| Literature DB >> 34929001 |
Blanca González-Mon1, Emilie Lindkvist1, Örjan Bodin1, José Alberto Zepeda-Domínguez2, Maja Schlüter1.
Abstract
Local and regional trade networks in small-scale fisheries are important for food security and livelihoods across the world. Such networks consist of both economic flows and social relationships, which connect different production regions to different types of fish demand. The structure of such trade networks, and the actions that take place within them (e.g., people fishing, buying, selling), can influence the capacity of small-scale fisheries to provide sufficient fish in a changing social and ecological context. In this study, we aim to understand the importance of networks between different types of traders that access spatially-distinct fish stocks for the availability and variability of fish provision. We deployed a mixed-methods approach, combining agent-based modelling, network analysis and qualitative data from a small-scale fishery in Baja California Sur, Mexico. The empirical data allowed us to investigate the trade processes that occur within trade networks; and the generation of distinct, empirically-informed network structures. Formalized in an agent-based model, these network structures enable analysis of how different trade networks affect the dynamics of fish provision and the exploitation level of fish stocks. Model results reveal how trade strategies based on social relationships and species diversification can lead to spillover effects between fish species and fishing regions. We found that the proportion of different trader types and their spatial connectivity have the potential to increase fish provision. However, they can also increase overexploitation depending on the specific connectivity patterns and trader types. Moreover, increasing connectivity generally leads to positive outcomes for some individual traders, but this does not necessarily imply better outcomes at the system level. Overall, our model provides an empirically-grounded, stylized representation of a fisheries trading system, and reveals important trade-offs that should be considered when evaluating the potential effect of future changes in regional trade networks.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34929001 PMCID: PMC8687593 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0261514
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Fig 1Conceptual model representing the structure of the Small-Trade model.
The model aims to analyze a regional trade network (red links) between fish dealers and sellers, the two trader types that are connected to two final markets (red boxes) via vertical trade links (black links). Note that directionality of the red links (e.g. D→S) implies D “request fish to” and “buy from” S. Each trader is assumed to be connected to fishers (not explicitly represented) who allocate their fishing effort between the stocks of the two fish species within one region (A and B). Green lines represent these “fishing” relationships.
Fig 2Trade networks used in experiments for the Small-Trade model.
Color indicates different trader types (dark green, dealers; light green, sellers) and directionality indicates “buying from” or “requesting” (i.e. opposite of the flow of fish). a) Empirical network; b) Empirically-simulated network; c) network with more dealers. d- f are theoretical networks used in model experiments for reference: d) only sellers (absence of network); e) pair-wise network connecting traders from different regions; and f) fully connected network. NOTE: all networks have one added isolated trader for analytical purposes to have symmetry between regions in the ABM since the empirical network has 15 traders.
Model scenarios.
| Scenarios | Empirical example | Model interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Species seasonal closure that can be associated to species’ dynamics (red snapper stops “biting” in some regions certain times of the year, which interviewees referred to as when “the fishery closed itself”). It could also refer to fishing bans, such as a turtle protected area that banned fishing with specific gears. | Seasonal species catchability = 0 of species A during 6 out of 12 months in region 1, where individual catch depends on trader´s effort, fish stock level, and catchability of fish stock (see SM6 in | |
| Catch fluctuates due to different environmental or social dynamics. | There is 20% stochastic variability in individual catch between the catch that is expected and the actual catch that is received. |
Scenarios of different catch dynamics implemented as exogenous changes in the model to investigate how the different network structures influence responses to such changes. Each scenario was tested for each of the network structures in Fig 2B–2F.
Fig 3Flow chart of the model process.
Two different types of activities are represented in the model: the social-ecological interactions between traders and fish stocks (blue); and trade strategies. There are two types of trade strategies: information transmission (orange); and actual trade consisting of buying and selling fish (yellow). The word “trade” refers to activities performed by both types of traders (dealers and sellers).
Weekly processes and trader activities in the model.
