| Literature DB >> 35329270 |
Aiqun Wang1, Ming Zhang1, Shuya Zhou1.
Abstract
Although a firm's exposure to air pollution-related risk has become an important factor that creditors cannot ignore in the procedure of lending decision making with the aggravation of air pollution, empirical evidence on whether and how air pollution affects the cost of debt has been relatively scarce. Employing a series of Chinese listed firms from the main board of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering 2014 to 2018, our research responds to this research gap by exploring how air pollution-induced environmental violation risk affects the cost of debt by constructing an assessment system of firms' environmental violation risk. The results shed light on an issue that firms exposed to higher concentrations of air pollution may suffer a higher environmental violation risk, resulting in a higher debt cost. In addition, a further analysis shows that environmental regulatory pressure and heavily polluting firms enhance the influence of air pollution on the cost of debt, while state-owned firms and firms' economic contributions weaken the influence of air pollution on the cost of debt. Our research is conducive to highlighting not only the importance of environmental governance for mitigating the cost of debt to the firms exposed to air pollution, but also its importance to creditors exposed to their clients' environmental violation risk and default risk.Entities:
Keywords: atmospheric pollution; debt financing cost; economic contribution; environmental penalties; environmental regulatory pressure; heavily polluting firms; state-owned firms
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35329270 PMCID: PMC8954880 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19063584
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Assessment system of firms’ environmental violation risk.
| Items | Category of Punishment for Environmental Violations | Score Value | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Warning | 1 | |
| 2 | Order to make corrections or make corrections within a time limit | 1 | |
| 3 | Penalty | The penalty is less than 10,000 yuan | 1 |
| The penalty is more than 10,000 yuan and less than 50,000 yuan | 2 | ||
| The penalty is more than 50,000 yuan and less than 100,000 yuan | 3 | ||
| The penalty is more than 100,000 yuan and less than 200,000 yuan | 4 | ||
| The penalty is more than 200,000 yuan | 6 | ||
| 4 | Order to stop construction | Construction projects of registration form | 3 |
| Construction projects of report form | 6 | ||
| Construction projects of report | 12 | ||
| 5 | Order to restrict production | 6 | |
| 6 | Order to stop production for rectification | 12 | |
| 7 | Seal up and detain | 6 | |
| 8 | Confiscation of illegal income and illegal property | 6 | |
| 9 | Temporary seizure of permits or other documents | 6 | |
| 10 | Revocation of licenses or other certificates | 12 | |
| 11 | Environmental violation cases of administrative detention | 12 | |
| 12 | Cases suspected of environmental crimes | 12 | |
Definitions of variables.
| Variables | Definition |
|---|---|
| Dependent variable | |
| Cost | Cost of debt, measured as the ratio of total interest expense to average interest-bearing debt |
| Independent variable | |
| Air | Air pollution, measured as the mean value of the daily AQI of the cities where the firms were located |
| Mediating variable | |
| Violation | Environmental violation risk of firms, measured as Ln (Severity + 1) |
| Control variables | |
| Size | Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year |
| State | 0 if the affiliation of the actual controller of a firm is the state, and 1 otherwise |
| Lev | Ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of the year |
| Ic | Interest coverage ratio, measured as the ratio of EBIT to interest expense |
| Fix | Ratio of total fixed assets to total assets at the end of year |
| Roa | Return on assets, measured as the ratio of EBIT to average total assets |
| Growth | Growth rate of a firm’s total revenue from year t − 1 to year t |
| Cfo | Ratio of net cash flow from operating activities to total assets at the end of year |
| Gdp | Growth rate of a province’s total GDP from year t − 1 to year t |
| Second | Proportion of secondary industry in the province where the firms were located |
Notes: AQI was the air quality index; Severity was the severity of environmental violations; EBIT was the earnings before interest and tax; GDP was the gross domestic product.
