| Literature DB >> 34404960 |
Miriam Alvarado1, Tarra L Penney1,2, Nigel Unwin3,4,5, Madhuvanti M Murphy5, Jean Adams1.
Abstract
Consuming sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) has been associated with increased rates of obesity and type 2 diabetes, making SSBs an increasingly popular target for taxation. In addition to changing prices, the introduction of an SSB tax may convey information about the health risks of SSBs (a signalling effect). If SSB taxation operates in part by producing a health risk signal, there may be important opportunities to amplify this effect. Our aim was to assess whether there is evidence of a risk signalling effect following the introduction of the Barbados SSB tax. We used process tracing to assess the existence of a signalling effect around sodas and sugar-sweetened juices (juice drinks). We used three data sources: 611 archived transcripts of local television news, 30 interviews with members of the public, and electronic point of sales data (46 months) from a major grocery store chain. We used directed content analysis to assess the qualitative data and an interrupted time series analysis to assess the quantitative data. We found evidence consistent with a risk signalling effect following the introduction of the SSB tax for sodas but not for juice drinks. Consistent with risk signalling theory, the findings suggest that consumers were aware of the tax, believed in a health rationale for the tax, understood that sodas were taxed and perceived that sodas and juice drinks were unhealthy. However consumers appear not to have understood that juice drinks were taxed, potentially reducing tax effectiveness from a health perspective. In addition, the tax may have incentivised companies to increase advertising around juice drinks (undermining any signalling effect) and to introduce low-cost SSB product lines. Policymakers can maximize the impact of risk signals by being clear about the definition of taxed SSBs, emphasizing the health rationale for introducing such a policy, and introducing co-interventions (e.g. marketing restrictions) that reduce opportunities for industry countersignals. These actions may amplify the impact of an SSB tax.Entities:
Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Noncommunicable Diseases; Policy evaluation; Sugar-sweetened beverages
Year: 2021 PMID: 34404960 PMCID: PMC8346947 DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102104
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Food Policy ISSN: 0306-9192 Impact factor: 4.552
Fig. 1Expressive function of law theory applied to sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation for sodas and juice drinks separately a, b a Note that price change represents another mechanism through which the introduction of an SSB tax may influence SSB sales. b Numbers 1–5 correspond to testable components of the theory; ‘X’ corresponds to the hypothesized cause and ‘Y’ corresponds to the outcome.
Predicted empirical evidence and test types.
| Hypotheses ( | Prior p(h) | Part | Means of Verification | Predicted Empirical Evidence ( | Test Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Likely, given evidence of SSB tax awareness in other settings, e.g. 65% awareness in Mexico, ( | 1a | Interviews with members of the public | Participants report being aware of the tax, and can describe details (e.g. when/how they heard about the tax, how it was introduced, etc.) | Hoop | |
| 1b | Archived media data | Major news sources cover the tax, providing a plausible mechanism for the public to have learned about the policy | Hoop | ||
| Agnostic | 2a | Interviews with members of the public | Participants report that the tax was introduced because of the health risks of SSBs | Doubly Decisive | |
| Agnostic | 3a | Interviews with members of the public | Participants report that the tax is applied on sodas and/or juice drinks | Doubly Decisive | |
| Likely, given evidence of increased newspaper coverage of SSBs as unhealthy in Barbados ( | 4a | Interviews with members of the public | Participants mention health risks of sodas and/or juice drinks | Hoop | |
| 4b | Interviews with members of the public | Participants mention increasing their perception of the health risks of sodas and/or juice drinks because of the tax | Smoking Gun | ||
| 4c | Archived media data | News media coverage of SSBs as unhealthy increases following introduction of the tax | Hoop | ||
| Agnostic | 5a | Electronic point of sale data from a major grocery store chain | Sales of taxed sodas and/or juice drinks decrease over time | Hoop | |
| 5b | Electronic point of sale data from a major grocery store chain | Sales of soda/juice drinks | Hoop |
Note: e: evidence; h: hypothesis that part of a causal mechanism exists; p(h): probability of the hypothesis being true.
Fig. A1PRISMA-based flow chart around archived media transcripts included in study
Results of empirical tests and implications.
| Hypotheses ( | Interpretation (prior → posterior) |
|---|---|
| Likely → Likely | |
| Agnostic → Very likely | |
| Agnostic → Very likely (for sodas) | |
| Likely → Likely (for sodas) | |
| Agnostic → Agnostic (for sodas) |
Note: e: evidence; h: hypothesis that part of a causal mechanism exist
Fig. 6Updated risk signalling theory based on process tracing. Note that our reported levels of confidence do not correspond to the strength of the effect, but rather to the level of confidence we have in each component of the theory after considering the evidence presented above.
Fig. 2Frequency and distribution of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) related advertisements shown during Caribbean Broadcast Corporation (CBC) Evening News, Barbados, June 2014 - July 2017. Note: Orchard is a juice drink brand, Glucerna is a meal-replacement shake targeted at diabetics and Milo is a malt-based drink.
Fig. 3Comparison of sales trends (mL/capita) for sodas and juice drinks, Barbados, 2013–2016 (re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, Alvarado et al., 2019)). Note: The two upper panels (3A and 3B) display the unadjusted model results overlaid with the raw data. Soda sales were truncated at 150 mL/capita for ease of display. The lower panels (3C and 3D) display the model results adjusted for seasonality and holidays.
Fig. 4Price of soda and juice drinks following the introduction of the Barbados sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax, 2013–2016, based on products with data in every week of the study period (Panels A and B) and all products (Panels C and D), re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, Alvarado et al., 2019).
Post-tax change (%) in average weekly cost per litre (consumption weighted by sales volume).
| SSB Type | Products (#) | Coef. | 95% CI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soda | 54 | 6.2% | 6.0% | 6.3% |
| Juice Drinks | 48 | 9.0% | 8.8% | 9.2% |
Note: Regression coefficients and 95% CIs were back-transformed to the original scale using (exp()-1*100) to estimate mean percentage change.
Fig. 5Mean weekly cost per litre, top-selling juice drink brands, Barbados, 2013–2016, (re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, Alvarado et al., 2019)).