| Literature DB >> 35409488 |
Wonder Agbenyo1, Yuansheng Jiang1, Xinxin Jia1, Jingyi Wang1, Gideon Ntim-Amo2, Rahman Dunya2, Anthony Siaw1, Isaac Asare2, Martinson Ankrah Twumasi1.
Abstract
People's lives, particularly farmers', have been affected by extreme weather conditions that have reduced the yield of numerous crops due to climate change. Climate-smart agriculture practices can reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions and have the propensity to increase farm income and productivity. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to ascertain whether CSA practices impact farmers' income. This study includes all cocoa farmers in the selected districts in the Ashanti Region. The population includes those who live in the six cocoa production villages. The multistage sampling procedure was considered based on the dominants of literature. The study used an endogenous switching regression framework to examine the effects of the adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices (CSAPs) on farmers' income. While estimating treatment effects, telasso uses lasso techniques to select the appropriate variable sets. The results revealed that gender, farm experience, age, household size, and farm size do not significantly influence the adoption of irrigation and crop insurance. The study revealed a significant positive impact of access to credit on adopting irrigation and crop insurance. The adoption of climate-smart practices has a positive coefficient. This indicates that if all respondents in each region adopts these practices, their income would increase significantly. This study shows that adopting irrigation practices leads to an increase in household income of 8.6% and 11.1%, respectively, for cocoa farmers. Crop insurance has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant on household income, on-farm, and off-farm. This paper shows that climate-smart practices such as crop insurance can positively influence farmers' income in Ghana. We also conjecture that crop insurance is the most effective and efficient climate-smart practice among the various agricultural practices. The study suggests that access to credit and mass awareness should be compulsory modules coupled with the consistent training of farmers on new technologies for effective policy implementation. Expanding access to extension officers could enhance farmers' adaptive capacity and warrant the efficiency of implemented practices.Entities:
Keywords: adoption; climate change; climate-smart agricultural practices; endogenous switch regression; telasso treatment effect
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35409488 PMCID: PMC8998110 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19073804
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1Conceptual framework on climate change, its repercussions, climate-smart agriculture practices and farmers’ income.
Figure 2Map showing study districts and selected villages.
Sample Distribution.
| Selected Districts | Population | Percentage | Proportion to Sample |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bosmtwe | 93,910 | 35 | 210 |
| Sekyere East | 90,477 | 33 | 198 |
| Akim North | 87,501 | 32 | 192 |
| Total | 270,130 | 100 | 600 |
Source: Author’s calculation (2019).
Variable names and measurements.
| Variables | Measurement | Mean | S.D. | Observation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Binary variable = 1 (male), 0 (female) | 1.388 | 0.488 | 600 |
| Education | Continuous Variable = (in Years) | 1.950 | 0.731 | 597 |
| Farm experience | Continuous variable (in Years) | 18.977 | 12.974 | 600 |
| Household size | Continuous variable (number) | 5.803 | 1.799 | 600 |
| Age | Continuous variable (in Years) | 43.872 | 6.805 | 600 |
| Asset ownership | Binary variable 1 (yes), 0 otherwise | 2.368 | 0.968 | 600 |
| Farm size | Continuous variable (in acres) | 6.622 | 9.008 | 593 |
| Access to credit | Binary variable = 1 (have access), 0 otherwise | 1.587 | 0.493 | 600 |
| Extension officer | Binary variable 1 (yes), 0 (no) | 2.135 | 1.034 | 600 |
| Farm membership association | Binary variable = 1 (member), 0 otherwise | 1.658 | 0.475 | 600 |
| Climate-Smart Agricultural Practices variables | ||||
| Adoption of crop insurance | Binary variable = 1 (yes), 0 otherwise | 0.327 | 0.469 | 600 |
| Adoption of irrigation | Binary variable = 1 (yes), 0 otherwise | 0.322 | 0.468 | 600 |
| Adoption of organic fertilizer | Binary variable = 1 (yes), 0 otherwise | 0.565 | 0.496 | 600 |
| Outcome Variables | ||||
| Household income | Continuous variable (Ghc value) | 7.262 | 0.554 | 534 |
| Farm income | Continuous variable (Ghc value) | 7.358 | 0.603 | 576 |
| Off-farm income | Continuous variable (Ghc value) | 6.372 | 0.773 | 529 |
Source: Field Survey, 2019.
