| Literature DB >> 34457754 |
Muhammad Maaz1,2.
Abstract
Every year, medical students vie for American graduate training through the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Some students yet behave in ways that imply persistent misunderstandings about the matching algorithm. This paper explains the economic and mathematical literature underpinning it for a medical audience. The NRMP implements the Roth-Peranson algorithm, finding a stable match by having students propose to residency programs according to their preference ranking. This configuration favors students while disfavoring hospitals. Game-theoretic analysis shows us that students are unequivocally unable to "game the system" by misstating their preferences. Telling the truth is the optimal strategy. © International Association of Medical Science Educators 2020, corrected publication 2020.Entities:
Keywords: Match; NRMP; Postgraduate education; Residency
Year: 2020 PMID: 34457754 PMCID: PMC8368266 DOI: 10.1007/s40670-020-00955-8
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Med Sci Educ ISSN: 2156-8650