| Key assumption | Empirical motivation | Model interpretation |
|---|---|---|
|
| ||
| Final market demand is not influenced by the trading activities in the regional fishery. Traders know the demand from the market. | Demand can come from markets at other scales. See for example [ | Exogenous constant. Each trader updates their market demand based on this value. Calibrated: calculated as being equal to the catch at MSY. |
|
| ||
| Dealers have expectations on their need for fish and, if they cannot meet the demand through their own fishers, they ask other traders with whom they have stable relationships. All relationships are equally committed. | Traders can be in communication with the fishers to know how much fish they are going to get, and can call their buyers to know how much fish they need | Traders use the market demand, the demand they had from their trade partners, and catch they obtained to predict and request fish from others. Traders request when they could not meet their demand with their own catch in the previous time step, and request equal from all their trading partners (out-links). |
|
| ||
| Traders communicate between each other and try to meet each other’s demand for fish. | Traders are in communication with their stable trading partners and “know” what | Traders update their demand for fish based on what the dealers request to them. |
|
| ||
| Traders can influence fishers’ target species, and decide the need for fish based on their market demand and fish catch. However, they cannot change the total effort. | Traders report requesting fishers the species they need or not, or even stopping to receive certain species altogether if they don’t need them | “Combined” decision-making algorithm: traders balance equally (at 50%) their relative need for each fish species with the relative Catch Per Unit Effort, and change their effort allocation between species accordingly (with a maximum 20% increment). Effort is constant. |
|
| ||
| Catch can be affected by factors other than fishing effort. Fish availability and catch is variable and influenced by multiple factors related to the ecology, biophysical and institutional conditions. | Fish catches fluctuate and fish species are not available all the time at all places | Represented by two variables 1) Individual catchability ( |
|
| ||
| Traders have some capacity to influence fishers’ effort allocation strategy. Traders ask their fishers for fish and fishers go fishing following traders’ advice. | Some traders report influencing what species fishers catch, even if this is not true for all traders | Traders go fishing, influencing the fish stock (that regenerates according to a logistic growth function) and obtaining catch that depend on their fishing effort, the stock level, and the catchability of the stock. |
|
| ||
| Traders have moral commitment between each other, and they try to sell/buy to all their trading partners to maintain their relationships. | Traders report calling each other to request what they need, and some traders try to trade regularly with all their stable trading partners | Dealers evaluate their fish demand and request an equal amount of fish to all their trade partners. First sellers sell to dealers according to that request, and then dealers sell each other according to that request. |
|
| ||
| Traders can offer fish to their stable partners based on opportunity. Dealers will buy the fish they need to satisfy their demand. | Traders report calling each other to offer fish (mainly suppliers/sellers call offering the fish they have) | Traders offer their remaining fish to their trading partners at random, and dealers buy if they still need more fish to meet their demand, until all possible demands within the network are met (or there is no fish to sell). |
|
| ||
| Traders sell to the markets, which have a limited demand. | Traders sell to different fish shops, restaurants, and exporters within the state, or even export fish themselves nationally or internationally [ | Traders sell their catch to the markets (buyers) one by one activated at random. When the markets are full, fish goes to waste. |
The table provides details on the main assumptions, relationship with primary and secondary empirical information, and model interpretation. Note that the same process applies to both types of fish stocks.
*Results from the qualitative analysis, see S2 Appendix for more details on the themes informing the narratives presented.
Fig 4Influence of network structures on fish supply and stock exploitation.
Panels a-c show scenario 1, the seasonality scenario (seasonality of species A in region 1). Panels d-f show scenario 2, the catch variability scenario. Panels a, b, d and e show the average (grey bars) and variability (standard deviation, red interval lines) of fish scarcity in the two markets (for species A and B). Panels c and f show the distribution of the exploitation of the two fish stocks in region 2 as compared to the reference point of exploitation at MSY (dotted red line). Note that the exploitation of fish stocks in region 1 is not affected by the network structures (see S4.2 and S4.6 Figs in S4 Appendix). Network types following Fig 1, and ordered from less to more dealers and connectivity. Results shown are averages and variability across 300 runs for the last five years of simulation.
Fig 5Influence of connectivity between regions for scarcity and stock exploitation in response to seasonality in Species A in region 1.
The E.I. index represents the spatial connectivity of traders in region 1, where EI>0 implies more request links from region 1 to region 2 than within region 1; and EI<0 indicates more requests links within region 1 than between the regions. Panels a-b show average scarcity, and panels c-f show the average exploitation index of the four fish stocks as a percentage, compared to the reference point of exploitation at MSY (dotted red line, where <0 represents overexploitation). Network types following Fig 1. Note that the scale of the y-axis changes between panels (panels cannot be quantitatively compared). Results show 300 simulations per network type, where each dot is the average in one simulation. *The high under-exploitation of the seasonal species (A) in e) is because it is not harvested during half of the year due to an external constraint imposed in the scenario (see Table 1).
Fig 6Influence of traders´ position in the network on individual traders’ supply.
Panels a-b show the seasonality scenario (seasonality of species A in region 1). Panels c-d show the catch variability scenario. Outdegree represents number of outgoing links, where out-going means requesting to or buying from, and thus sellers have outdegree = 0 by definition. Box and whisker plots represent median (black line in the box connected by colored lines per network type) and variability (quartiles represented by the box and whiskers) in traders´ average supply (a and c) and in traders´ supply variability (b and d), calculated across the 16 traders in 300 runs per network type. Dots are outliers. Network types following Fig 1, represented in different colors. Please observe that direct comparisons of degree centralities across network types should be done with caution since the networks differ in respect to several factors. This caution does not apply when comparing degree centralities within the same type of networks.