Contingency coefficient test for co-linearity between independent variables.
| Variables | Gender | Education | Farm Experience | Age | Asset Ownership | Household Size | Farm Size | Access to Credit | Extension Officer | Farm Membership | Irrigation | Crop Insurance | Organic Fertilizer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
| Education | 0.039 | 1.000 | |||||||||||
| Farm Experience | 0.058 | −0.047 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
| Age | 0.088 | −0.052 | 0.007 | 1.000 | |||||||||
| Asset Ownership | 0.148 | 0.211 | −0.021 | 0.105 | 1.000 | ||||||||
| Household size | −0.059 | 0.017 | 0.042 | −0.062 | 0.026 | 1.000 | |||||||
| Farm Size | 0.055 | 0.022 | 0.060 | 0.049 | −0.044 | 0.005 | 1.000 | ||||||
| Access to Credit | 0.056 | 0.095 | −0.023 | −0.037 | 0.120 | 0.003 | −0.030 | 1.000 | |||||
| Extension officer | 0.117 | −0.031 | 0.025 | 0.049 | 0.034 | −0.033 | 0.068 | 0.155 | 1.000 | ||||
| Farm Membership | −0.016 | −0.052 | 0.022 | −0.057 | 0.079 | −0.007 | 0.026 | 0.016 | −0.033 | 1.000 | |||
| Irrigation | 0.023 | −0.015 | 0.061 | −0.004 | −0.061 | 0.076 | 0.005 | 0.099 | 0.189 | −0.049 | 1.000 | ||
| Crop Insurance | 0.068 | 0.107 | −0.037 | −0.010 | 0.133 | 0.014 | −0.016 | 0.069 | −0.110 | −0.006 | −0.038 | 1.000 | |
| Organic Fertilizer | 0.002 | −0.022 | −0.018 | −0.019 | 0.011 | 0.070 | −0.019 | 0.006 | −0.014 | 0.074 | −0.020 | 0.245 | 1.000 |
Source: Author’s computation based on survey data (2019).
Mean differences between adopters and non-adopters of climate-smart agricultural practices.
| Variables | Adoption of Irrigation | Buying of Crop Insurance | Adoption of Organic Fertilizer | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adopters | Non-Adopters | |t| | Adopters | Non-Adopters | |t| | Adopters | Non-Adopters | |t| | |
| Gender | 1.404 | 1.381 | −0.55 | 1.439 | 1.364 | −1.77 * | 1.389 | 1.387 | −0.06 |
| Education | 1.885 | 1.980 | 1.50 * | 1.938 | 1.955 | 0.26 | 1.970 | 1.923 | −0.78 |
| Farm experience | 19.179 | 18.881 | −0.26 | 18.891 | 19.019 | 0.11 | 17.665 | 20.681 | 2.84 ** |
| Age | 43.839 | 43.887 | 0.08 | 43.75 | 43.931 | 0.30 | 43.755 | 44.022 | 0.48 |
| Asset ownership | 2.280 | 2.410 | 1.54 * | 2.561 | 2.275 | −3.43 *** | 2.381 | 2.352 | −0.35 |
| Household size | 6.005 | 5.708 | −1.90 * | 5.796 | 5.807 | 0.07 | 5.912 | 5.663 | −1.68 * |
| Farm size | 12.953 | 12.899 | −0.10 | 12.786 | 12.980 | 0.37 | 12.820 | 13.042 | 0.45 |
| Access to credit | 1.653 | 1.548 | −2.43 ** | 1.631 | 1.558 | −1.69 * | 1.585 | 1.579 | −0.15 |
| Extension officer | 2.420 | 2.000 | −4.73 *** | 1.974 | 2.213 | 2.66 ** | 2.121 | 2.153 | 0.38 |
| Household income | 7.241 | 7.267 | 0.50 | 7.278 | 7.249 | −0.55 | 7.270 | 7.243 | −0.56 |
| Farm income | 7.263 | 7.400 | 2.53 ** | 7.466 | 7.308 | −2.94 ** | 7.399 | 7.304 | −1.87 * |
| Off-farm income | 6.346 | 6.384 | 0.54 | 6.514 | 6.315 | −2.69 ** | 6.355 | 6.392 | 0.54 |
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Figure 3Kernel density distribution of outcome variables by irrigation adoption.