Air pollution conditions of the provinces where the sample firms were located.
| Province | Mean AQI | N | Province | Mean AQI | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hebei | 124.1973 | 99 | Hunan | 85.2114 | 111 |
| Henan | 115.0412 | 146 | Jilin | 84.2591 | 77 |
| Beijing | 111.4179 | 354 | Inner Mongolia | 83.9621 | 59 |
| Shaanxi | 109.8092 | 69 | Heilongjiang | 82.3223 | 70 |
| Tianjin | 107.3100 | 60 | Chongqing | 82.2441 | 80 |
| Xinjiang | 105.8833 | 84 | Shanghai | 82.0048 | 307 |
| Shandong | 104.0479 | 267 | Zhejiang | 78.8685 | 351 |
| Shanxi | 101.2360 | 108 | Jiangxi | 71.6547 | 72 |
| Gansu | 97.1313 | 49 | Guangxi | 66.4132 | 60 |
| Hubei | 96.4351 | 150 | Guizhou | 63.4468 | 44 |
| Ningxia | 96.0047 | 29 | Tibet | 63.0077 | 16 |
| Jiangsu | 90.9829 | 304 | Guangdong | 62.9685 | 343 |
| Sichuan | 90.9101 | 176 | Fujian | 57.5179 | 101 |
| Qinghai | 86.8484 | 32 | Yunnan | 56.5209 | 61 |
| Anhui | 86.8321 | 146 | Hainan | 46.4630 | 34 |
| Liaoning | 86.2856 | 134 | Total | 88.7361 | 3993 |
Notes: Mean AQI was the mean values of the daily air quality index during the sample period.
Variable descriptive statistics.
| Variables | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Median | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost | 3993 | 0.0320 | 0.0157 | 0.0004 | 0.0314 | 0.0773 |
| Air | 3993 | 88.7361 | 20.9627 | 46.4630 | 86.7135 | 142.000 |
| Size | 3993 | 22.9095 | 1.3719 | 20.1914 | 22.7688 | 26.8076 |
| State | 3993 | 0.3869 | 0.4871 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Lev | 3993 | 0.5173 | 0.1824 | 0.1207 | 0.5179 | 0.9450 |
| Ic | 3993 | 16.2714 | 49.4600 | −16.7000 | 4.0300 | 388.0000 |
| Fix | 3993 | 0.2967 | 0.1916 | 0.0103 | 0.2673 | 0.7888 |
| Roa | 3993 | 0.0520 | 0.0562 | −0.1487 | 0.0468 | 0.2313 |
| Growth | 3993 | 0.1625 | 0.4536 | −0.4920 | 0.0849 | 3.0500 |
| Cfo | 3993 | 0.0474 | 0.0626 | −0.1325 | 0.0459 | 0.2331 |
| Gdp | 3993 | 0.0769 | 0.0432 | −0.2240 | 0.0823 | 0.1459 |
| Second | 3993 | 0.4104 | 0.0874 | 0.1863 | 0.4399 | 0.5313 |
Notes: Cost was the cost of debt; Air was the air pollution; Size was the size of firms; State was the ownership of firms; Lev was the leverage of firms; Ic was the interest coverage ratio of firms; Fix was the fixed assets ratio of firms; Roa was the return on total assets; Growth was the revenue growth rate of firms; Cfo was the operating cash flow of firms; Gdp was the provincial GDP growth rate; Second was the proportion of provincial secondary industry.
Pearson correlations.
