Wolfgang Strube1,2, Camelia Lucia Cimpianu1, Miriam Ulbrich1, Ömer Faruk Öztürk1,3, Thomas Schneider-Axmann1, Peter Falkai1, Louise Marshall4, Sven Bestmann4,5, Alkomiet Hasan2. 1. Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Ludwig Maximillian University, Munich,Germany. 2. Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics of the University Augsburg, Medical Faculty, University of Augsburg, Bezirkskrankenhaus Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany. 3. International Max Planck Research School for Translational Psychiatry, Munich, Germany. 4. Department of Clinical and Movement Neurosciences, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, Queen Square, London, UK. 5. Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, Queen Square, London, UK.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) is a prominent reasoning bias in schizophrenia (SCZ). While it has been linked to not only psychopathological abnormalities (delusions and impulsive decision-making) but also unstable belief formation, its origin remains unclear. We here directly test to which extend JTC is associated with delusional ideation, impulsive decision-making, and unstable belief formation. METHODS: In total, 45 SCZ patients were compared with matched samples of 45 patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and 45 healthy controls (HC) as delusions and JTC also occur in other mental disorders and the general population. Participants performed a probabilistic beads task. To test the association of JTC with measures of delusions (Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale [PANSS]positive, PANSSpositive-factor, and Peter Delusions Inventory [PDI]), Bayesian linear regressions were computed. For the link between JTC and impulsive decision-making and unstable beliefs, we conducted between-group comparisons of "draws to decision" (DTD), "decision times" (DT), and "disconfirmatory evidence scores" (DES). RESULTS: Bayesian regression obtained no robust relationship between PDI and DTD (all |R2adj| ≤ .057, all P ≥ .022, all Bayes Factors [BF01] ≤ 0.046; α adj = .00833). Compared with MDD and HC, patients with SCZ needed more time to decide (significantly higher DT in ambiguous trials: all P ≤ .005, r2 ≥ .216; numerically higher DT in other trials). Further, SCZ had unstable beliefs about the correct source jar whenever unexpected changes in bead sequences (disconfirmatory evidence) occurred (compared with MDD: all P ≤ .004 and all r2 ≥ .232; compared with HC: numerically higher DES). No significant correlation was observed between DT and DTD (all P ≥ .050). CONCLUSIONS: Our findings point toward a relationship of JTC with unstable belief formation and do not support the assumption that JTC is associated with impulsive decision-making.
BACKGROUND: Jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) is a prominent reasoning bias in schizophrenia (SCZ). While it has been linked to not only psychopathological abnormalities (delusions and impulsive decision-making) but also unstable belief formation, its origin remains unclear. We here directly test to which extend JTC is associated with delusional ideation, impulsive decision-making, and unstable belief formation. METHODS: In total, 45 SCZ patients were compared with matched samples of 45 patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and 45 healthy controls (HC) as delusions and JTC also occur in other mental disorders and the general population. Participants performed a probabilistic beads task. To test the association of JTC with measures of delusions (Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale [PANSS]positive, PANSSpositive-factor, and Peter Delusions Inventory [PDI]), Bayesian linear regressions were computed. For the link between JTC and impulsive decision-making and unstable beliefs, we conducted between-group comparisons of "draws to decision" (DTD), "decision times" (DT), and "disconfirmatory evidence scores" (DES). RESULTS: Bayesian regression obtained no robust relationship between PDI and DTD (all |R2adj| ≤ .057, all P ≥ .022, all Bayes Factors [BF01] ≤ 0.046; α adj = .00833). Compared with MDD and HC, patients with SCZ needed more time to decide (significantly higher DT in ambiguous trials: all P ≤ .005, r2 ≥ .216; numerically higher DT in other trials). Further, SCZ had unstable beliefs about the correct source jar whenever unexpected changes in bead sequences (disconfirmatory evidence) occurred (compared with MDD: all P ≤ .004 and all r2 ≥ .232; compared with HC: numerically higher DES). No significant correlation was observed between DT and DTD (all P ≥ .050). CONCLUSIONS: Our findings point toward a relationship of JTC with unstable belief formation and do not support the assumption that JTC is associated with impulsive decision-making.
Authors: Giada Tripoli; Diego Quattrone; Laura Ferraro; Charlotte Gayer-Anderson; Victoria Rodriguez; Caterina La Cascia; Daniele La Barbera; Crocettarachele Sartorio; Fabio Seminerio; Ilaria Tarricone; Domenico Berardi; Andrei Szöke; Celso Arango; Andrea Tortelli; Pierre-Michel Llorca; Lieuwe de Haan; Eva Velthorst; Julio Bobes; Miguel Bernardo; Julio Sanjuán; Jose Luis Santos; Manuel Arrojo; Cristina Marta Del-Ben; Paulo Rossi Menezes; Jean-Paul Selten; Peter B Jones; Hannah E Jongsma; James B Kirkbride; Antonio Lasalvia; Sarah Tosato; Alex Richards; Michael O'Donovan; Bart Pf Rutten; Jim van Os; Craig Morgan; Pak C Sham; Robin M Murray; Graham K Murray; Marta Di Forti Journal: Psychol Med Date: 2020-04-24 Impact factor: 7.723