| Literature DB >> 35141198 |
Qiao Chen1, Hai-Ming Wei2, Yu-Peng Zhi3.
Abstract
Using national dynamic panel data from 21 emerging markets between 1999 and 2020 and bidirectional fixed effect and threshold regression methods, this paper evaluated the impact of health investment on industrial structure upgrading from two aspects of economic output and economic structure. The results showed that: (1) public health investment and private health investment have a crowding out effect on the added value of primary and secondary industries, and the crowding out effect of public health investment is greater than that of private health investment; (2) Public health investment and private health investment have a spillover effect on the added value of the tertiary industry, and the spillover effect of public health investment is greater than that of private health investment; (3) Both public and private health investment contribute to the transfer of the labor force to the tertiary industry, and tests showed the baseline regression results were robust and reliable; (4) The relationship between health investment and industrial structure upgrading was non-linear. As per capital GDP increases, the inhibition effect of public health investment on industrial structure upgrading gradually weakens whilst the promotion effect of private health investment on industrial structure upgrading gradually increases. The results of this study clarify how health investment affects industrial structure, and offers new guidance for health investment policy formulation in emerging market countries.Entities:
Keywords: emerging market countries; health investment; non-linear relationship; spillover or crowding out; upgrading of industrial structure
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35141198 PMCID: PMC8820387 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.833961
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Public Health ISSN: 2296-2565
Descriptive statistics of variables.
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| 884 | 6.94 | 6.388 | 0.471 | 36.212 |
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| 959 | 32.25 | 6.57 | 16.953 | 61.844 |
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| 959 | 14.383 | 10.276 | 1.541 | 54.919 |
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| 884 | 48.295 | 8.403 | 22.308 | 88.724 |
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| 570 | 24.497 | 6.347 | 13.345 | 45.419 |
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| 570 | 24.891 | 15.562 | 2.636 | 62.562 |
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| 570 | 50.612 | 12.4 | 18.9 | 72.292 |
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| 361 | 458.199 | 418.917 | 18.312 | 2514.624 |
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| 361 | 310.779 | 193.886 | 55.216 | 1133.509 |
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| 1009 | 3385.819 | 4150.45 | 53.537 | 23494.596 |
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| 1016 | 23.952 | 7.35 | 4.527 | 95.32 |
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| 809 | −6708 | 204300 | −2317000 | 416700 |
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| 1140 | 65.494 | 17.144 | 36.49 | 105.758 |
Figure 1Scatter charts illustrating the levels of health investment and added value to GDP by each industry.
Baseline regression results.
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| −0.09 | −1.30 | −0.01 | −0.24 | 0.09 | 1.52 | |||
| (−3.94) | (−5.34) | (−1.01) | (−2.16) | (3.70) | (6.03) | ||||
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| −0.08 | −1.19 | −0.01 | −0.22 | 0.08 | 1.40 | |||
| (−3.46) | (−4.99) | (−0.82) | (−2.08) | (3.17) | (5.70) | ||||
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| −0.46 | −0.48 | −0.43 | −0.46 | −0.46 | −0.45 | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.70 |
| (−2.57) | (−2.67) | (−2.46) | (−5.87) | (−5.91) | (−5.81) | (3.94) | (4.04) | (3.89) | |
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| 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.16 | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.10 | −0.14 |
| (3.11) | (2.96) | (3.87) | (−4.03) | (−4.09) | (−3.73) | (−2.29) | (−2.14) | (−3.15) | |
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| −0.33 | −0.33 | −0.32 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18 |
| (−2.59) | (−2.54) | (−2.58) | (1.48) | (1.49) | (1.53) | (1.47) | (1.43) | (1.42) | |
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| 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | −0.15 | −0.16 | −0.09 |
| (2.58) | (2.77) | (1.30) | (4.00) | (4.08) | (3.35) | (−3.91) | (−4.10) | (−2.49) | |
| C | 29.20 | 20.58 | 149.96 | 7.33 | 6.40 | 29.85 | 57.63 | 66.01 | −85.17 |
| (10.55) | (7.88) | (6.15) | (6.10) | (5.67) | (2.74) | (19.92) | (24.17) | (−3.38) | |
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| 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 |
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| 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.76 |
represent significance levels of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robustness test.
