| Literature DB >> 35282404 |
Joydeep Dey1, Anirban Bhowmik1, Sunil Karforma2.
Abstract
Patients' data security is an open challenge on any telemedicine system. The challenge has been extended enough in this unprecedented corona virus led pandemic. COVID-19 has brought abrupt adaptations in medical sciences. To reduce corona virus transmission, quarantine yourself and opting for online services is mostly apt even during "New Normal" second wave of COVID-19. The emergence of telemedicine is a significant contribution in the medical sciences. Relevant online security and challenges are the contemporary and relevant challenges in COVID-19 E-Health. The objective of this proposed technique is to reinforce the technical safeguards to the electronic health system against the tricksters. Perceptron based session key and modified logistic map based intermediate key were proposed. A strict lossless secret sharing has been proposed to protect patients' clinical reports and data. Participation of all the recipients is bare essential in regenerating the original report. Simple mathematical operations were carried out to develop the secret shares. Electing the head of the recipients has also been included here. Different secret shares were encapsulated with the proposed frame structure. The chaotic sequences in the ranges of r = [0.41,0.53], r = [0.61, 0.66], and r = [0.91, 0.99] on the initial values x = 3.64, 3.81, and 3.88 respectively were noted under this technique test. An appropriate correlation between the proposed encryption and cryptographic time, and proposed decryption and cryptographic time were found. Such values were r ec = 0.989929 and r dc = 0.988828 respectively. Myriad mathematical tests likes of statistical randomization, brute force, graphical analysis, performance time, etc. were carried on the proposed technique. Their results have proved our efficacy in fostering the patients' data transmission in "New Normal" COVID-19 E-Health.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; Intermediate key; Logistic map; Lossless secret sharing; Session key
Year: 2022 PMID: 35282404 PMCID: PMC8900109 DOI: 10.1007/s11042-022-12440-y
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Multimed Tools Appl ISSN: 1380-7501 Impact factor: 2.577
Fig. 1Neural perceptron with 3 inputs
Advantages and disadvantages over existing techniques
| Sl. No. | Paper Reference No. | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 27, 28, & 29 | Good key exchange protocol. | Weak technique with respect to time complexity, and performance analysis. |
| 2 | 30,31, & 32 | Hard encryption protocol | The key generation protocol is weak |
| 3 | 33,34,35, & 36 | Strong authentication protocol | Secret sharing technique is complex. The technique is not suitable to defend chosen plain text attack, and occlusion attack. |
| 4 | 37, & 38 | Benefits of Telemedicine in COVID- era | The technique is not suitable to defend chosen plain text attack, brute force attack. |
| 5 | 39 | Good encryption scheme | Authentication part is not strong. |
| 6 | 40, & 41 | Review of security vulnerabilities | No new model, existing models were applied. |
| 7 | 43, & 44 | Good key exchange protocol on neural networks | Weak encryption protocol. |
| 8 | This Paper | Strong Cryptosystem with respect to key generation, encryption, and decryption. | In the next phase, we will incorporate a strong authentication protocol with this technique. |
Fig. 2Flow diagram of the proposed technique
Fig. 3Efficacy in terms of proposed modification in logistic map
List of generated intermediate keys
| IK Key ID | Intermediate Key (IK) |
|---|---|
| IK$1 | 915cf |
| IK$2 | d0076 |
| IK$3 | 8796e |
| IK$4 | 3b511 |
| IK$5 | 53a02 |
| IK$6 | b4681 |
| IK$7 | 26f31 |
| IK$8 | 0939d |
| IK$9 | f8143 |
| IK$10 | ga8de |
List of generated session keys
| SK key group | Perceptron architecture | SK ID | Session Key (SK) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SK#1 | 16–1-1 | SK#1.1 | 64ae3 |
| SK#1.2 | ed72b | ||
| SK#1.3 | 75ab1 | ||
| SK#1.4 | 25,122 | ||
| SK#1.5 | 69,100 | ||
| SK#1.6 | 2fc9b | ||
| SK#1.7 | c97ef | ||
