| Literature DB >> 35096290 |
Hiva Sharebiani1, Sara Hajimiri1, Shadi Abbasnia1,2, Saman Soleimanpour2,3, Amir Mohamad Hashem Asnaashari4, Narges Valizadeh1, Mohammad Derakhshan2,3, Rezvan Pilpa2,3, Arezoo Firouzeh2,3, Kiarash Ghazvini2,3, Saeed Amel Jamehdar2,3, Seyed Abdolrahim Rezaee1.
Abstract
OBJECTIVES: Game theory describes the interactions between two players and the pay-off from winning, losing, or compromising. In the present study, Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb)-host interactions were used as an example for the application of game theory to describe and predict the different outcomes of Mtb-infection and introducing target molecules for use in protection or therapy.Entities:
Keywords: Ag85; ESAT-6; Game theory; Mycobacterium tuberculosis; Th1; Tuberculosis
Year: 2021 PMID: 35096290 PMCID: PMC8769512 DOI: 10.22038/IJBMS.2021.55471.12410
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Iran J Basic Med Sci ISSN: 2008-3866 Impact factor: 2.699
Primer and probe sequences & associated accession numbers
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| NM_004048.2 | F | TTGTCTTTCAGCAAGGACTGG | TCACATGGTTCACACGGCAGGCAT |
| R | CCACTTAACTATCTTGGGCTGTG | |||
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| NM_001295.2 | F | CCAGCATCTACCTCCTGAAC | ACCTGCTCTTCCTGTTCACGCTTC |
| R | GGATCTTACACATGGCATCAC | |||
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| NM_001123041.2 | F | CGGCCTGAGTAACTGTGAAAG | ACTGGACCAAGCCACGCAGGTGACA |
| R | CGAAGGCATAGATGATGGGATTG | |||
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| NM_013351.1 | F | GTCCAATGTGACCCAGATG | CCTCTGGCTCTCCGTCGTTCTCAACAC |
| R | TGCGTGTTGGAAGCGTTG | |||
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| NM_000625.4 | F | GCTCAAATCTCGGCAGAATCTAC | TCCGACATCCAGCCGTGCCACCA |
| R | GCCATCCTCACAGGAGAGTTC | |||
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| NM_000660.5 | F | GCAAGTGGACATCAACGGGTT | |
| R | CGCACGCAGCAGTTCTTCTC | |||
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| NG_028155.1 | F | GCCAAGGTCATCCAACTACT | AAGCTGCTCGAGATTTCCACCAATAGA |
| R | GCCTGCTTCACCACCTTCTGATG | |||
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| NM_002422.4 | F | CCCACTCTATCACTCACTCACAG | CCTGACTCGGTTCCGCCTGTCTCA |
| R | CAAAGGACAAAGCAGGATCACAG | |||
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| NM_004994.2 | F | CAGCGAGAGACTCTACAC | CACCACGGACGGTCGCTCC |
| R | GTCCCGGTCGTAGTTG | |||
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| NC_000962.3 | F | CCTGCGGTTTATCTGCTCGA | AACACCCCGGCGTTCGAGTGGTACT |
| R | TGTAGAAGCTGGACTGCCCG | |||
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| NC_000962.3 | F | GTCCATTCATTCCCTCCTTGAC | CCTGACCAAGCTCGCAGCGGC |
| R | GCGTTGTTCAGCTCGGTAG | |||
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| NM_021803.3 | F | GCCAATAAGCAGAAGCAGGAAC | CCTGCTGCTGCTCCTCGTCGGC |
| R | GCCCATTTGCGAGGACAG |
Strategic form of game
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| Mean | SD | ||
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| 68.43 | 8.29 | 0.650 |
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| 69.56 | 7.46 | |
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| 69.03 | 7.74 | |
N; Players scape. i; player. Ai; action profile of player i. an ; Action of Mtb. a’n; Action of host. Si; Strategy profile of player i. s; Strategy. Ui; Pay-off profile of player i. G; Profile of subgames. g;Subgame. T; Profile of stages. t; Stage of game.
†a1= Ag85B (low), a2=CFP-10(low), a3=ESAT-6(low), a4=Ag85B (High), a5=CFP-10(High), a6=ESAT-6(High)
Ag85B (Low)< 0.082, Ag85B (High)> 0.082, CFP-10(Low)< 0.1, CFP-10(High)> 0.1, ESAT-6(Low)< 0.467 and ESAT-6(High)> 0.467.
