Literature DB >> 34457754

A Primer on the Game Theory Behind the National Resident Matching Program for the Medical Educator and Student.

Muhammad Maaz1,2.   

Abstract

Every year, medical students vie for American graduate training through the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Some students yet behave in ways that imply persistent misunderstandings about the matching algorithm. This paper explains the economic and mathematical literature underpinning it for a medical audience. The NRMP implements the Roth-Peranson algorithm, finding a stable match by having students propose to residency programs according to their preference ranking. This configuration favors students while disfavoring hospitals. Game-theoretic analysis shows us that students are unequivocally unable to "game the system" by misstating their preferences. Telling the truth is the optimal strategy. © International Association of Medical Science Educators 2020, corrected publication 2020.

Entities:  

Keywords:  Match; NRMP; Postgraduate education; Residency

Year:  2020        PMID: 34457754      PMCID: PMC8368266          DOI: 10.1007/s40670-020-00955-8

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Med Sci Educ        ISSN: 2156-8650


  2 in total

1.  The effects of the change in the NRMP matching algorithm. National Resident Matching Program.

Authors:  A E Roth; E Peranson
Journal:  JAMA       Date:  1997-09-03       Impact factor: 56.272

2.  The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design.

Authors:  Alvin E Roth; Elliott Peranson
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  1999-09
  2 in total

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