| Literature DB >> 35409663 |
Jie Fan1, Zhuo Shen2, Zhengwen Wang1,3.
Abstract
Taking 286 cities above the prefecture level in China as the research object and the research period from 2003 to 2019, through the two-way fixed effect model, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of the city level on environmental collaborative governance. The threshold regression model is used to reveal the nonlinear relationship between urban levels and environmental collaborative governance and to analyze the phase characteristics of different urban levels for environmental collaborative governance. The results show that: (1) The city level has a significant role in promoting collaborative environmental governance. (2) The regression results of the three major sections show that the urban level promotion in the eastern region has the strongest promoting effect on the coordinated environmental governance, and the western region is the weakest. (3) The impact of the city level on collaborative environmental governance is nonlinear. When the city scale reaches a certain critical point, its impact on the collaborative environmental governance tends to intensify.Entities:
Keywords: city hierarchy; city scale; environmental collaborative governance; threshold regression model
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35409663 PMCID: PMC8997426 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19073980
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Benchmark regression results.
| (1) | (2) | (3) Exclude Extreme Values | |
|---|---|---|---|
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| 25.321 *** | 25.452 *** | 15.782 *** |
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| −0.328 *** | −0.318 *** | −0.252 *** |
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| 0.128 * | 0.152 | 0.056 ** |
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| 1.328 | 0.685 | 0.214 |
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| −7.02 | −5.52 | −4.29 *** |
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| 5.235 *** | 3.215 | 0.758 ** |
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| 0.4251 | 0.4562 | 0.4788 |
Note: t values are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The result is calculated by Stata 14.0, the same below.
Robustness test results.
| (1) Eastern China | (2) Central China | (3) Western China | (4) One Period Behind | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| 42.185 *** | 30.258 *** | 15.856 *** | 26.152 *** |
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| −0.286 *** | −0.029 | −0.254 *** | −0.251 *** |
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| 0.125 * | 0.069 | 0.055 *** | 0.032 *** |
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| 11.572 *** | 4.211 *** | 5.242 | 6.352 *** |
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| −0.852 | 0.125 | −0.212 | 0.252 |
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| 5.231 ** | 4.562 *** | 3.956 ** | 4.956 *** |
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| 0.6232 | 0.5685 | 0.4025 | 0.4521 |
Note: t values are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Threshold effect test.
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| 1% | 5% | 10% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP |
| 365.232 *** | 0.000 | 38.523 | 21.356 | 14.212 |
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| 92.358 *** | 0.000 | 20.325 | 12.356 | 7.523 | |
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| 0.000 * | 0.085 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Note: t values are in parentheses; *** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Threshold effect analysis.
|
| threshold variable < | 5.632 *** |
| −0.221 *** |
| 48.235 *** |
| 0.018 *** | ||
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| 3.256 *** | |||
| - |
| −2.25 | ||
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| 2.752 ** | R2 | 0.5428 | |
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| 1.566 × 107 |
| - | |
Note: t values are in parentheses; *** and ** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.