| Variables | Cost | Air | Size | State | Lev | Ic | Fix | Roa | Growth | Cfo | Gdp | Second |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost | 1.0000 | |||||||||||
| Air | 0.0084 | 1.0000 | ||||||||||
| Size | 0.0734 *** | 0.1175 *** | 1.0000 | |||||||||
| State | −0.0101 | 0.1862 *** | 0.2975 *** | 1.0000 | ||||||||
| Lev | 0.1345 *** | 0.1202 *** | 0.3795 *** | 0.2388 *** | 1.0000 | |||||||
| Ic | 0.3158 *** | −0.0232 | 0.0753 *** | 0.0651 *** | 0.2649 *** | 1.0000 | ||||||
| Fix | 0.2994 *** | 0.0391 ** | 0.1378 *** | 0.2073 *** | 0.0701 *** | 0.1231 *** | 1.0000 | |||||
| Roa | −0.0401 ** | 0.0476 *** | 0.0584 *** | 0.1450 *** | 0.3310 *** | 0.3035 *** | −0.0321 ** | 1.0000 | ||||
| Growth | 0.0214 | −0.0240 | 0.0036 | 0.0954 *** | 0.0462 *** | 0.0508 *** | 0.0870 *** | 0.2420 *** | 1.0000 | |||
| Cfo | 0.0793 *** | −0.0224 | 0.1299 *** | −0.0197 | 0.1379 *** | 0.1313 *** | 0.3237 *** | 0.4049 *** | −0.0109 | 1.0000 | ||
| Gdp | 0.0827 *** | 0.0571 *** | −0.0135 | 0.0577 *** | 0.0624 *** | 0.0045 | 0.0800 *** | 0.0610 *** | 0.0308 * | 0.0162 | 1.0000 | |
| Second | 0.0784 *** | 0.0871 *** | 0.2299 *** | 0.0801 *** | −0.0208 | −0.0312 ** | 0.1013 *** | 0.0188 | −0.0089 | 0.0128 | −0.0265 * | 1.0000 |
Notes: The explanation for abbreviations of all variables used inside Table 5 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. *, **, and *** reflect p-values of the correlation coefficients between variables were less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Influence of air pollution on cost of debt and mechanism of environmental violation risk.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air | 0.0000 ** | 0.0001 *** | 0.0044 *** | 0.0001 *** |
| Violation | 0.0006 ** | |||
| Size | 0.0003 | 0.0834 *** | 0.0002 | |
| State | 0.0036 *** | −0.0867 ** | 0.0044 *** | |
| Lev | 0.0085 *** | 0.0425 | 0.0084 *** | |
| Ic | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 | −0.0001 *** | |
| Fix | 0.0119 *** | 0.4438 *** | 0.0104 *** | |
| Roa | 0.0078 | −0.1507 | 0.0093 * | |
| Growth | 0.0025 *** | −0.0087 | 0.0027 *** | |
| Cfo | 0.0033 | 0.0770 | 0.0058 | |
| Gdp | −0.0015 | 0.2689 | −0.0015 | |
| Second | 0.0021 | −0.1988 | 0.0076 | |
| _Cons | 0.0205 *** | 0.0030 | −1.0131 | 0.0011 |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 15.57 *** | 22.08 *** | 9.22 *** | 18.76 *** |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.2346 | 0.3318 | 0.1832 | 0.3288 |
| N | 3993 | 3993 | 3372 | 3372 |
| Sobel-test | 1.7600 * | |||
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) represent the regression results on the influence of air pollution on the cost of debt. Columns (3) and (4) represent the regression results on the mechanism of environmental violation risk. Violation was the environmental violation risk of firms. The explanation for abbreviations of other variables used inside Table 6 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. The numbers in brackets are t-values. *, **, and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA).
