| Literature DB >> 34866763 |
Daniel A Collier1, Dan Fitzpatrick2, Madison Dell3, Samuel S Snideman4, Christopher R Marsicano5, Robert Kelchen6, Kevin E Wells7.
Abstract
Postsecondary institutions' responses to COVID-19 are a topic of immediate relevance. Emergent research suggests that partisanship was more strongly linked to institutions offering in-person instruction for Fall 2020 than was COVID-19. Using data from the College Crisis Initiative and a multiple group structural equation modeling approach, we tested the relationships between our outcome of interest (in-person instruction in Fall 2020) and state and county sociopolitical features, state and county COVID-19 rates, and state revenue losses. Our full-sample model suggested that County Political Preferences had the strongest association with in-person instruction, followed by Pandemic Severity and State Sociopolitical Features. Because institutional sectors may be uniquely sensitive to these factors, we tested our models separately on 4-year public, 4-year private, and 2-year public and 2-year private institutions. State Sociopolitical Features were significantly related to in-person instruction for 4-year private and 2-year public institutions but were strongest for 4-year public institutions. For 4-year private and 2-year public institutions, County Political Preferences' effect sizes were 2-3 times stronger than effects from State Sociopolitical Features. Pandemic Severity was significantly, negatively related to in-person instruction for 4-year private and 2-year public institutions-similar in magnitude to State Sociopolitical Features. Our analysis revealed that COVID-19 played a stronger role in determining in-person instruction in Fall 2020 than initial research using less sophisticated methods suggested-and while State Sociopolitical Features may have played a role in the decision, 4-year private and 2-year public institutions were more sensitive to county-level preferences.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; Dependency; In-person instruction; Politics; Structural equation modeling
Year: 2021 PMID: 34866763 PMCID: PMC8631564 DOI: 10.1007/s11162-021-09665-5
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Res High Educ ISSN: 0361-0365
Fig. 1Accepted model. Robust standardized coefficients reported in Table 5
Path coefficients for the Overall Model
| Direct | Indirect | Total | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| County features | ||||
| State features | .45*** | .45*** | ||
| Pandemic severity | ||||
| State features | .52*** | − .09*** | .43*** | |
| County political preferences | − .19*** | − .19*** | ||
| State revenue changes | ||||
| State features | .36*** | − .03*** | .33*** | |
| County political preferences | .11*** | .01 | .12*** | |
| Pandemic severity | − .06** | − .06** | ||
| In-person instruction | ||||
| State features | .08* | .02*** | .10*** | |
| County political preferences | .13*** | .03*** | .16*** | |
| Revenue declines | .04 | .04 | ||
| Pandemic severity | − .12*** | − .00 | − .12*** |
p ≤ .10 + , p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***
Slight rounding errors may exist
Observed variable R2
| Baseline model | |
|---|---|
| Observed variables | |
| State Republican control | 0.64 |
| State % without Bachelor’s or Higher | 0.46 |
| 2016 share of County for GOP candidate | 0.28 |
| State COVID-19 cases per capita (10k) | 0.87 |
| County COVID-19 cases per capita (10k) | 0.52 |
| State revenue declines | 0.16 |
| In-person instruction | 0.05 |
Correlation matrix of variables in reported model
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Primarily in-person | |||||||
| 2 | Republican State control | .10*** | ||||||
| 3 | % of State without Bachelor’s Degree | .06** | .55*** | |||||
| 4 | 16 county vote to GOP President candidate | .16*** | .33*** | .35*** | ||||
| 5 | 14-day average State COVID-19 cases (per capita) | – .05** | .36*** | .23*** | .08*** | |||
| 6 | 14-day average county COVID-19 cases (per capita) | – .06** | .27*** | .18*** | – .02 | .68*** | ||
| 7 | Revenue declines | .09*** | .29*** | .29*** | .27*** | .10*** | .06** |
p ≤ .10 + , p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***
Goodness and badness of fit statistics for invariance tests
| Models | CFI | TLI | RMSEA | SRMR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline model | 0.993 | 0.980 | 0.037 | 0.023 |
| Constrained loadings | 0.995 | 0.987 | 0.030 | 0.023 |
| Constrained intercepts | 0.977 | 0.954 | 0.056 | 0.037 |
| Constrained slopes | 0.983 | 0.975 | 0.041 | 0.035 |
| Constrained slopes & intercepts | 0.925 | 0.914 | 0.077 | 0.061 |
Invariance tests
| Models | χ2 | df | Δ χ2 | Δ df | Pr(> χ2) | CFI | Δ CFI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline model | |||||||
| Constrained loadings | 53.31 | 34 | 1.22 | 6 | = .976 | 0.995 | 0.001 |
| Constrained intercepts | 125.36 | 43 | 73.27 | 15 | < .001 | 0.977 | − 0 .016 |
| Constrained slopes | 118.84 | 58 | 66.75 | 30 | < .001 | 0.983 | − 0.010 |
| Constrained slopes & intercepts | 337.20 | 73 | 285.12 | 45 | < .001 | 0.925 | − 0.068 |
Bold values indicate baseline comparisons
Structural equation model examining path coefficients by sector
| 4-year public | 4-year private | 2-year public | 2-year private | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutions | Institutions | Institutions | Institutions | |||||||||
| Direct | Indirect | Total | Direct | Indirect | Total | Direct | Indirect | Total | Direct | Indirect | Total | |
| County features | ||||||||||||
| State features | .44*** | .44*** | .51*** | .51*** | .43*** | .43*** | .56*** | .56*** | ||||
| Pandemic severity | ||||||||||||
| State features | .59*** | − .10*** | .49*** | .51*** | − .15*** | − 36*** | .51*** | − .05** | .46*** | .42*** | − .10 | .31*** |
| County features | − .22*** | − .22*** | − .29*** | − .29*** | − .12** | − .12** | − .18*** | − .18*** | ||||
| State revenue changes | ||||||||||||
| State features | .36*** | − .01 | .35*** | .35*** | − .02 | .32*** | .36*** | − .04* | .32*** | .65*** | − .06 | .60*** |
| County features | .04 | .00 | .05 | .13*** | .01 | .15*** | .14*** | .01 + | .15*** | .00 | .03 | .03 |
| Pandemic severity | − .01 | − .01 | − .04 | − .04 | − .09* | − .09* | − .15 + | − .15 + | ||||
| In-person instruction | ||||||||||||
| State features | .24** | − .04 | .20** | .04 | .08*** | .12*** | − .01 | .07*** | .06*** | − .41 + | .18 + | − .23 |
| County features | .08 | .03 | .11* | .22*** | .04*** | .26*** | .21*** | .01 | .23*** | .31* | .02 | .33** |
| Revenue declines | − .01 | − .01 | .07 + | .07 + | .01 | .01 | .14 | .14 | ||||
| Pandemic severity | − .13 + | .00 | − .13 + | − .11** | − .00 | − .12** | − .09* | .00 | − .09* | − .10 | − .02 | − .12 |
| CFI | 1.00 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 1.00 | ||||||||
| TLI | 1.02 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 1.02 | ||||||||
| RMSEA | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.00 | ||||||||
| SRMR | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.04 | ||||||||
p ≤ .10 + , p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***
Slight rounding errors may exist
Fig. 2Alternative model with prestige and residential characteristics