††a’1=CCR1(low), a’2=CCR2(low), a’3=T-bet(low), a’4=iNOS(low), a’5=TGF-β(low), a’6=IDO(low), a’7=CCR1(Medium), a’8=CCR2(Medium), a’9=T-bet(Medium), a’10=iNOS(Medium), a’11=TGF-β(Medium), a’12=IDO(Medium), a’13=CCR1(High), a’14=CCR2(High), a’15=T-bet(High), a’16=iNOS(High), a’17=TGF-β(High), a’18=IDO(High)
CCR1(Low)< 0.51, CCR1 (Medium)= [0.51-1.12], CCR1(High)> 1.12, CCR2(Low)< 0.22, CCR2 (Medium)= [0.22-0.88], CCR2(High)> 0.88, T-bet(Low)< 0.003, T-bet(Medium)= [0.003-0.055], T-bet (High)> 0.055, iNOS(Low)< 0.003, iNOS (Medium)= [0.003-0.12], iNOS (High)> 0.12, TGF-β (low)< 0.068, TGF-β(Medium)= [0.068-0.155], TGF-β(High)> 0.155, IDO (Low)< 0.11, IDO(Medium)= [0.11-0.43] and IDO(High) > 0.43.
‡SA: Ag85B(Low), CFP-10(Low), ESAT-6(Low), SB: Ag85B(High), CFP-10(low), ESAT-6(Low),
SC: Ag85B(Low), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(Low), SD: Ag85B(Low), CFP-10(Low), ESAT-6(High),
SE: Ag85B(High), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(Low), SF: Ag85B(High), CFP-10(Low), ESAT-6(High),
SG: Ag85B(Low), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(High), SH: Ag85B(High), CFP-10(High), ESAT-6(High),
‡‡Sa: CCR1(High), CCR2 (Medium), T-bet (High), iNOS (High), TGF-β (Low), IDO (Low)
Sb: CCR1(High), CCR2 (High), T-bet (High), iNOS (High), TGF-β (Medium), IDO (Medium)
Scg: CCR1(Medium), CCR2 (Medium), T-bet (Medium), iNOS (Medium), TGF-β (Low), IDO (Low)
Sd: CCR1 (High), CCR2 (Medium), T-bet (Medium), iNOS (Medium), TGF-β (Low), IDO (Low)
Se: CCR1 (Medium), CCR2 (High), T-bet (High), iNOS (High), TGF-β (Medium), IDO (Medium)
Sf: CCR1 (High), CCR2 (High), T-bet (High), iNOS (High), TGF-β (Low), IDO (Medium)
Sh: CCR1 (Medium), CCR2 (High), T-bet (Medium), iNOS (Medium), TGF-β (Medium), IDO (Medium)
Evaluation of action roles in host strategies
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| Men | 57.1 | 43.7 | 50 | |
| Women | 42.9 | 56.3 | 50 | ||
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| Employee | 0 | 42.8 | 20 |
| Self-employed | 75 | 57.2 | 66.6 | ||
| Retired | 25 | 0 | 13.4 | ||
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| Housewife | 42.8 | 64.2 | 50 | |
| Employee | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
Evaluation of action roles in host strategies. Expression of each gene in every host strategy was specialized in all strategies that remained latent (B, E and H paths), levels of TGF-β and IDO placed in medium range and in other paths that reactivated, these genes show low expression. Therefore, levels of TGF-β and IDO were differentiator between latent and reactivated paths. In all host strategies in response to high levels of Ag85B Mtb strategy, T-bet and iNOS expressed in high level while these levels were medium in response to high levels of CFP-10 or CFP-10 and ESAT-6, therefore levels of T-bet and iNOS expression related with type of Mtb strategies. Levels of CCR1 and CCR2 related to increase and decrease of Mtb virulence gene expression. High level of CCR1 expression was related to expression of CFP-10 and ESAT-6 in low level and medium level of this chemokine receptor had reverse effect on expression of these virulence genes. When CCR2 expressed in high level, expression of Ag85B placed on high level too, against in medium levels of CCR2 such as C, G and D paths, expression of Ag85B placed on low level
Figure 1Circle; Mtb’s decision node. Triangle; Host’s decision node. Edges; Player’s strategy. …….. Dotted lines; Player’s frequently repeated strategies. G; Original game. gn; Subgame (shown by rectangular nesting). a1-a6; Mtb’s actions. A-H; Mtb’s strategies (final outcomes). a-h; Host’s strategies
Age homogeneity of groups
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| Frequencies | % | Frequencies | % | Frequencies | % | Frequencies | % | ||
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| 15 | 93.75 | 1 | 6.25 | 14 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0.533 |
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| 14 | 87.50 | 16 | 12.50 | 11 | 78.57 | 3 | 21.43 | 0.433 |
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| 0 | 0 | 16 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 100 | - |
