| Literature DB >> 35110961 |
Adam Flitton1, Thomas E Currie1.
Abstract
A huge number of hypotheses have been put forward to explain the substantial diversity in economic performance we see in the present-day. There has been a growing appreciation that historical and ecological factors have contributed to social and economic development. However, it is not clear whether such factors have exerted a direct effect on modern productivity, or whether they influence economies indirectly by shaping the cultural evolution of norms and institutions. Here we analyse a global cross-national dataset to test between hypotheses involving a number of different ecological, historical, and proximate social factors and a range of direct and indirect pathways. We show that the historical timing of agriculture predicts the timing of the emergence of statehood, which in turn affects economic development indirectly through its effect on institutions. Ecological factors appear to affect economic performance indirectly through their historical effects on the development of agriculture and by shaping patterns of European settler colonization. More effective institutional performance is also predicted by lower-levels of in-group bias which itself appears related to the proportion of a nation's population that descends from European countries. These results support the idea that cultural evolutionary processes have been important in shaping the social norms and institutions that enable large-scale cooperation and economic growth in present-day societies.Entities:
Keywords: Cultural evolution; Human evolutionary ecology; Institutional economics; Macroeconomics
Year: 2022 PMID: 35110961 PMCID: PMC8785121 DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.11.001
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Evol Hum Behav ISSN: 1090-5138 Impact factor: 4.178
Different hypotheses and predicted relationships tested in this study. Arrow number relates to visual representation of these relationships in Fig. 1. The table presents only the hypotheses from the literature that motivated examination of these relationship in this study. Alternative hypotheses or explanations for such relationships are possible.
| Predictor variables | Hypothesis | Prediction | Arrow no. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Social predictors | |||
| Institutions | Adjudication of contracts and enforcement of law allows large-scale cooperation. Checks on the executive ensure incentives for labour and skill accumulation ( | InQ (+)➔ GDP | 1 |
| In-group bias | Differences in standards used to treat in-group and outgroup members introduce risks of opportunism in transactions. Nepotistic aspect of these biases also contributes to political patronage and corruption ( | IGB (−)➔GDP | 3 |
| In-group preferences may prevent adoption of more inclusive rules or prevent such rules being implemented effectively ( | IGB (−)➔ InQ | 2 | |
| Historical and ecological predictors | |||
| European descent | A body of knowledge and technologies associated with European populations aids economic activity. Assumes that European colonial settlers brought with them cultural traits and human capital that had developed in the context of the Europeans' societies, which may have aided economic development ( | EA (+)➔GDP | 12 |
| Europeans developed relatively inclusive institutions when they settled in large numbers. Where they did not settle in large numbers, they established authoritarian systems designed to exploit populations and extract natural resources ( | EA (+)➔ InQ | 13 | |
| European culture is relatively individualist and impersonal, and Europeans would have brought such cultural traits with them when settling in colonial countries ( | EA (−)➔ IGB | 14 | |
| State history | Historical experience with central organization is heritable and predicts greater levels of economic development in the present day ( | SH (+)➔ GDP | 4 |
| Political centralization is an important pre-cursor for development of inclusive institutions ( | SH (+)➔ InQ | 5 | |
| Centralized governance selects for cultures of trust and impersonal treatment ( | SH (−)➔ IGB | 6 | |
| Timing of agricultural transition | Earlier transitions provided a head-start to the development of important technologies associated with economic performance ( | Ag (+)➔GDP | 8 |
| Longer histories of features of agricultural subsistence (irrigation, large-scale coordination) suggest more experience with property rights ( | Ag (+)➔ InQ | 9 | |
| Agricultural production benefits from collectivist norms, implying that agriculture selects for in-group biases ( | Ag (+)➔ IGB | 10 | |
| Growing population sizes associated with agriculture select for centralized governance to maintain cooperation and coordination ( | Ag (+)➔ SH | 11 | |
| Disease | Disease affects workforce directly and stunts productivity ( | Dis (−)➔GDP | 15 |
| Increased pathogen risk favours more insular social norms to reduce the probability of contracting diseases from other groups ( | Dis (+)➔ IGB | 16 | |
| The disease environment influenced the extent of European settlement ( | Dis (−)➔ EA | 17 | |
| Pathogen stress selects for smaller and more numerous groups ( | Dis (−)➔ SH | 7 | |
| Latitude | Latitude covaries with climate and natural resources that are important in economic development ( | Lat (+)➔GDP | 18 |
| Latitude covaries with natural endowments which predict the extent of bias of resources towards elites ( | Lat (−)➔ InQ | 19 | |
| Latitude covaries with the suitability of regions for agriculture ( | Lat (+)➔ Ag | 20 | |
| Environmental factors in higher latitudes may have been more conducive to evolution of centralized societies ( | Lat (+)➔ SH | 21 | |
| Populations tend to migrate to regions of ecological similarity, with European settlers tending to colonize regions of similar latitude to Europe ( | Lat (+)➔ EA | 22 | |
| Latitude co-varies with climate, with in-group bias being lower in less-demanding temperate climates ( | Lat (−)➔ IGB | 23 | |
| Latitude covaries with environmental variables that predict severity of infectious disease ( | Lat (−)➔ Dis | 24 | |
Fig. 1Full path diagram showing all the theoretically-informed relationship between different variables that we assess in this study. Red arrows relate to direct, proximate explanations of economic performance, blue arrows reflect direct historical explanations, while black arrows indicate relationships that could be involved in more indirect pathways. Dashed lines are used to indicate situations where an arrow runs “behind” another variable in this figure but does not indicate an association with that variable (e.g. arrow number 19 simply reflects the potential relationship between Latitude and Institutional Quality, and has nothing to do with European ancestry). Numbers on arrows relate to numbers in Table 1. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Descriptive statistics and information about the variables examined in this study. Values for State History, and Timing of Agricultural Transition have been adjusted using the population ancestry matrix.
