.331 | −0.890 | −0.038 |
| (−1.93) | (−1.09) | (−1.59) | (−1.08) | (−0.54) | (−0.17) | |
| Balance | 0.046 ** | 0.322 *** | −0.015 | 0.050 ** | 0.270 ** | −0.001 |
| (2.24) | (3.00) | (−0.99) | (2.09) | (2.21) | (−0.03) | |
| Tobin Q | −0.025 ** | 0.047 | −0.038 *** | −0.022 * | 0.058 | −0.010 |
| (−2.34) | (1.02) | (−4.94) | (−1.71) | (0.94) | (−1.07) | |
| List | 0.178 *** | 0.294 ** | 0.163 *** | 0.168 *** | 0.437 ** | 0.081 *** |
| (6.73) | (1.98) | (7.90) | (5.43) | (2.39) | (3.31) | |
| INST | 0.258 *** | 0.665 ** | 0.133 *** | 0.167 ** | 0.972 *** | 0.084 * |
| (3.94) | (2.09) | (2.92) | (2.25) | (2.68) | (1.65) | |
| OWN | 0.142 *** | 0.519 *** | 0.016 | 0.104 *** | 0.585 *** | 0.072 *** |
| (4.33) | (2.97) | (0.66) | (2.81) | (2.88) | (2.73) | |
| Constant | −6.934 *** | −29.934 *** | −1.565 *** | −6.891 *** | −34.332 *** | −1.659 *** |
| (−18.17) | (−15.08) | (−5.70) | (−14.87) | (−15.08) | (−5.53) | |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.347 | 0.167 | 0.706 | 0.328 | 0.185 | 0.717 |
| F-statistic | 79.73 *** | 57.29 *** | 705.5 *** | 66.15 *** | 14.74 *** | 469.5 *** |
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.