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| Model | 0.2452 | 84 | 0.0029 | 15.57 | 0.0000 |
| Residual | 0.7329 | 3908 | 0.0002 | ||
| Total | 0.9781 | 3992 | 0.0002 | ||
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| Model | 0.3399 | 94 | 0.0036 | 22.08 | 0.0000 |
| Residual | 0.6383 | 3898 | 0.0002 | ||
| Total | 0.9781 | 3992 | 0.0002 | ||
Sensitivity test for measurement of air pollution and the cost of debt.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air | 0.0000 *** | ||||
| PM_2.5 | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | |||
| AQI_grade | 0.0016 ** | 0.0015 *** | |||
| Size | 0.0003 * | 0.0003 | 0.0003 ** | 0.0004 ** | 0.0003 ** |
| State | 0.0039 *** | 0.0036 *** | 0.0034 *** | 0.0037 *** | 0.0034 *** |
| Lev | 0.0074 *** | 0.0085 *** | 0.0101 *** | 0.0096 *** | 0.0101 *** |
| Ic | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** |
| Fix | 0.0115 *** | 0.0119 *** | 0.0136 *** | 0.0130 *** | 0.0136 *** |
| Roa | 0.0068 | 0.0079 * | 0.0051 | 0.0042 | 0.0052 |
| Growth | 0.0026 *** | 0.0026 *** | 0.0017 *** | 0.0017 *** | 0.0017 *** |
| Cfo | 0.0032 | 0.0033 | 0.0008 | 0.0012 | 0.0009 |
| Gdp | −0.0020 | −0.0009 | −0.0018 | −0.0019 | −0.0015 |
| Second | 0.0066 | −0.0001 | −0.0003 | 0.0013 | −0.0024 |
| _Cons | −0.0008 | 0.0061 | −0.0021 | −0.0034 | −0.0002 |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 21.54 *** | 22.03 *** | 25.80 *** | 24.88 *** | 25.79 *** |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.3357 | 0.3312 | 0.3687 | 0.3701 | 0.3686 |
| N | 3822 | 3993 | 3993 | 3822 | 3993 |
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) represent the regression results on the sensitivity test of air pollution. Columns (3), (4), and (5) represent the regression results on the sensitivity test of the cost of debt. Cost was the ratio of total interest expense to average interest-bearing debt; Expense was the ratio of total interest expense to average total debt; Air was the average air quality index; PM_2.5 was the average PM2.5 concentration; AQI_grade was the grade of average air quality index. The explanation for abbreviations of other variables used inside Table 8 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. The numbers in brackets are t-values. *, **, and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Endogenous test of 2SLS analysis.
| Variables | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Air | 0.0003 *** | |
| Rain | −0.0018 ** | |
| Wind | −5.2605 *** | |
| Size | −0.0174 | 0.0003 |
| State | −1.9900 *** | 0.0042 *** |
| Lev | 0.2585 | 0.0084 *** |
| Ic | 0.0001 | −0.0001 *** |
| Fix | −0.6003 | 0.0122 *** |
| Roa | 0.9495 | 0.0077 |
| Growth | 0.0934 | 0.0025 *** |
| Cfo | 0.1855 | 0.0033 |
| Gdp | 31.2401 *** | −0.0095 |
| Second | −9.8322 | 0.0026 |
| _Cons | 113.4483 *** | −0.0215 |
| Year | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 200.27 *** | |
| Wald | 10187.56 *** | |
| R2 | 0.7562 | 0.3176 |
| N | 3993 | 3993 |
Notes: Table 9 reflects the results on the endogenous test of 2SLS analysis. Rain was the rainfall of the cities; Wind was the wind speed of the cities. The explanation for abbreviations of other variables used inside Table 9 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. In particular, Rain and Wind were tool variables used in 2SLS analysis. ** and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Endogenous test of PSM estimation.
| Variables | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Air | 0.0001 ** | 0.0001 ** |
| Size | 0.0001 | |
| State | 0.0043 *** | |
| Lev | 0.0100 *** | |
| Ic | −0.0001 *** | |
| Fix | 0.0102 *** | |
| Roa | 0.0038 | |
| Growth | 0.0025 *** | |
| Cfo | 0.0110 ** | |
| Gdp | 0.0022 | |
| Second | 0.0069 | |
| _Cons | 0.0254 *** | 0.0078 |
| Year | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 9.72 *** | 12.89 *** |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.2568 | 0.3456 |
| N | 2095 | 2095 |
Notes: Table 10 reflects the results on the endogenous test of PSM estimation. The explanation for abbreviations of all variables used inside Table 10 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. ** and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Moderating effect of firm’s environmental regulatory pressure and industry characteristic.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full | High | Low | Full | High | Low | |
