| Literature DB >> 34873212 |
Mohammad Reza Farzanegan1,2,3, Hans Philipp Hofmann4.
Abstract
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak has resulted in the death of over four million people since late 2019. To reduce the human and economic costs of COVID-19, different vaccines have been developed and distributed across countries. There has been significant cross-country variation in the vaccination of people against COVID-19. In this study, we focus on public corruption to explain the significant cause of cross-country variation in immunization progress. We suggest that countries with a higher degree of public corruption have been less successful in the vaccination of their population, controlling for other important determinants of immunization progress.Entities:
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Year: 2021 PMID: 34873212 PMCID: PMC8648879 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-02802-1
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sci Rep ISSN: 2045-2322 Impact factor: 4.379
Review of the literature on the governance-vaccination nexus.
| Study | Subject of investigation | Approach | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| Achim et al.[ | Effect of corruption on population health | Pooled OLS 185 countries (54 high-income and 131 low-income countries) Period of the analysis: 2005–2017 | Higher levels of corruption are negatively associated with physical health (expressed as life expectancy and Mortality rate) and mental health (expressed by happiness) |
| Habibov[ | Effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction in transitional countries | OLS regression and two-stage 2SLS regression Use the “Life in Transition Survey” Observations: (N = 8655) in 12 post-socialist countries | Negative relationship between corruption and healthcare satisfaction |
| Hanf et al.[ | Effect of corruption on national under-five mortality rate | Multivariate linear regression modelling 178 countries Cross-sectional | Positive effect of corruption on child mortality Authors estimate that more than 140,000 annual children deaths could be indirectly attributed to corruption |
| Holmberg and Rothstein[ | Effect of quality of government on population health | Multivariate linear regression > 120 countries cross-sectional | Higher levels of the QoG index are positively associated with life expectancy and higher levels of subjective health feelings Complementary, higher levels of the QoG index were negatively associated with mortality rates for children and mothers |
| Lio and Lee[ | Effect of corruption on five indicators for population health | Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects 119 countries for the period 2005–2011 | Lower levels of corruption are positively associated with: Longer life expectancy Lower infant mortality rate Lower under-five mortality rate |
| Sommer[ | Investigate the effect of the interaction between health expenditure and corruption in the executive and in the public sectors on infant and child mortality | Two-way fixed effects models 90 lowand middle-income countries timeframe: 1996 to 2012 Panel data | Negative interaction effect of corruption and health expenditure on child and infant mortality |
| Azfar and Gurgur[ | Effect of corruption on health outcomes | Random effects, tobit, ordinary-least Philippines: Survey data | Corruption reduces immunization rates and delays the vaccination of newborns. One standard deviation (≈10%) increase in corruption reduces the immunization rate by approximately 11–19% Effect of corruption on health outcomes depends on the geography of the regions (rural/urban) Lower-income strata were more affected by corruption |
| Factor and Kang[ | Developing a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of corruption. Analyzing the effects of corruption on different health indicators such as immunization | Structural equation models 133 countries | Higher corruption is associated with lower levels of health expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita, and with poorer health outcomes in general Corruption has negative effect on DPT immunization rates |
| Goel and Nelson[ | Examine socio-economic driver of two dependent variables; administration and delivery efficiency of Covid-19 vaccines | OLS regression 50 States of the United States Data was collected for two different periods (12. January and 2. February 2021) | Nursing homes per capita, Covid-19 deaths and amount of health workers are positively associated with the delivery efficiency of Covid-19 vaccines Centralized public health agency is associated with vaccination efficiency Corruption (5-year average) shows positive effect for both dependent variables but no statistical significance for the variable which captures the dissemination of vaccinations in the second time period (2. February 2021) |
| Li et al.[ | Investigate the effect of corruption on health outcomes/dependent variables were among others DPT immunization and measles immunization | Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation methods, ≈ 150 countries/cross-country panel data | Negative effect of corruption on health outcomes such as DPT and measles immunization |
Descriptive statistics.
| Variable | Obs | Mean | SD | Min | Max | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Given 1 dose (30 Aug. 2021) % of population | 190 | 35.95 | 26.46 | 0.10 | 83.60 | Bloomberg[ |
| Fully vaccinated (30 Aug. 2021) % of population | 186 | 28.45 | 24.81 | 0.10 | 83.40 | Bloomberg[ |
| Control of corruption (in 2020) (re-scaled)* | 188 | − 0.01 | 1.01 | − 2.27 | 1.91 | WGI[ |
| Corruption perceptions index (in 2020) (re-scaled)** | 171 | 55.95 | 18.95 | 12 | 88 | Transparency International[ |
| Log of GDP per capita (2017–2019) | 183 | 8.81 | 1.47 | 5.94 | 12.19 | WDI[ |
| Log of physicians (per 1,000 people) (2017–2019) | 113 | 0.09 | 1.33 | − 3.33 | 2.12 | WDI[ |
| Log of domestic general government health expenditure per capita (2017–2019) | 177 | 5.84 | 1.74 | 1.42 | 8.65 | WDI[ |
| Log of nurses and midwives (per 1000 people) (2017–2019) | 146 | 0.98 | 1.17 | − 2.64 | 4.54 | WDI[ |
| Urban population (% of population) (2017–2019) | 191 | 60.35 | 23.93 | 13.17 | 100 | WDI[ |
| Polity2 index (in 2018) | 160 | 4.38 | 6.04 | − 10 | 10 | Marshall et al[ |
| Government effectiveness (in 2020) | 188 | 0.03 | 1.00 | − 2.34 | 2.34 | WGI[ |
| Fractionalization | 149 | 0.46 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.89 | Drazanova[ |
| Globalization (in 2018) | 184 | 62.78 | 14.24 | 30.16 | 90.79 | Gygli et al.[ |
*Re-scaled by multiplying the original index by − 1. Higher scores show higher levels of petty and grand corruption.
