| Literature DB >> 35274628 |
Pooja Rani1, Sahil Verma2,3, Navneet Kaur2,4, Marcin Wozniak5, Jana Shafi6, Muhammad Fazal Ijaz7.
Abstract
The paper presents a new security aspect for a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET)-based IoT model using the concept of artificial intelligence. The Black Hole Attack (BHA) is considered one of the most affecting threats in the MANET in which the attacker node drops the entire data traffic and hence degrades the network performance. Therefore, it necessitates the designing of an algorithm that can protect the network from the BHA node. This article introduces Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV), a new updated routing protocol that combines the advantages of the Artificial Bee Colony (ABC), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), and Support Vector Machine (SVM) techniques. The combination of the SVM with ANN is the novelty of the proposed model that helps to identify the attackers within the discovered route using the AODV routing mechanism. Here, the model is trained using ANN but the selection of training data is performed using the ABC fitness function followed by SVM. The role of ABC is to provide a better route for data transmission between the source and the destination node. The optimized route, suggested by ABC, is then passed to the SVM model along with the node's properties. Based on those properties ANN decides whether the node is a normal or an attacker node. The simulation analysis performed in MATLAB shows that the proposed work exhibits an improvement in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), throughput, and delay. To validate the system efficiency, a comparative analysis is performed against the existing approaches such as Decision Tree and Random Forest that indicate that the utilization of the SVM with ANN is a beneficial step regarding the detection of BHA attackers in the MANET-based IoT networks.Entities:
Keywords: AODV; Artificial Bee Colony algorithm; Black Hole Attack (BHA); MANET; artificial neural network
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 35274628 PMCID: PMC8749673 DOI: 10.3390/s22010251
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Figure 1Packet drop by black hole node.
Node (normal and malicious) behavior.
| Malicious | Destination Sequence Number | Hop Count | Packet Drop | Threat | Threat Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No | High | High | No | No | No Threat |
| Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | BHA |
| Yes | No | High | Yes | Yes | BHA |
| Yes | High | No | Yes | Yes | BHA |
| Yes | High | High | Yes | Yes | Gray hole |
Figure 2The flow of proposed work.
Simulation Parameter.
|
| 0.2 ms to 1 ms |
|
| 100 to 200 |
|
| 1 |
|
| 1000 × 1000 |
Figure 3Node deployment.
Figure 4AODV routing Process.
Figure 5New user connection request using AODV.
Figure 6Working flow of ABC.
Figure 7Scouting mechanism of ABC.
Figure 8ANN Structure.
Figure 9Trained ANN.
Figure 10Mean square error (MSE).
Figure 11Block diagram of SVM.
Figure 12Information flow in ML model.
Test cases generation
|
|
| ||
|
| Judgment Parameter | Analysis Parameter | |
| 7 | [0.1–2] | Throughput, Delay | Energy Consumption |
Packet delivery ratio.
| Number of Nodes | Under Threat | AODV without Threat | AODV with ABC | After Prevention | Using DT | Using RF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 42.5 | 48.52 | 84.55 | 96.45 | 94.52 | 93.26 |
| 200 | 51.25 | 57.41 | 85.22 | 96.47 | 94.87 | 93.48 |
| 400 | 56.75 | 65.22 | 88.13 | 98.75 | 95.26 | 94.75 |
| 600 | 60.66 | 66.27 | 89.72 | 98.76 | 96.27 | 94.68 |
| 800 | 65.37 | 69.47 | 91.67 | 98.74 | 96.99 | 95.82 |
| 1000 | 67.2 | 72.24 | 93.74 | 99.17 | 97.12 | 96.78 |
| 2000 | 69.77 | 75.47 | 94.72 | 99.38 | 97.59 | 97.13 |
Figure 13Packet delivery ratio.
Throughput.
| Number of Nodes | Under Threat | AODV | AODV with ABC | After Prevention | Using DT | Using RF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 53.02 | 67.8 | 82.7 | 89.2 | 87.56 | 95.26 |
| 200 | 54.83 | 70.67 | 84.22 | 89.8 | 87.89 | 86.29 |
| 400 | 61.3 | 73.13 | 87.08 | 91.79 | 91.78 | 89.15 |
| 600 | 62.9 | 76.17 | 89.51 | 92.92 | 92.67 | 90.36 |
| 800 | 64.29 | 77.09 | 90.87 | 94.3 | 93.26 | 92.45 |
| 1000 | 66.34 | 79.2 | 93.3 | 95.22 | 94.75 | 93.17 |
| 2000 | 67.02 | 80.82 | 93.33 | 96.23 | 94.89 | 94.68 |
Figure 14Throughput.
Average Delay(s).
| Number of Nodes | Under Threat | AODV | AODV with ABC | After Prevention | Using DT | Using RF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 0.123 | 0.112 | 0.062 | 0.033 | 0.0363 | 0.0375 |
| 200 | 0.1504 | 0.123 | 0.0694 | 0.036 | 0.0392 | 0.0412 |
| 400 | 0.2416 | 0.135 | 0.0767 | 0.043 | 0.0481 | 0.0496 |
| 600 | 0.2527 | 0.145 | 0.0781 | 0.0431 | 0.0495 | 0.0499 |
| 800 | 0.2718 | 0.156 | 0.892 | 0.0433 | 0.0501 | 0.0521 |
| 1000 | 0.2781 | 0.17 | 0.904 | 0.0437 | 0.0512 | 0.0534 |
| 2000 | 0.2956 | 0.178 | 0.922 | 0.0439 | 0.0523 | 0.0554 |
Figure 15Delay.
Statistical test values.
| PDR (%) | Throughput (Kbps) | Delay (s) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before Prevention | Proposed | Before Prevention | Proposed | Before Prevention | Proposed |
| 59.07 | 97.96 | 61.38 | 92.78 | 0.2304 | 0.04 |
Comparative parametric value.
| PDR (%) | Throughput (Kbps) | Delay (s) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed | [ | [ | Proposed | [ | Proposed | [ | [ |
| 97.96 | 96.94 | 95.14 | 92.78 | 79.08 | 0.04 | 0.087 | 0.035 |