| Air | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | 0.0000 | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | 0.0000 |
| Air * PITI | 0.0003 *** | |||||
| Air * Polluted | 0.0000 ** | |||||
| PITI | −0.0029 | |||||
| Polluted | 0.0184 *** | |||||
| State | 0.0037 *** | 0.0021 *** | 0.0051 *** | 0.0036 *** | 0.0036 *** | 0.0036 *** |
| Size | 0.0003 | 0.0003 | 0.0002 | 0.0003 | 0.0004 | 0.0001 |
| Lev | 0.0084 *** | 0.0100 *** | 0.0074 *** | 0.0086 *** | 0.0109 *** | 0.0068 *** |
| Ic | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** |
| Fix | 0.0119 *** | 0.0093 *** | 0.0150 *** | 0.0117 *** | 0.0132 *** | 0.0088 *** |
| Roa | 0.0078 | 0.0069 | 0.0120 * | 0.0077 | 0.0096 | 0.0016 |
| Growth | 0.0025 *** | 0.0039 *** | 0.0014 ** | 0.0026 *** | 0.0041 *** | 0.0011 |
| Cfo | 0.0030 | −0.0045 | 0.0094 * | 0.0035 | 0.0108 * | −0.0016 |
| Gdp | −0.0004 | −0.0072 | −0.0037 | −0.0013 | −0.0035 | −0.0007 |
| Second | 0.0077 | 0.0962 | −0.0030 | 0.0012 | 0.0182 | −0.0151 |
| _Cons | 0.0057 | −0.0273 | 0.0105 | 0.0179 * | 0.0049 | 0.0240 |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 21.78 *** | 13.74 *** | 11.97 *** | 21.93 *** | 14.01 *** | 14.57 *** |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.3332 | 0.3330 | 0.3329 | 0.3324 | 0.2983 | 0.3317 |
| N | 3993 | 1991 | 2002 | 3993 | 2051 | 1942 |
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) of this table represent the results on the moderating role of environmental regulatory pressure. Columns (4) to (6) of this table represent the results on the moderating role of industry characteristic. PITI was the Pollution Information Transparency Index; Polluted was the firms’ industry characteristics. The explanation for abbreviations of other variables used inside Table 11 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. The numbers in brackets are t-values. *, **, and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Moderating effect of firm’s ownership and economic contribution.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full | State-Owned | Non-State-Owned | Full | High Tax | Low Tax | |
| Air | 0.0001 *** | 0.0000 | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | −0.0000 | 0.0001 *** |
| Air * State | 0.0000 * | |||||
| Air * Tax | −0.0031 ** | |||||
| Tax | −0.0887 *** | |||||
| State | 0.0037 *** | 0.0037 *** | 0.0030 *** | 0.0046 *** | ||
| Size | 0.0003 | 0.000 * | 0.0001 | 0.0006 *** | −0.0004 | 0.0015 *** |
| Lev | 0.0085 *** | 0.0079 *** | 0.0118 *** | 0.0080 *** | 0.0133 *** | 0.0084 *** |
| Ic | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** | −0.0001 *** |
| Fix | 0.0119 *** | 0.0086 *** | 0.0208 *** | 0.0121 *** | 0.0139 *** | 0.0126 *** |
| Roa | 0.0077 | 0.0146 ** | 0.0001 | 0.0080 * | 0.0173 ** | 0.0068 |
| Growth | 0.002 *** | 0.0026 *** | 0.0023 *** | 0.0025 *** | 0.0050 *** | 0.0004 |
| Cfo | 0.0034 | 0.0133 *** | −0.0084 | 0.0044 | 0.0070 | 0.0003 |
| Gdp | −0.0013 | 0.0035 | −0.0073 | −0.0012 | −0.0021 | −0.0004 |
| Second | 0.0021 | 0.0032 | −0.0068 | 0.0003 | 0.0238 | −0.0231 |
| _Cons | 0.0100 | 0.0192 | −0.0108 | 0.0021 | −0.0138 | 0.0029 |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F-statistics | 21.89 *** | 18.63 *** | 9.29 *** | 21.86 *** | 17.56 *** | 10.38 *** |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.3321 | 0.3881 | 0.3235 | 0.3341 | 0.4276 | 0.3018 |
| N | 3993 | 2448 | 1545 | 3993 | 1996 | 1997 |
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) represent the regression results on the moderating role of ownership. Columns (4) to (6) represent the regression results on the moderating role of economic contribution. Tax was the economic contribution of firms. The explanation for abbreviations of other variables used inside Table 12 were mentioned in the footer of Table 4. The numbers in brackets are t-values. *, **, and *** reflect p-values of the coefficients were less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.