**Rescaled by subtracting the original index from 100. Higher scores show higher levels of public corruption.
Regression results with the % of the population who have received one COVID-19 vaccine as of 30.08.2021and corruption as the main explanatory variable.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corruption in 2020 (WGI) | − 18.391*** (− 17.45) | − 14.678*** (− 10.80) | − 7.146*** (− 3.87) | − 12.716*** (− 6.74) | − 7.959*** (− 4.40) | − 10.203*** (− 5.60) | − 12.138*** (− 7.98) | − 17.008*** (− 13.78) | − 1.506 (− 0.44) | − 16.037*** (− 12.36) | − 11.716*** (− 6.62) | − 11.409** (− 2.32) | − 10.422*** (− 3.08) | |
| Corruption in 2020 (TI) | − 0.541*** (− 2.93) | |||||||||||||
| Log of GDP per capita | 8.868*** (6.55) | 5.304 (1.61) | 8.105*** (2.91) | 8.435*** (2.97) | ||||||||||
| Log of physicians (per 1,000 people) | 5.575*** (3.45) | 0.144 (0.05) | 1.238 (0.49) | 0.655 (0.26) | ||||||||||
| Log of government health expenditure | 7.163*** (5.52) | 3.969 (1.20) | ||||||||||||
| Log of nurses and midwives | 4.851*** (3.36) | − 1.650 (− 0.71) | − 0.844 (− 0.42) | − 0.828 (− 0.42) | ||||||||||
| Urban population (% of total population) | 0.272*** (4.53) | − 0.113 (− 0.79) | − 0.075 (− 0.56) | − 0.086 (− 0.62) | ||||||||||
| Polity2 index | − 0.690** (− 2.36) | − 0.703** (− 2.46) | − 0.733** (− 2.59) | − 0.629** (− 2.08) | ||||||||||
| Government effectiveness | 15.889*** (4.67) | − 2.120 (− 0.35) | ||||||||||||
| Fractionalization | − 3.201 (− 0.55) | 6.384 (0.95) | 4.850 (0.73) | 4.147 (0.62) | ||||||||||
| Globalization | 0.576*** (3.61) | 0.375 (0.92) | 0.260 (0.70) | 0.228 (0.56) | ||||||||||
| Africa | − 10.407 (− 1.56) | − 6.874 (− 1.12) | 9.319 (1.50) | − 5.821 (− 0.89) | − 10.992* (− 1.68) | − 13.221** (− 2.00) | − 3.002 (− 0.45) | − 8.970 (− 1.59) | − 1.370 (− 0.13) | − 7.227 (− 1.04) | 14.691 (1.65) | 15.277* (1.80) | 14.896* (1.72) | |
| Asia | 11.293* (1.69) | 7.009 (1.11) | 21.261*** (3.43) | 7.734 (1.17) | 10.076 (1.49) | 5.700 (0.84) | 17.736** (2.53) | 5.901 (0.98) | 21.523** (2.10) | 10.321 (1.43) | 28.245*** (3.85) | 27.886*** (3.86) | 28.022*** (3.68) | |
| North America | 10.703 (1.49) | 3.368 (0.49) | 16.046*** (2.63) | 1.078 (0.15) | 6.353 (0.87) | 5.912 (0.85) | 27.426*** (3.62) | 7.030 (1.15) | 26.530** (2.46) | 11.330 (1.46) | 28.881*** (4.04) | 30.612*** (4.58) | 31.132*** (4.36) | |
| South America | 21.291*** (3.13) | 16.084** (2.41) | 32.862*** (5.92) | 12.133* (1.72) | 19.674*** (2.97) | 11.882* (1.67) | 31.386*** (4.62) | 19.984*** (3.29) | 31.673*** (3.11) | 19.429*** (2.64) | 43.552*** (6.80) | 44.785*** (7.78) | 45.534*** (7.40) | |
| Europe | 12.947** (2.04) | 4.114 (0.66) | 23.504*** (4.56) | 3.143 (0.47) | 11.881* (1.78) | 6.825 (1.03) | 21.654*** (3.37) | 7.225 (1.29) | 20.179** (2.09) | 3.895 (0.50) | 25.124*** (3.84) | 26.578*** (4.16) | 27.378*** (3.92) | |
| Obervations | 183 | 183 | 179 | 112 | 174 | 145 | 182 | 158 | 183 | 147 | 179 | 92 | 93 | 93 |
| R-squared | 0.50 | 0.64 | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.68 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.81 |
