| Literature DB >> 34413078 |
Simone E Carter1, Steve Ahuka-Mundeke2, Jérôme Pfaffmann Zambruni3, Carlos Navarro Colorado3, Esther van Kleef4, Pascale Lissouba5, Sophie Meakin6, Olivier le Polain de Waroux7, Thibaut Jombart8, Mathias Mossoko9, Dorothée Bulemfu Nkakirande9, Marjam Esmail3, Giulia Earle-Richardson10, Marie-Amelie Degail7, Chantal Umutoni11, Julienne Ngoundoung Anoko12, Nina Gobat13.
Abstract
The emerging field of outbreak analytics calls attention to the need for data from multiple sources to inform evidence-based decision making in managing infectious diseases outbreaks. To date, these approaches have not systematically integrated evidence from social and behavioural sciences. During the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, an innovative solution to systematic and timely generation of integrated and actionable social science evidence emerged in the form of the Cellulle d'Analyse en Sciences Sociales (Social Sciences Analytics Cell) (CASS), a social science analytical cell. CASS worked closely with data scientists and epidemiologists operating under the Epidemiological Cell to produce integrated outbreak analytics (IOA), where quantitative epidemiological analyses were complemented by behavioural field studies and social science analyses to help better explain and understand drivers and barriers to outbreak dynamics. The primary activity of the CASS was to conduct operational social science analyses that were useful to decision makers. This included ensuring that research questions were relevant, driven by epidemiological data from the field, that research could be conducted rapidly (ie, often within days), that findings were regularly and systematically presented to partners and that recommendations were co-developed with response actors. The implementation of the recommendations based on CASS analytics was also monitored over time, to measure their impact on response operations. This practice paper presents the CASS logic model, developed through a field-based externally led consultation, and documents key factors contributing to the usefulness and adaption of CASS and IOA to guide replication for future outbreaks. © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.Entities:
Keywords: epidemiology; health services research; other study design; public health; viral haemorrhagic fevers
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34413078 PMCID: PMC8380808 DOI: 10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006736
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMJ Glob Health ISSN: 2059-7908
Figure 1Flow of Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales analytics process.
Figure 2Structure and placement of Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales (CASS) teams across the coordination and subcoordination structure of the Ebola response.13 The CASS team had full time capacity to cover three subcoordinations and their surrounding areas. These were the most recurrent hostpots. Rapid studies conducted in Goma and Bunia were done by the mobile team. Note: the subcoordination locations changed during the outbreak based on case-load. MoH, Ministry of Health.
Additional examples of changes and impact of the use of CASS studies during the 2018–2020 Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreak
| Study | Rationale for study, key partners, study aim and methods | Results/Recommendations | Change and impact on outbreak intervention | |
|
| Perceptions of risk among pregnant and breastfeeding women |
Women who were not eligible for the vaccine reported feeling abandoned, not receiving psychosocial support or surveillance and follow-up (compared with their neighbours or others Female breastfeeding healthcare workers continued to work and place themselves at risk, without access to the vaccine, while others decided independently to stop breast feeding (or report stopping) to access the vaccine. |
Surveillance forms were adapted to include pregnant and breastfeeding status. Vaccination teams began reporting daily how many non-eligible were not vaccinated: this further highlighted the daily number of women at risk because of the eligibility criteria. Kits were provided to support breastfeeding mothers (healthcare worker, frontline responder, high-risk contact) who wished to stop breast feeding and access the vaccine. Advocacy to allow pregnant and breastfeeding women access to the novel Ebola vaccine. This was raised to SAGE and, following this, the policy was changed in June 2019. | |
|
| Perceptions of infection prevention control (IPC) and healthcare services measures | Community members saw the value and benefit of decontamination practices. Reluctance to engage with decontamination practices was linked to the fact that decontamination for Ebola was being undertaken by unknown external teams in a context of significant mistrust. For other infectious disease scenarios requiring decontamination, local community members were used to this being conducted at the level of the health facilities by local healthcare workers. |
Guidelines for community engagement in IPC (March 2019). Training of 95 local hygienists in 30 neighbourhoods in all the health areas of Beni and 50 others in the health facilities of 15 surrounding health facilities (July 2019). Recommendation implemented and inserted in the strategic response plan 4: involve communities and families in decontamination and in close collaboration with the risk communication and community engagement and psychosocial support (PSS) teams. | |
|
| Understanding delays in treatment- seeking | Barriers to treatment-seeking were largely due to misunderstanding of Ebola symptoms (posters and images focused on severe rather than more common symptoms) as well as fear that Ebola Treatment Centres would result in death. |
Development of new communications tools (messages and images) which include ‘dry’ symptoms and make comparisons to other known illnesses (now included in all communication tools). Messages and campaigns focused on early treatment-seeking for survival. | |
|
| Understanding nosocomial transmission |
IPC data highlighted that less than half of the healthcare facilities had received training. CASS healthcare worker surveys conducted across all response locations smaller and harder to reach facilities were less likely to report having received support. The majority of healthcare workers were not being trained on location and did not feel able to stop nosocomial transmission due to reported lack of training. Many healthcare workers did not feel able to detect a possible Ebola case. Healthcare workers reported increased community tensions and fear of accusations from communities for working for the response, which may influence willingness to raise an alert. Traditional practitioners were reported as not sufficiently involved in the response. | New IPC-WASH training to focus on smaller healthcare facilities and to include practical demonstrations and application as a key component of the training. Communication materials adapted to better explain and communicate on common Ebola systems (less visibly severe). Traditional practitioners were included into the IPC-WASH pillars across multiple locations, reinforcing their engagement with the response. | |
|
| Factors of risk for children under 5 years of age |
CASS analysis of health services use data demonstrated increased use of healthcare facilities by up to 300%–400% for children under 5 years of age. IPC data highlighted that nosocomial infections were more likely in smaller healthcare facilities; there the increased use of services was likely to cause overcrowding and limited capacity to stop nosocomial transmission. Surveillance data found that children under 5 years of age were less to be listed as contacts and, when listed, less likely to be followed up. CASS qualitative data found that children continued to receive injections and intravenous treatments in healthcare facilities, that parents reported bed-sharing and lack of IPC measures. Parents and surveillance teams also perceived small children as not likely to be contacts and were therefore not quick to list them. |
Communication materials were developed to explain the risks for children (when they may have become a contact) and the importance of listing children. Training for PSS and surveillance teams were reinforced to increase the number of children under 5 years of age listed as contacts and to reinforce follow-up of cases. |
This list is not exhaustive. A complete list of CASS studies conducted during the outbreak can be found online.23
CASS, Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DHIS2, The District Health Information Software (https://dhis2.org/); IPC-WASH, Infection Prevention and Control-Water Sanitation Hygiene; MoH, Ministry of Health.
Figure 3Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales (CASS) logic model.