| Literature DB >> 34831753 |
Pei Wang1, Cong Dong2, Nan Chen1, Ming Qi1, Shucheng Yang1, Amuji Bridget Nnenna1, Wenxin Li1.
Abstract
Economic development in the "new era" will require green innovation. To encourage the growth of green technology innovation, it has become fashionable to strengthen environmental regulation. However, the impact of environmental regulation on green technology innovation, as well as the role of government subsidies, needs to be examined. Utilizing fixed-effect models and 2SLS models to explore the impact of environmental regulation on green technology innovation in China from 2003 to 2017, this research sought to examine whether environmental regulations impact green technology innovation, as well as the role of government subsidies in the above-mentioned influence path. The findings support the Porter Hypothesis by demonstrating an inverted "U" relationship between environmental regulation and green technology innovation. The impact of environmental regulation on green technology innovation varies by region. To be specific, there is an inverted "U" relationship between environmental regulation and green technology innovation in China's central and central coast regions. In comparison, the north area, southern coast, and southwest region exhibit a "U" relationship between the two. The relationship is not significant in the Beijing-Tianjin region. Additionally, government subsidies act as an intermediate in this process, positively influencing firms to pursue green technology innovation during the earliest stages of environmental regulation strengthening. However, government subsidies above a certain level are unproductive and should be used appropriately and phased off in due course.Entities:
Keywords: China; environmental regulation; government subsidies; green technology innovation
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34831753 PMCID: PMC8622477 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph182211991
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1The additive combinations of latent mechanisms result in an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and green technology innovation.
Figure 2The intermediary role of government subsidies in the path of environmental regulation affecting green technology innovation.
The provinces (cities) in eight regions of China.
| Regions | Provinces (Cities) |
|---|---|
| Beijing–Tianjin | Beijing, Tianjin |
| North | Hebei, Shandong |
| Central | Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi |
| Central Coast | Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu |
| South Coast | Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan |
| Northwest | Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang |
| Southwest | Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi |
| Northeast | Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning |
Figure 32003–2017 sales revenue of new products and total energy consumption (data source: China National Bureau of Statistics).
Figure 42003–2017 price index (data source: China National Bureau of Statistics).
Figure 52003–2017 new product sales revenue per unit of energy consumption (data source: China National Bureau of Statistics).
Description of the variables.
| Variable Name | Variable Code | Metrics | Variable Property |
|---|---|---|---|
| Green technology innovation | tec_ino | new product sales revenue/total energy consumption | Dependent variable |
| Environmental regulation | en_ru | Calculated by comprehensive weighting method | Independent variable |
| Government subsidies | gov_sub | The government funds in the internal expenditures of R&D funds after logarithmic transformation | Intermediate variable |
| Size of regional industry | size | the number of above-scale industrial enterprises after logarithmic transformation | Control variable |
| Level of regional economic development | per_gdp | Per capita GDP | Control variable |
| Human capital | hum_cap | Number of years of education per capita | Control variable |
| Regional population | popu | take log of total population of a region | Control variable |
| Foreign direct investment | fdi | take log of foreign direct investment | Control variable |
Descriptive statistics of the variables (after logarithm).
| Variable | Observations | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tec_ino | 435 | 7.016935 | 1.272259 | 3.72145 | 9.170255 |
| en_ru | 435 | 1.199214 | 1.097396 | 0.1324278 | 5.514703 |
| gov-sub | 435 | 12.36613 | 1.573007 | 8.550241 | 15.6511 |
| Size | 435 | 8.81462 | 1.122623 | 5.940171 | 10.98217 |
| per-gdp | 435 | 10.25625 | 0.7188959 | 8.677609 | 11.66635 |
| hum-cap | 435 | 9.792706 | 0.882625 | 7.77328 | 13.0702 |
| popu | 435 | 8.227627 | 0.6788662 | 6.413459 | 9.272752 |
| Fdi | 435 | 12.40906 | 1.65686 | 8.171599 | 14.86275 |
Figure 6(a) The mean of green technology innovation in eight regions; (b) the mean of environmental regulation in eight regions. In these figures, the grey parts represent Qinghai and Tibet. Due to lack of data, the corresponding index values are not shown in the figure above.
Total sample regression.
| Dependent Variable: tec_ino | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |||
| FE | IV | FE | IV | |
| en_ru | 0.515 *** | 0.133 ** | 1.490 *** | 2.413 *** |
| (4.05) | (2.13) | (6.90) | (3.54) | |
| en_rusq | −0.192 *** | −0.366 *** | ||
| (−4.89) | (−3.28) | |||
| Size | −0.292 *** | −0.005 | −0.279 ** | −0.150 ** |
| (−2.78) | (−0.13) | (−2.43) | (−2.05) | |
| per_gdp | −0.330 | 0.032 | −0.857 *** | −0.303 * |
| (−1.66) | (0.34) | (−3.94) | (−1.72) | |
| hum_cap | −0.151 | −0.142 *** | 0.016 | 0.085 |
| (−1.48) | (−5.33) | (0.15) | (1.12) | |
| Popu | −1.639 | 0.378 | −1.835 | 0.488 |
| (−1.64) | (1.04) | (−1.67) | (0.71) | |
| Fdi | 0.129 | 0.056 * | 0.199 ** | 0.220 *** |
| (1.44) | (1.66) | (2.06) | (3.31) | |
| (−0.36) | (−0.67) | |||
| Constant | 25.720 *** | 29.460 *** | ||
| (3.19) | (3.39) | |||
| Observations | 435 | 435 | 435 | 435 |
| R-squared | 0.208 | 0.858 | 0.297 | 0.630 |
| pro | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and the values in parentheses represent t-statistics.