Figure 4Kernel density distribution of outcome variables by crop insurance adoption.
Figure 5Kernel density distribution of outcome variables by organic fertilizer adoption.
Determinants of climate-smart agricultural practices.
| Variables | Adoption of Irrigation | Buying of Crop Insurance | Adoption of Organic Fertilizer | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coeff. | Margins | Coeff. | Margins | Coeff. | Margins | |
| Gender | 0.016 (0.123) | 0.219 | 0.137 (0.119) | 0.216 | 0.361 (0.211) | 0.291 * |
| Education | −0.231 (0.119) | −0.553 * | −0.188 (0.119) | −0.523 * | 0.123 (0.125) | 0.150 |
| Farm experience | −0.002 (0.004) | −0.040 | −0.002 (0.004) | −0.036 | −0.015 (0.007) | −0.199 * |
| Age | −0.115 (0.042) | −0.098 | −0.134 (0.071) | −0.328 * | −0.123 (0.060) | −0.303 * |
| Asset ownership | −0.140 (0.066) | −0.388 ** | 0.114 (0.059) | 0.297 * | −0.049 (0.139) | −0.068 |
| Household size | 0.056 (0.032) | 0.019 | 0.006 (0.033) | 0.042 | 0.109 (0.051) | 0.400 * |
| Farm size | −0.004 (0.007) | −0.064 | −0.007 (0.007) | −0.061 | −0.023 (0.010) | −0.131 * |
| Access to credit | 0.230 (0.117) | 0.407 * | 0.253 (0.119) | 0.453 * | −0.105 (0.186) | −0.098 |
| Extension officer | 0.146 (0.057) | −0.405 * | −0.097 (0.060) | −0.251 | 0.463 (0.176) | 0.428 ** |
| Farm membership | 0.548 (0.148) | 0.385 *** | 0.502 (0.124) | 0.774 *** | 0.498 (0.243) | 0.472 * |
| _cons | −1.525 (0.602) | −1.564 (0.672) | 0.465 (0.906) | |||
| Log likelihood | −343.749 | −336.278 | −142.727 | |||
| Wald chi2 (13) | 33.28 | 50.36 | 30.67 | |||
| Prob > chi2 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.006 | |||
| Pseudo R2 | 0.048 | 0.069 | 0.106 | |||
| Observations | 577 | 577 | 577 | |||
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Endogenous switch regression model estimation on adoption of irrigation system on income levels of cocoa farmers.
| Variables | Adoption of Irrigation System | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | |
| Household Income | Farm Income | Off-Farm Income | |||||||
| Gender | 0.020 | −0.001 | 0.086 | 0.011 | −0.180 | 0.014 *** | −0.006 | −0.043 | −0.045 |
| Education | −0.118 ** | −0.065 | −0.008 | −0.080 * | −0.054 | 0.118 * | −0.125 ** | 0.212 * | 0.094 * |
| Farm experience | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.005 * | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.002 | 0.006 * |
| Age | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.005 | 0.002 | −0.001 | −0.006 | −0.003 | 0.001 |
| Asset ownership | −0.122 * | −0.114 * | 0.044 | −0.116 * | −0.114 * | 0.135 *** | −0.115 * | 0.023 | 0.026 |
| Household size | 0.045 | 0.050 * | 0.065 * | 0.063 * | 0.052 | 0.005 | 0.059 * | 0.001 | −0.030 |
| Farm size | −0.004 | 0.011 * | 0.003 | −0.002 | −0.012 * | 0.003 | −0.008 | 0.017 * | 0.025 *** |
| Access to credit | 0.124 | 0.191 * | 0.053 | 0.137 | 0.206 * | −0.113 * | 0.156 | 0.217 * | 0.028 |
| Extension Officer | 0.149 * | −0.012 | −0.045 * | 0.141 * | 0.104 * | −0.029 | 0.158 * | 0.002 | 0.100 ** |
| Farm Org membership | 0.517 *** | 0.387 *** | 0.642 *** | ||||||
| _cons | −1.464 * | 6.810 *** | 7.343 *** | −1.503 * | 6.321 *** | 7.395 *** | −1.658 * | 6.147 *** | 6.599 *** |
| /lns1 | −0.539 *** | −0.007 | −0.337 *** | ||||||
| /lns2 | −0.660 *** | −0.560 *** | −0.370 *** | ||||||
| /r1 | 0.134 | 1.883 *** | −0.105 | ||||||
| /r2 | −0.125 | 0.309 | 0.166 | ||||||
| LR test | Chi2 (1) = 81.82 | Chi2 (1) = 52.22 | Chi2 (1) = 84.70 | ||||||
| Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | |||||||
| Observation | 503 | 553 | 509 | ||||||
Note: All outcome variables are in log-transformed forms. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Endogenous switch regression model estimation on adoption of crop insurance on income levels of cocoa farmers.