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| 7 | 43.75 | 9 | 56.25 | 8 | 57.14 | 6 | 42.86 | 0.358 |
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| 13 | 81.25 | 3 | 18.75 | 8 | 57.14 | 6 | 42.86 | 0.15 |
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| 0 | 0 | 16 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 100 | - |
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| 0.58 | 3.98 | 0.08 | 4.44 | 0.02 | ||||
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| 8.77 | 36.24 | 11.37 | 26.44 | 0.01 | ||||
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| 8.36 | 57.22 | 12.39 | 69.48 | 0.004 | ||||
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| 2.21 | 7.6 | 2.4 | 6.8 | 0.30 | ||||
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| 11.78 | 35.64 | 14.60 | 28.87 | 0.1 | ||||
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| 0.51 | 0.5 | 0.12 | 0.5 | 1 | ||||
Social and demographic characteristics of the study subjects
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| X ± SEM | X ± SEM | |||
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| 1. 1±0.23 | 0.34± 0.09 | 0. 01 | |
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| 0.78± 0.21 | 0.29± 0.8 | 0. 1 | |
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| 0.84±0.52 | 2.28±1.44 | 0.03 | |
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| 0.64±0.29 | 1.72± 0.64 | 0.24 | |
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| 0.2± 0.07 | 0.139±0.03 | 0.85 | |
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| 0.67 ± 0.28 | 0.034±0.01 | 0.001 | |
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| 0.22±0.09 | 0.64±0.23 | 0.52 | |
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| 2.56±0.68 | 1.13±0.35 | 0.05 | |
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| 13 | 0.003 | 0.452 | 0.11 ± 0.3 |
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| 14 | 0 | 13.79 | 1.16 ± 0.97 |
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| 14 | 0.082 | 31.10 | 2.18 ± 8.19 |
Comparison of TB positive group with TB negative group in terms of clinical and para-clinical symptoms
| N= { |
| A |
| SMtb= {sA, sB, sC, sD, sE, sF, sG, sH} ‡ |
| AHost= {a'1, a'2, a'3, a'4, a'5, a'6, a'7, a'8, a'9, a'10, a'11, a'12, a'13, a'14, a'15, a'16, a'17, a'18} †† |
| SHost= {sa, sb, scg, sd, se, sf, sh} ‡‡ |
| U |
| G= {gn, gn+8, gn+16, g(2n-1)+24,g(2n)+24, g(2n-1)+36,g(2n)+36│n≤4} |
| G= {gn, gn+8, gn+16, g(n+4)+24, g(n+4)+36│4<n≤8} |
| T = T= {t1, t2, t3, ...∞│t2=t2n, t3=t2n+1} |
The gene expression data using real-time PCR
| TGF-β and IDO (Medium)= | T-bet, iNOS (High)= Ag85B (high) | T-bet, iNOS (Medium)= CFP-10(High) | ||
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| CCR1(High) | CCR1(Medium) | CCR1(Medium) | ||
| TGF-β and IDO (Low)= | CCR1(Medium) CCR1(High) | CCR2(Medium)=Decrease of Ag85B | ||
| CCR1(Medium) | CCR1(High) | |||
Figure 2PSPE index during the time graph. Horizontal axis shows the PSPE index from zero until 100% and the vertical axis shows the number of repetition times from zero until infinity. The right curve is a PSPE dominant strategy (D path), left curves are PSPE dominated strategies (A, F, C, and G paths) and optimal strategy (B, E, and H paths) is a middle line that has a constant value during the repetition times equal to 50% and this is the vertical asymptote for two other curves. Increase in repeated times can lead to increases in the PSPE efficiency index and response appropriacy about inappropriate responses. This means that interaction between host and parasite will moderate by increasing the number of encounters of players together and players avoiding malicious strategies and moving towards cooperation strategies like increasing immune response inhibition by a medium level of TGF-β and IDO. Another argument is at least one of two players’ strategies which are in response to each other in repeated stages must be placed in PSPE to shape a cooperation strategy. In A, B, E, and F paths Mtb strategy is placed in PSPE, and in C, D, G, and H paths host strategy is placed in PSPE