Test of an inversely U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and green technology innovation.
| Green Technology Innovation | |
|---|---|
| Test of joint significance of PPC variables (PPC and PPC-squared) ( | 0.000 |
| Sasabuchi-test of inverse U-shape in PPC ( | 0.008 |
| Estimated extreme point | 3.882 |
| 95% confidence interval—Fieller method | [3.350, 4.976] |
| Test of joint significance of control variables ( | 0.000 |
| Test of joint significance of all variables in the model | 0.000 |
The regional grouping regression.
| Dependent Variable: tec_ino | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| Region | Beijing-Tianjin | North | Central | Centra-Coast | South-Coast | Northwest | South-West | Northeast |
| en_ru | 0.413 | −0.592 *** | 0.761 * | 1.423 *** | −0.337 | 0.366 | −0.424 *** | −0.522 |
| (1.81) | (−82.41) | (2.56) | (11.28) | (−0.62) | (0.40) | (−5.08) | (−1.54) | |
| en_rusq | −0.043 | 0.022 ** | −0.135 * | −0.132 ** | 0.147 * | −0.210 | 0.068 ** | 0.202 |
| (−5.46) | (16.63) | (−2.25) | (−6.76) | (3.18) | (−0.72) | (3.28) | (1.91) | |
| Size | −0.034 | −0.196 *** | −0.257 ** | 0.244 | −0.119 | −0.144 * | −0.020 | 0.361 |
| (−0.05) | (−77.99) | (−2.63) | (2.37) | (−0.92) | (−2.64) | (−0.33) | (0.49) | |
| per_gdp | −0.986 ** | 0.197 ** | 0.842 * | 0.029 | −0.351 | 0.815 * | −0.118 | −1.409 |
| (−18.48) | (18.54) | (2.28) | (0.16) | (−1.17) | (2.14) | (−0.65) | (−0.70) | |
| hum_cap | 0.724 | 0.038 ** | −0.265 *** | −0.008 | −0.344 ** | −0.144 | 0.050 | 0.244 |
| (2.64) | (58.50) | (−5.14) | (−0.25) | (−5.71) | (−0.99) | (0.65) | (1.63) | |
| Popu | −6.695 | −18.817 ** | 3.020 | 1.111 | −0.773 | 3.808 | −2.151 * | 10.464 |
| (−3.10) | (−63.64) | (1.55) | (1.07) | (−0.86) | (1.54) | (−2.42) | (0.87) | |
| Fdi | 0.322 | 0.128 *** | 0.028 | −0.245 | 0.557 * | −0.063 | 0.037 | 0.082 |
| (1.37) | (65.03) | (0.43) | (−2.01) | (3.23) | (−1.21) | (0.78) | (0.62) | |
| Constant | 56.189 | 174.648 *** | −21.584 | 0.076 | 15.216 | −26.513 | 25.952 ** | −70.744 |
| (5.80) | (64.34) | (−1.14) | (0.01) | (2.28) | (−1.33) | (3.16) | (−0.73) | |
| Observations | 30 | 30 | 90 | 45 | 45 | 75 | 75 | 45 |
| R-squared | 0.790 | 0.998 | 0.973 | 0.987 | 0.802 | 0.925 | 0.957 | 0.825 |
| Pro | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and the values in parentheses represent t-statistics.
The mediating effect of government subsidies.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variable | tec_ino | gov_sub | tec_ino |
| en_ru | 1.490 *** | −0.918 *** | −0.500 ** |
| (6.90) | (−4.32) | (−2.20) | |
| en_rusq | −0.192 *** | 0.161 *** | −0.031 * |
| (−4.89) | (5.60) | (−1.79) | |
| gov_sub | −0.112 | ||
| (−1.19) | |||
| en_ru ** gov_sub | 0.056 *** | ||
| (4.21) | |||
| size | −0.279 ** | 0.530 *** | −0.038 |
| (−2.43) | (3.52) | (−0.86) | |
| per_gdp | −0.857 *** | −1.037 *** | 0.054 |
| (−3.94) | (−7.16) | (0.42) | |
| hum_cap | 0.016 | 0.136 ** | −0.090 ** |
| (0.15) | (2.07) | (−2.26) | |
| popu | −1.835 | −3.830 ** | 0.760 |
| (−1.67) | (−2.56) | (1.37) | |
| fdi | 0.199 ** | −0.128 | 0.071 |
| (2.06) | (−1.28) | (1.51) | |
| Constant | 29.460 *** | 50.765 *** | 2.809 |
| (3.39) | (4.05) | (0.52) | |
| Observations | 435 | 435 | 435 |
| R-squared | 0.297 | 0.756 | 0.868 |
| Number of pro | 29 | 29 | 29 |
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and the values in parentheses represent t-statistics.
The robust test.
| (1) | |
|---|---|
| Dependent Variable | Patent |
| en_ru | 1.151 *** |
| (6.00) | |
| en_rusq | −0.117 *** |
| (−3.85) | |
| size | 0.122 * |
| (1.95) | |
| per_gdp | 0.229 |
| (1.51) | |
| hum_cap | −0.076 |
| (−1.08) | |
| popu | 0.026 |
| (0.06) | |
| fdi | −0.164 *** |
| (−3.62) | |
| Constant | 5.511 |
| (1.30) | |
| Observations | 150 |
| R-squared | 0.652 |
| Number of pro | 29 |
Note: *** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and the values in parentheses represent t-statistics.