Literature DB >> 34601903

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.

Gilbert Roberts1, Nichola Raihani2, Redouan Bshary3, Héctor M Manrique4, Andrea Farina5, Flóra Samu6, Pat Barclay7.   

Abstract

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Entities:  

Keywords:  cooperation; indirect reciprocity; partner choice; reputations

Mesh:

Year:  2021        PMID: 34601903      PMCID: PMC8487748          DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0290

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci        ISSN: 0962-8436            Impact factor:   6.237


  74 in total

1.  Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  O Leimar; P Hammerstein
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2001-04-07       Impact factor: 5.349

2.  Costly but worthless gifts facilitate courtship.

Authors:  Peter D Sozou; Robert M Seymour
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2005-09-22       Impact factor: 5.349

3.  Duration of courtship effort as a costly signal.

Authors:  Robert M Seymour; Peter D Sozou
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2008-10-10       Impact factor: 2.691

4.  Expanded social fitness and Hamilton's rule for kin, kith, and kind.

Authors:  David C Queller
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2011-06-20       Impact factor: 11.205

5.  Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation.

Authors:  Fernando P Santos; Francisco C Santos; Jorge M Pacheco
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2018-03-07       Impact factor: 49.962

6.  Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games.

Authors:  Karolina Sylwester; Gilbert Roberts
Journal:  Biol Lett       Date:  2010-04-21       Impact factor: 3.703

7.  Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Ralf D Sommerfeld; Hans-Jürgen Krambeck; Dirk Semmann; Manfred Milinski
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2007-10-18       Impact factor: 11.205

Review 8.  Reputation, a universal currency for human social interactions.

Authors:  Manfred Milinski
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2016-02-05       Impact factor: 6.237

9.  Justified defection is neither justified nor unjustified in indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Hitoshi Yamamoto; Takahisa Suzuki; Ryohei Umetani
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2020-06-30       Impact factor: 3.240

10.  Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of Prejudicial Groups.

Authors:  Roger M Whitaker; Gualtiero B Colombo; David G Rand
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2018-09-05       Impact factor: 4.379

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  13 in total

Review 1.  Male services during between-group conflict: the 'hired gun' hypothesis revisited.

Authors:  Redouan Bshary; Xiang-Yi Li Richter; Carel van Schaik
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2022-04-04       Impact factor: 6.237

2.  Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation.

Authors:  Mohammad Salahshour
Journal:  PLoS Comput Biol       Date:  2022-09-29       Impact factor: 4.779

3.  Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment.

Authors:  Yuma Fujimoto; Hisashi Ohtsuki
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2022-06-22       Impact factor: 4.996

4.  The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.

Authors:  S Számadó; D Balliet; F Giardini; E A Power; K Takács
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

Review 5.  Reputation and socio-ecology in humans.

Authors:  A Romano; F Giardini; S Columbus; E W de Kwaadsteniet; D Kisfalusi; Z Triki; C Snijders; K Hagel
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

Review 6.  The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation.

Authors:  Héctor M Manrique; Henriette Zeidler; Gilbert Roberts; Pat Barclay; Michael Walker; Flóra Samu; Andrea Fariña; Redouan Bshary; Nichola Raihani
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

7.  When does reputation lie? Dynamic feedbacks between costly signals, social capital and social prominence.

Authors:  Marion Dumas; Jessica L Barker; Eleanor A Power
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

8.  Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms.

Authors:  Wojtek Przepiorka; Andreas Diekmann
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

Review 9.  The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Fernando P Santos; Jorge M Pacheco; Francisco C Santos
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

10.  Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game.

Authors:  Tommaso Batistoni; Pat Barclay; Nichola J Raihani
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2022-01-12       Impact factor: 5.349

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