Method of estimation is ordinary lease squares. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, *Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Regression results with the % of the population who have been fully vaccinated against COVID-19 as of 30.08.2021 and corruption as the main explanatory variable.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corruption in 2020 (WGI) | − 16.836*** (− 14.89) | − 13.267*** (− 9.07) | − 5.724*** (− 2.78) | − 11.592*** (− 5.62) | − 7.402*** (− 3.71) | − 9.193*** (− 4.21) | − 10.938*** (− 6.57) | − 14.930*** (− 10.71) | − 0.763 (− 0.22) | − 14.500*** (− 10.30) | − 11.358*** (− 6.09) | − 9.037 (− 1.60) | − 10.102*** (− 2.75) | |
| Corruption in 2020 (TI) | − 0.514** (− 2.52) | |||||||||||||
| Log of GDP per capita | 8.665*** (5.60) | 6.142* (1.98) | 6.850** (2.59) | 7.253*** (2.71) | ||||||||||
| Log of physicians (per 1,000 people) | 4.298** (2.57) | 1.070 (0.39) | 1.199 (0.47) | 0.650 (0.26) | ||||||||||
| Log of government health expenditure | 5.824*** (4.23) | 0.717 (0.23) | ||||||||||||
| Log of nurses and midwives | 3.224* (1.89) | − 1.927 (− 0.82) | − 1.873 (− 0.83) | − 1.783 (− 0.80) | ||||||||||
| Urban population (% of total population) | 0.239*** (3.69) | − 0.046 (− 0.35) | − 0.054 (− 0.43) | − 0.068 (− 0.53) | ||||||||||
| Polity2 index | − 0.540* (− 1.80) | − 0.604* (− 1.93) | − 0.616* (− 1.97) | − 0.526 (− 1.58) | ||||||||||
| Government effectiveness | 15.084*** (4.28) | 1.617 (0.23) | ||||||||||||
| Fractionalization | − 1.272 (− 0.24) | 6.054 (0.90) | 6.133 (0.98) | 5.303 (0.84) | ||||||||||
| Globalization | 0.411** (2.48) | 0.230 (0.54) | 0.284 (0.80) | 0.255 (0.65) | ||||||||||
| Africa | − 1.248 (− 0.17) | 2.936 (0.47) | 15.342* (1.84) | 3.275 (0.48) | − 2.857 (− 0.41) | − 2.629 (− 0.37) | 6.488 (1.44) | 1.104 (0.18) | 11.478* (1.88) | 5.572 (0.96) | 25.284*** (2.90) | 25.335*** (2.94) | 24.856*** (2.82) | |
| Asia | 13.362* (1.85) | 10.195 (1.55) | 21.520** (2.62) | 11.296 (1.58) | 12.461* (1.67) | 9.579 (1.29) | 20.849*** (4.25) | 9.162 (1.40) | 28.245*** (4.64) | 17.260*** (2.85) | 32.690*** (4.42) | 32.955*** (4.46) | 32.960*** (4.25) | |
| North America | 13.518* (1.81) | 7.471 (1.10) | 17.462** (2.27) | 5.391 (0.74) | 8.555 (1.15) | 10.460 (1.41) | 25.747*** (4.49) | 11.124* (1.73) | 28.965*** (4.27) | 18.495*** (2.78) | 31.578*** (4.26) | 32.140*** (4.67) | 32.475*** (4.52) | |
| South America | 20.538*** (2.77) | 16.311** (2.20) | 29.535*** (3.61) | 14.223* (1.79) | 19.313** (2.53) | 13.375* (1.66) | 30.712*** (6.12) | 20.391*** (3.06) | 34.935*** (5.66) | 23.828*** (3.74) | 43.356*** (5.62) | 43.600*** (5.85) | 44.209*** (5.60) | |
| Europe | 21.414*** (3.11) | 14.014** (2.13) | 32.512*** (4.69) | 14.990** (2.07) | 23.187*** (3.17) | 17.242** (2.38) | 30.543*** (7.05) | 17.075*** (2.75) | 33.240*** (6.34) | 19.511*** (2.88) | 39.437*** (5.77) | 39.142*** (6.01) | 39.718*** (5.56) | |
| Observations | 179 | 179 | 175 | 110 | 171 | 141 | 178 | 155 | 179 | 144 | 175 | 91 | 91 | 91 |
| R-squared | 0.48 | 0.60 | 0.66 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.68 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 0.63 | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.77 |
Method of estimation is ordinary lease squares. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, *Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.