| Variables | Buying of Crop Insurance | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | |
| Household Income | Farm Income | Off-Farm Income | |||||||
| Gender | −0.006 | −0.030 | 0.079 | −0.018 | −0.211 * | 0.022 | −0.046 | 0.007 | −0.102 |
| Education | −0.122 ** | −0.056 | −0.096 * | −0.087 * | −0.103 | −0.106 * | −0.130 ** | −0.045 | −0.071 |
| Farm experience | 0.015 | −0.005 | 0.008 * | 0.012 | 0.018 * | −0.003 | 0.020 * | 0.158 * | 0.001 |
| Age | 0.001 | −0.002 | −0.004 | −0.003 | 0.013 * | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.001 | 0.002 |
| Asset ownership | −0.120 * | −0.104 * | 0.039(0.035) | −0.112 * | 0.089 | 0.119 *** | −0.102 | −0.002 | 0.068 |
| Household size | 0.050 | 0.060 * | 0.008 | 0.066 * | 0.057 * | 0.009 | 0.059 * | 0.005 | −0.025 |
| Farm size | −0.008 | −0.003 | −0.009 * | −0.003 | 0.011 | −0.006 | 0.004 | −0.001 | 0.005 |
| Access to credit | 0.107 | 0.084 | 0.206 * | 0.128 | −0.064 | −0.130 * | 0.157 | 0.261 * | −0.117 |
| Extension Officer | 0.155 * | 0.103 * | −0.060 * | 0.139 * | 0.203 ** | −0.068 * | 0.144 * | −0.176 * | 0.038 |
| Farm Org membership | 0.515 *** | 0.395 *** | 0.638 *** | ||||||
| _cons | −1.980 ** | 7.010 *** | 7.282 *** | −1.833 ** | 6.294 *** | 7.534 *** | −2.198 ** | 6.375*** | 7.013 *** |
| /lns1 | −0.532 *** | −0.016 | −0.290 *** | ||||||
| /lns2 | −0.659 *** | −0.569 *** | −0.285 *** | ||||||
| /r1 | 0.126 | 1.847 *** | 0.049 | ||||||
| /r2 | −0.169 | 0.203 | −0.111 | ||||||
| LR test | Chi2 (1) = 84.21 | Chi2 (1) = 57.98 | Chi2 (1) = 86.65 | ||||||
| Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | |||||||
| Observation | 503 | 553 | 509 | ||||||
Note: All outcome variables are in log-transformed forms. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Endogenous switch regression model estimation on adoption of organic fertilizer on income levels of cocoa farmers.