| SK#1.8 | 452e2 | ||
| SK#1.9 | eec4f | ||
| SK#1.10 | 01369 | ||
| SK#2 | 32–1-1 | SK#2.1 | da368 |
| SK#2.2 | 08e0a | ||
| SK#2.3 | 06501 | ||
| SK#2.4 | 41c55 | ||
| SK#2.5 | 1743b | ||
| SK#2.6 | bf03c | ||
| SK#2.7 | 0d521 | ||
| SK#2.8 | b82d4 | ||
| SK#2.9 | e9f94 | ||
| SK#2.10 | 212b4 | ||
| SK#3 | 48–1-1 | SK#3.1 | a05df |
| SK#3.2 | a4940 | ||
| SK#3.3 | 3deff | ||
| SK#3.4 | 1d1a8 | ||
| SK#3.5 | 601ba | ||
| SK#3.6 | f16ee | ||
| SK#3.7 | d52a3 | ||
| SK#3.8 | 68d72 | ||
| SK#3.9 | 40b94 | ||
| SK#3.10 | 733cf |
Index of NIST Suite
| NIST#01 | |
| NIST#02 | |
| NIST#03 | |
| NIST#04 | |
| NIST#05 | |
| NIST#06 | |
| NIST#07 | |
| NIST#08 | |
| NIST#09 | |
| NIST#10 |
Statistical robustness on intermediate key
| IK Key ID | Assigned Id | p value | Standard p value | Output |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IK$1 | NIST#01 | 0.240 | 0.250 | T |
| IK$2 | NIST#02 | 0.148 | 0.150 | T |
| IK$3 | NIST#03 | 0.168 | 0.165 | T |
| IK$4 | NIST#04 | 0.252 | 0.251 | T |
| IK$5 | NIST#05 | 0.160 | 0.155 | T |
| IK$6 | NIST#06 | 0.281 | 0.280 | T |
| IK$7 | NIST#07 | 0.247 | 0.245 | T |
| IK$8 | NIST#08 | 0.185 | 0.185 | T |
| IK$9 | NIST#09 | 0.164 | 0.165 | T |
| IK$10 | NIST#10 | 0.223 | 0.220 | T |
Statistical robustness on intermediate key
| SK Key Group | Assigned Id | p-value | Standard p value | Output (T: Passed, F:Failed) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SK#1 | NIST#01 | 0.174 | 0.150 | T |
| NIST#02 | 0.250 | 0.250 | T | |
| NIST#03 | 0.148 | 0.150 | T | |
| NIST#04 | 0.207 | 0.200 | T | |
| NIST#05 | 0.153 | 0.155 | T | |
| NIST#06 | 0.241 | 0.240 | T | |
| NIST#07 | 0.164 | 0.145 | T | |
| NIST#08 | 0.236 | 0.235 | T | |
| NIST#09 | 0.254 | 0.255 | T | |
| NIST#10 | 0.125 | 0.120 | T | |
| SK#2 | NIST#01 | 0.151 | 0.150 | T |
| NIST#02 | 0.232 | 0.230 | T | |
| NIST#03 | 0.175 | 0.175 | T | |
| NIST#04 | 0.214 | 0.201 | T | |
| NIST#05 | 0.156 | 0.151 | T | |
| NIST#06 | 0.237 | 0.230 | T | |
| NIST#07 | 0.178 | 0.175 | T | |
| NIST#08 | 0.221 | 0.220 | T | |
| NIST#09 | 0.224 | 0.220 | T | |
| NIST#10 | 0.139 | 0.140 | T | |
| SK#3 | NIST#01 | 0.162 | 0.160 | T |
| NIST#02 | 0.247 | 0.245 | T | |
| NIST#03 | 0.151 | 0.151 | T | |
| NIST#04 | 0.212 | 0.210 | T | |
| NIST#05 | 0.165 | 0.165 | T | |
| NIST#06 | 0.229 | 0.220 | T | |
| NIST#07 | 0.177 | 0.175 | T | |
| NIST#08 | 0.247 | 0.246 | T | |
| NIST#09 | 0.244 | 0.245 | T | |
| NIST#10 | 0.120 | 0.120 | T |
Fig. 4Average –values on the proposed set of keys
Histogram comparison on secret shares
Floating frequency comparison on secret shares
Entropy comparison on secret shares
| Partial Secret ID | Entropy of pre-encryption | Entropy post- encryption by our technique |
|---|---|---|
| PS $1 | 6.18 | 7.54 |
| PS $2 | 6.19 | 7.76 |
| PS $3 | 6.25 | 7.55 |
| PS $4 | 6.36 | 7.21 |
| PS $5 | 6.54 | 7.48 |
Fig. 5Snapshots of after shuffling t times
t number of proposed shares
| Partial Share ID | Column 1 | Column 2 | Column 3 | Column 4 | Column 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PS$1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PS$2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PS$3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| PS$4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| PS$5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
Fig. 6Proposed shares using session key
Comparison in terms of strict lossless shares combinations
| No. of recipients | Total share permutations | Strict lossless combination |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 3 | 6 | 1 |
| 4 | 24 | 1 |
| 5 | 120 | 1 |
Time required for Brute-force attacks
| Sl. No. | Length(Session Key) | Length(Intermediate Key) | Time Required to Decode(yrs) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 20 | 20 | 6.17*10325 |
| 2 | 30 | 30 | 1.07*10332 |
| 3 | 48 | 48 | 4.45*10342 |
| 4 | 80 | 80 | 1.35*10362 |
| 5 | 128 | 128 | 6.51*10390 |
Observations of noise attacks
| Sl. No. | No. of Elements = 210 | No. of Elements = 360 | No. of Elements = 490 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2 | 113.78 | 126.77 | 132.85 |