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| −0.04 | −0.03 | −0.23 | −2.04 | 0.17 | 0.19 | |||
| (−2.26) | (−1.97) | (−8.30) | (−7.17) | (8.09) | (9.63) | ||||
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| −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.21 | −1.78 | 0.01 | 0.01 | |||
| (−2.63) | (−2.38) | (−7.61) | (−6.39) | (6.67) | (8.39) | ||||
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| 0.60 | 0.34 | 0.99 | −1.94 | −1.97 | −1.89 | 2.24 | 1.25 | 0.79 |
| (1.58) | (1.40) | (2.42) | (−9.06) | (−9.10) | (−9.32) | (13.74) | (4.96) | (3.48) | |
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| 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.16 | −0.18 | −0.19 | −0.13 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| (5.62) | (5.97) | (5.28) | (−3.46) | (−3.65) | (−2.76) | (0.17) | (3.11) | (1.65) | |
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| −0.44 | −0.47 | −0.47 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.31 |
| (−4.85) | (−5.17) | (−5.17) | (0.60) | (0.63) | (0.76) | (2.73) | (1.91) | (2.91) | |
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| −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.04 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.19 | −0.24 | −0.24 | −0.18 |
| (−1.10) | (−2.11) | (−1.56) | (5.93) | (6.20) | (4.41) | (−7.10) | (−7.07) | (−5.58) | |
| C | 22.10 | 23.37 | 23.39 | 27.57 | 5.40 | 208.71 | 53.94 | 57.61 | 46.02 |
| (12.90) | (13.03) | (13.10) | (8.33) | (1.72) | (7.32) | (21.37) | (23.48) | (18.52) | |
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| 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 | 361 |
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| 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.72 |
indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Figure 2The influence mechanism of health investment on industrial structure.
Effect test of public health investment thresholds.
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| Single threshold | 165.761 | 0.005 | 500 | 157.652 | 106.780 | 75.549 |
| Double thresholds | 129.647 | 0.020 | 500 | 146.235 | 97.877 | 70.781 |
| Triple thresholds | −136.261 | 0.365 | 500 | −55.011 | −73.301 | −81.519 |
represent significance levels of 1 and 5 % respectively.
Public health investment threshold estimates and confidence intervals.
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| Threshold value | 4,412 | [3,694, 4,499] |
| Threshold value | 12,000 | [12,460, 15,753] |
The units of .
Estimated results of public and private health investment on industrial structure upgrading.
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| −0.494 |
| −0.179 |
| (−7.01) | (−2.63) | ||
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| −0.266 |
| 5.52e-12 |
| (−1.05) | (0.51) | ||
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| −0.226 |
| −0.151 |
| (−3.44) | (−2.67) | ||
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| −0.126 |
| 0.061 |
| ( | (−3.70) | ( | (2.29) |
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| −0.103 |
| 0.155 |
| (4,412 < | (−0.92) | (4,033 < | (4.91) |
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| −0.088 |
| 1.065 |
| ( | (−2.90) | ( | (13.16) |
| C | 36.19 | C | −27.95 |
| (7.44) | (−4.16) | ||
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| 361 |
| 361 |
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| 0.619 |
| 0.748 |
represent significance levels of 1 and 5% respectively.
Effect test of private health investment thresholds.
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| Single threshold test | 95.162 | 0.060 | 300 | 127.964 | 97.817 | 81.731 |
| Double threshold test | 337.340 | 0.000 | 300 | 118.140 | 56.748 | 30.892 |
| Triple threshold test | 0.000 | 0.285 | 200 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
are significant at 10 and 1% levels respectively.
Figure 3Estimation of the first and second threshold of per capital GDP based on a likelihood ratio function.
Results of threshold estimation for private health investment.
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| Threshold value | 4,033 | [3,741, 4,772] |
| Threshold value | 16,000 | [16,000, 16,500] |
The units of .
Figure 4Estimation of the first and second threshold of per capital GDP based on a likelihood ratio function.
Figure 5Trend line illustrating the relationship between public (left) and private (right) health investment and industrial structure upgrading.