| Variables | Adoption of Organic Fertilizer | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | First Stage Selection | Adopters | Non-Adopters | |
| Household Income | Farm Income | Off-Farm Income | |||||||
| Gender | 0.096 | 0.103 | −0.154 * | −0.017 | −0.147 * | 0.028 | 0.064 | −0.113 | 0.073 |
| Education | −0.013 | 0.202 * | −0.072 | −0.021 | −0.024 | 0.032 | −0.054 | 0.126 * | 0.169 * |
| Farm experience | −0.012 * | −0.002 | 0.017 *** | −0.010 * | 0.018 * | −0.005 | −0.012 | 0.022 * | −0.005 |
| Age | −0.130 * | −0.005 | 0.023 * | 0.004 | 0.013 * | −0.005 | −0.004 | −0.006 | 0.001 |
| Asset ownership | 0.021 | 0.129 * | −0.041 | 0.022 | 0.076 * | 0.062 | 0.051 | 0.076 | −0.023 |
| Household size | 0.056 * | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.060 * | −0.057 * | −0.026 | 0.062 * | −0.033 | −0.004 |
| Farm size | −0.009 | 0.001 * | 0.011 * | −0.008 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.018 ** | 0.026 *** |
| Access to credit | −0.017 | 0.213 * | 0.135 * | −0.011 | −0.211 * | 0.203 ** | 0.126 * | −0.046 | 0.204 * |
| Extension Officer | 0.010 | −0.048 | −0.211 * | −0.176 * | −0.051 | −0.043 | 0.158 * | 0.229 ** | −0.187 * |
| Farm Org membership | 0.237 * | 0.261 * | 0.298 ** | ||||||
| _cons | −2.345 *** | 6.943 *** | 7.370 *** | −1.735 ** | 7.954 *** | 7.534 *** | −1.136 *** | 6.682 *** | 7.126 *** |
| /lns1 | −0.599 *** | −0.523 *** | −0.371 *** | ||||||
| /lns2 | −0.617 *** | −0.102 | −0.131 | ||||||
| /r1 | 0.157 | 0.447 | −0.097 | ||||||
| /r2 | −0.061 | −1.631 *** | 0.968 *** | ||||||
| LR test | Chi2 (1) = 98.24 | Chi2 (1) = 53.16 | Chi2 (1) = 95.36 | ||||||
| Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | Prob > chi2 = 0.000 | |||||||
| Observation | 503 | 553 | 509 | ||||||
Note: All outcome variables are in log-transformed forms. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Telasso average treatment effect of climate-smart agricultural practices on farmers’ income.
|
| ||||||
| Average Treatment Effect | Household Income | Farm Income | Off-farm Income | |||
| Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | |
| 1 vs. 0 | 0.086 * | 0.036 | 0.111 * | 0.060 | 0.017 | 0.072 |
| 0 | 6.495 *** | 0.018 | 7.388 *** | 0.031 | 6.369 *** | 0.042 |
|
| ||||||
| Average Treatment Effect | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err |
| 1 vs. 0 | 0.159 ** | 0.050 | 0.142 * | 0.059 | 0.179 ** | 0.052 |
| 0 | 6.319 *** | 0.043 | 7.322 *** | 0.471 | 6.329 *** | 0.044 |
|
| ||||||
| Average Treatment Effect | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err |
| 1 vs. 0 | 0.011 | 0.050 | 0.084 | 0.052 | 0.017 | 0.064 |
| 0 | 7.249 *** | 0.037 | 7.308 *** | 0.278 *** | 6.365 *** | 0.049 |
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Nearest neighbor matching and propensity score matching algorithm average treatment effect (robust analysis).
| Household Income | Farm Income | Off-Farm Income | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adoption of irrigation | ||||||
| Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | Coeff | Robust Std. Err | |
| NNM ATE | 0.225 * | 0.112 | 0.217 * | 0.121 | 0.215 * | 0.120 |
| PSM ATE | 0.188 ** | 0.056 | 0.939 *** | 0.238 | 0.385 | 0.298 |
| Crop Insurance | ||||||
| NNM ATE | 0.297 *** | 0.082 | 0.263 *** | 0.075 | 0.157 ** | 0.065 |
| PSM ATE | 0.313 *** | 0.088 | 0.309 *** | 0.070 | 0.091 * | 0.037 |
| Organic Fertilizer | ||||||
| NNM ATE | 0.045 | 0.085 | 0.076 | 0.098 | 0.049 | 0.095 |
| PSM ATE | 0.110 | 0.084 | 0.156 | 0.099 | 0.122 | 0.088 |
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *, **, and *** represent significance level at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.