| Variable | Min | Mean | Max | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP | 355.6 | 16,301.5 | 100,575.1 | US$ per person, log10 transformed for analyses |
| Institution Quality | −1.61 | 0.11 | 2.02 | Composite “rule of law” variable, standardized score, higher values indicate more “inclusive” institutions |
| In-Group Bias | −2.32 | 0.14 | 2.39 | Composite standardized score of different measures, higher values indicate more in-group bias |
| European Ancestry | 0 | 45.19 | 100 | Percent of contemporary population that derive from European countries |
| State History | 0.06 | 0.56 | 0.96 | Index (range 0–1) estimating the extent to which there existed governance beyond the tribal level the period 1–1500 CE. Higher values indicate more experience with extensive, centralized forms of socio-political organization |
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | 1224 | 5559 | 9568 | Number of years before 2000 that populations switched from foraging to food production |
| Disease | −1.18 | 0.10 | 1.20 | Standardized score of estimates of historical disease prevalence, higher values indicate greater prevalence of disease |
| Latitude | 0.02 | 30.43 | 61.92 | Mid-point absolute latitude of countries, decimal degrees |
Support for different relationships between GDP, proximate, historical, and ecological factors. Parameter estimates are shown for each relationship indicated by the path numbers from Fig. 1. Results are given for both the full model (which includes all identified predictor variables for a given outcome variable), and the weighted estimates and variable importance from the model selection approach. Change in the amount of variance explained (ΔR2) is shown by either subtracting the variable from the full model, or including the variable as the only (single) predictor, as well as the variance explained by the full model (R2).
| Full model | AIC model average | r2 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| β | SE | p | β | SE | p | importance | subtracted | Single predictor | Full model | ||
| GDP | Intercept | <0.01 | 0.08 | 0.96 | <0.01 | 0.09 | 1.00 | – | – | – | 0.74 |
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.35 | 0.62 | 0.02 | 0.13 | ||
| Disease | −0.10 | 0.09 | 0.26 | −0.05 | 0.08 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.03 | 0.24 | ||
| European ancestry | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 0.73 | 0.03 | 0.31 | ||
| In-group bias | −0.10 | 0.07 | 0.17 | −0.06 | 0.08 | 0.43 | 0.55 | −0.01 | 0.31 | ||
| Institutional Quality | 0.49 | 0.08 | <0.01 | 0.55 | 0.08 | <0.01 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.59 | ||
| Latitude | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.88 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.65 | 0.38 | <0.01 | 0.20 | ||
| State History | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.44 | 0.54 | 0.02 | 0.12 | ||
| Institutional Quality | Intercept | <0.01 | 0.10 | 1.00 | <0.01 | 0.09 | 0.98 | – | – | – | 0.61 |
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.56 | 0.42 | −0.01 | 0.13 | ||
| European ancestry | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.24 | 0.73 | 0.02 | 0.31 | ||
| In-group bias | −0.52 | 0.08 | <0.01 | −0.54 | 0.08 | <0.01 | 1.00 | 0.23 | 0.49 | ||
| Latitude | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.36 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.44 | 0.55 | <0.01 | 0.20 | ||
| State History | 0.21 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.23 | 0.07 | <0.01 | 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.15 | ||
| In-group bias | Intercept | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.84 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.86 | – | – | – | 0.38 |
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.64 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.89 | 0.27 | <0.01 | 0.03 | ||
| Disease | 0.27 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.93 | 0.07 | 0.23 | ||
| European ancestry | −0.36 | 0.14 | 0.01 | −0.37 | 0.13 | <0.01 | 1.00 | 0.08 | 0.28 | ||
| Latitude | <0.01 | 0.13 | 0.99 | <0.01 | 0.06 | 0.99 | 0.20 | <0.01 | 0.17 | ||
| State History | −0.18 | 0.09 | 0.04 | −0.14 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.81 | 0.03 | 0.06 | ||
| European Ancestry | Intercept | −0.58 | 0.10 | 0.00 | −0.59 | 0.11 | 0.00 | – | – | – | 0.68 |
| Disease | −0.10 | 0.07 | 0.15 | −0.05 | 0.07 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.07 | 0.26 | ||
| Europe | 0.99 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.32 | 0.61 | ||
| Latitude | 0.21 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 1.00 | −0.03 | 0.36 | ||
| State History | Intercept | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.54 | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.52 | – | – | – | 0.22 |
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | 0.47 | 0.09 | <0.01 | 0.48 | 0.09 | <0.01 | 1.00 | 0.20 | 0.23 | ||
| Disease | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.60 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.88 | 0.28 | −0.01 | <0.01 | ||
| Latitude | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.53 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.82 | 0.29 | <0.01 | 0.03 | ||
| Timing of Agricultural Transition | Intercept | 0.35 | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.14 | – | – | – | 0.10 |
| Latitude | 0.27 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.26 | 0.11 | 0.02 | – | 0.06 | 0.08 | ||
| Latitude2 | −0.17 | 0.08 | 0.04 | −0.13 | 0.11 | 0.22 | – | 0.01 | 0.03 | ||
| Disease | Intercept | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.46 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.46 | – | – | – | 0.47 |
| Latitude | −0.58 | 0.06 | <0.01 | −0.58 | 0.07 | <0.01 | – | 0.47 | 0.47 | ||
Fig. 2Reduced path diagram that indicates the pathways which receive statistically significant support in model comparison. Line widths are proportional to the Akaike weighted coefficients of the pathways. Dashed lines are not statistically significant but receive some limited support.