| Literature DB >> 35025907 |
Xiaokang Yang1, Junbing Xu2, Minling Zhu3, Yinglong Yang1.
Abstract
In this study, we used a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to analyze the effect of environmental regulation on corporate tax avoidance behavior based on China's carbon emissions trading pilot policy of 2013. Our findings were as follows: (1) Environmental regulation has led companies to adopt further tax evasion behaviors. Furthermore, the core conclusion was confirmed after a series of robust and endogenous tests, such as parallel trends and PSM-DID (propensity score matching-difference-in-difference). (2) Environmental regulations increase tax avoidance activities by reducing corporate cash flows. (3) The influence of environmental regulation on firm tax evasion is highly pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, big-scale enterprises, and enterprises with a high degree of industry competition.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35025907 PMCID: PMC8757985 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0261037
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Descriptive statistics.
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Sd | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TA1 | 9390 | -0.007 | 0.112 | -0.250 | 0.401 |
| TA2 | 9390 | -0.007 | 0.110 | -0.250 | 0.401 |
| Treat*Post | 9390 | 0.182 | 0.386 | 0 | 1 |
| Lev | 9390 | 0.493 | 0.219 | 0.064 | 1.280 |
| Size | 9390 | 22.170 | 1.401 | 18.550 | 26.070 |
| NetFi | 9390 | 0.235 | 0.181 | 0.001 | 0.757 |
| NetIn | 9390 | 0.049 | 0.062 | 0.000 | 0.390 |
| Roa | 9390 | 0.052 | 0.053 | -0.128 | 0.283 |
| Age | 9390 | 2.783 | 0.342 | 1.386 | 3.332 |
| Foac | 9390 | 0.933 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Soe | 9390 | 0.541 | 0.498 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Environmental regulation and corporate tax avoidance.
| TA1 | TA2 | TA1 | TA2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0136*** | -0.0132*** | -0.0119** | -0.0116** |
| (-2.7059) | (-2.6992) | (-2.4389) | (-2.4325) | |
| Lev | -0.0359** | -0.0349** | ||
| (-2.4451) | (-2.4778) | |||
| Size | 0.0214*** | 0.0206*** | ||
| (4.8725) | (4.9187) | |||
| NetFi | -0.0181 | -0.0127 | ||
| (-0.8218) | (-0.6052) | |||
| NetIn | -0.0484 | -0.0439 | ||
| (-0.8561) | (-0.7757) | |||
| Roa | -0.3005*** | -0.2804*** | ||
| (-7.1047) | (-6.7077) | |||
| Age | -0.0413** | -0.0395** | ||
| (-2.1638) | (-2.1406) | |||
| Foac | 0.0380*** | 0.0347*** | ||
| (3.1680) | (3.1807) | |||
| Soe | -0.0031 | 0.0024 | ||
| (-0.2345) | (0.1978) | |||
| _Cons | -0.0043*** | -0.0046*** | -0.3584*** | -0.3476*** |
| (-4.7372) | (-5.2123) | (-3.4190) | (-3.4368) | |
| Firm/Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Obs | 9392 | 9392 | 9390 | 9390 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.392 | 0.399 | 0.409 | 0.414 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Event study.
| TA1 | TA2 | |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |
| Treat × Before3 | -0.0017 | -0.0045 |
| (-0.2799) | (-0.7260) | |
| Treat × Before2 | -0.0013 | -0.0029 |
| (-0.1840) | (-0.4122) | |
| Treat × Before1 | -0.0056 | -0.0075 |
| (-0.7566) | (-1.0156) | |
| Treat × After0 | -0.0191** | -0.0216*** |
| (-2.5716) | (-2.9769) | |
| Treat × After1 | -0.0148* | -0.0166** |
| (-1.8664) | (-2.0999) | |
| Treat × After2 | -0.0147* | -0.0155* |
| (-1.7448) | (-1.8786) | |
| Treat × After3 | -0.0051 | -0.0039 |
| (-0.5534) | (-0.4412) | |
| Cont_Vars | YES | YES |
| Firm/Year FE | YES | YES |
| Obs | 9390 | 9390 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.409 | 0.414 |
Robustness and endogenous test.
| Panel A | TA3 | TA1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0119** | -0.0133** | -0.0094* | -0.0119** |
| (-1.9923) | (-2.4100) | (-1.8713) | (-2.1075) | |
| Rep_TA | YES | |||
| Exc_Tax_Pol | YES | |||
| Con_Tim_Trend | YES | |||
| Exc_Eig_Reg | YES | |||
| Obs | 9390 | 7577 | 9390 | 6952 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.385 | 0.424 | 0.413 | 0.438 |
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| Treat × Post | -0.0119** | -0.0140*** | -0.0212*** | -0.0127** |
| (-2.4389) | (-2.5997) | (-3.1368) | (-2.2647) | |
| Con_SO2_Pol | YES | |||
| Sam_2011_2014 | YES | |||
| PSM-DID | YES | |||
| Two_DID | YES | |||
| Cont_Vars | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Firm/ Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Obs | 9390 | 4910 | 3967 | 2982 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.409 | 0.515 | 0.426 | 0.417 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Mechanism analysis.
| Cash | |
|---|---|
| (1) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0116** |
| (-2.1093) | |
| Cont_Vars | YES |
| Firm/Year FE | YES |
| Obs | 9390 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.643 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Heterogeneity analysis: Ownership structure.
| TA1 | ||
|---|---|---|
| NSOE | SOE | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0168** | -0.0133** |
| (-2.2703) | (-2.0186) | |
| Cont_Vars | YES | YES |
| Firm/ Year FE | YES | YES |
| Obs | 4283 | 5049 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.401 | 0.443 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Heterogeneity analysis: Firm size.
| TA1 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Small | Big | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0023 | -0.0229*** |
| (-0.3664) | (-2.9036) | |
| Cont_Vars | YES | YES |
| Firm/Year FE | YES | YES |
| Obs | 4592 | 4598 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.437 | 0.434 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Heterogeneity analysis: Industry competition.
| TA1 | ||
|---|---|---|
| High | Low | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| Treat × Post | -0.0143** | -0.0107 |
| (-1.9888) | (-1.5192) | |
| Cont_Vars | YES | YES |
| Firm/Year FE | YES | YES |
| Obs | 4433 | 4957 |
| Adj_R2 | 0.404 | 0.414 |
a T-statistics of clustering to enterprises are shown in parentheses
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.