| 3 | 262.32 | 311.22 | 298.58 |
Proposed cryptographic duration
| SK Key Group | No. of Session Keys | Proposed Encryption Time (in ms) | Average Encryption Time (in ms) | Proposed Decryption Time (in ms) | Average Decryption Time(in ms) | Proposed Cryptographic Time (in ms) | Average Cryptographic Time (in ms) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SK#1 | 10 | 401.58 | 40.16 | 346.74 | 34.68 | 748.32 | 74.83 |
| SK#2 | 10 | 357.81 | 35.79 | 263.27 | 26.32 | 621.08 | 62.1 |
| SK#3 | 10 | 241.24 | 24.12 | 189.42 | 18.95 | 430.66 | 43.1 |
Complexity of internal modules
| ID of the Internal Module | Name of the Internal Module | Internal Module’s Time Complexity | Notes (optional) |
|---|---|---|---|
| IM@1 | Session Key Generation | W is the weight vector, n is the number of recipients. | |
| IM@2 | Intermediate Key Generation | m is the size of the key. | |
| IM@3 | Secret Sharing | n is the number of recipients. | |
| IM@4 | Polling Head | n is the number of recipients. | |
| IM@5 | Encryption | x, y are the key set arrays. | |
| IM@6 | Encapsulation | n is the number of recipients. |
Attribute based comparison among techniques
| Testing key parameters | AES | DES | Blowfish | 3DES | This work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Block Length | 128 | 64 | 64 | 64 | Flexible on Length |
| Key Length | 128/192/256 | 56 | 32–448 | 56/112/168 | Flexible on Length |
| Cipher text | Symmetric Encryption | Symmetric Encryption | Symmetric Encryption | Symmetric Encryption | New Secret Sharing |
| Degree of Flexibility | High | Medium | Low | Medium | High |
| Performance Time | Better | Good | Good | Better | Better |
Comparison between existing secret sharing techniques and proposed technique
| Secret sharing scheme | Perfect/Non-perfect | Single/Multi-Secret | Threshold/Non-threshold | Type | Proactive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shamir [ | Perfect | Single | Threshold | Polynomial based | No |
| Benaloh [ | Perfect | Single | Non-threshold | Circuit based | No |
| Pedersen [ | Perfect | Single | Threshold | Polynomial based | Yes |
| Herzberg [ | Perfect | Single | Threshold | Polynomial based | No |
| Blakley [ | Non-perfect | Single | Threshold | Vector space based | No |
| Asmuth-Bloom [ | Non-Perfect | Single | Threshold | CRT based | No |
| Bai (ramp) [ | Non-Perfect | Multi-Secret | Threshold | Matrix Projection based | Partial |
| Franklin(ramp) [ | Non-Perfect | Multi-Secret | Threshold | Polynomial Based | No |
| Iftene [ | Non-Perfect | Single | Non-Threshold | CRT based | No |
| This Technique | Perfect | Multi-Secret | Non-Threshold | Unit Matrix based | No |
Comparison with respect to application model
| Parameters for Comparison | Sinkhole Attack | Worm Attack | Side-Channel Attack | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Network Layer | This Work | Application Layer | This Work | Application Layer | This | |
| Active or Passive Attacks on Patients’ Data | Active attacks means the misleading information which results in online medical packet dropping [ | May resist Active attacks. | It may edit the medical report files [ | May resist Active attacks. | Passive attack denotes the session key by using the side-channel by the intruders [ | May resist Passive attacks. |
| Level of damage done on Medical Data | Higher degree of chances. Data flowing from compromised node to the attacker. | May be achieved. | Higher degree of chances. As it can delete files, mail documents from the server [ | May be achieved. | Higher degree of chances. Intruder may retrieve the secret key [ | May be achieved. |
| Prevention of Medical Data | May be achieved if node authentication is done [ | Future Scope of work. | By avoiding suspicious web-sites, files, and documents [ | May be achieved. | Using the preventive precautions [ | May be achieved. |
| Guided Attacks on Medical data | Routing attack is possible here [ | May resist routing attack. | Malicious Codes attack may happen here. | May resist against the malicious codes. | Side Channel Information attack is feasible here [ | May resist different side-channel attacks. |