Literature DB >> 34986436

Persistent effects of temporary incentives: Evidence from a nationwide health insurance experiment.

Aurélien Baillon1, Joseph Capuno2, Owen O'Donnell3, Carlos Antonio Tan4, Kim van Wilgenburg5.   

Abstract

Temporary incentives are offered in anticipation of persistent effects that are seldom estimated. We use a nationwide randomized experiment in the Philippines to estimate effects of two incentives for health insurance three years after their withdrawal. We find that both temporary incentives had persistent effects on enrollment. A premium subsidy had a small but highly persistent effect. Application assistance offered to those initially unresponsive to the subsidy had a much larger but less persistent effect. The subsidy persuaded those with higher initial stated willingness to pay to enroll and keep enrolling. The offer of application assistance to initial non-compliers with the subsidy achieved a larger immediate effect by drawing in those who stated they valued insurance less and were less likely to re-enroll when the incentives were withdrawn.
Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Entities:  

Keywords:  Health insurance; Incentives; Persistence; Randomized experiment; Subsidy

Mesh:

Year:  2021        PMID: 34986436     DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102580

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Health Econ        ISSN: 0167-6296            Impact factor:   3.883


  1 in total

1.  Insurance decisions under nonperformance risk and ambiguity.

Authors:  Timo R Lambregts; Paul van Bruggen; Han Bleichrodt
Journal:  J Risk Uncertain       Date:  2021-11-26
  1 in total

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