| Literature DB >> 34253676 |
Kevin Jenniskens1,2, Martin C J Bootsma3,4, Johanna A A G Damen3,2, Michiel S Oerbekke2,5, Robin W M Vernooij3,2, René Spijker2, Karel G M Moons3, Mirjam E E Kretzschmar3, Lotty Hooft3,2.
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: To systematically review evidence on effectiveness of contact tracing apps (CTAs) for SARS-CoV-2 on epidemiological and clinical outcomes.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; epidemiology; microbiology; statistics & research methods
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34253676 PMCID: PMC8277487 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050519
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMJ Open ISSN: 2044-6055 Impact factor: 2.692
Descriptive characteristics of included studies
| Study | Country | Study type | Sample size/simulations (n) | Time horizon | Population | Specific setting(s) | Intervention | Comparison | Outcome(s) | Main findings |
| Bradshaw 2020 | Germany | Modelling | 500 or 1000 simulations | 52 weeks or 10 000 cases | General population | – | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | Manual contact tracing. Current practice. | R. Outbreak control. | Bidirectional tracing will enable more effective control of COVID-19. Switching from forward to bidirectional tracing can reduce R by 0.3 if the tracing time window is sufficiently wide. High adoption of bidirectional manual and digital contact tracing is 3× more effective at outbreak control compared with current practice. |
| Bulchandani 2020 | USA | Modelling | 4000 simulations | N/R | Susceptible population (ie, no immunity) | – | Contact tracing app (not specified) with quarantine | – | R. Outbreak control. | Outbreak control is possible regardless of proportion of asymptomatic transmission. Outbreak control requires a contact tracing app adoption of 75%–95%. |
| Cencetti 2020 | Italy | Modelling | 20 simulations | 50 days | General population | University High school. Workplace. | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | R. Outbreak control. | Reduction of R and outbreak control is dependent on contact tracing efficiency, isolation efficiency and R0. Outbreak control can be achieved through tracing and isolation, provided that hygiene and social distancing measures limit R0 to 1.5. Outbreak control not feasible if contact tracing app adoption is insufficient or if R0 is >2. |
| Chen 2020 | Taiwan | Empirical | 3000 individuals | 40 days | General population (Taiwan) | – | Public Warning System SMS (GPS) with quarantine and symptom monitoring | Current practice | Respiratory syndrome. Pneumonia. | Contact tracing and SMS feedback resulted in less cases of respiratory syndrome (16.87 vs 19.23 per 1000) and pneumonia (2.36 vs 3.81 per 1000) compared with the general population. Resource requirements for manual contact tracing could be reduced by using contract tracing apps combined with big data analytics. |
| Currie 2020 | Australia | Modelling | Not reported | 12 months | General population (Australia) | – | COVIDSafe contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | No contact tracing app | Outbreak control. Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. | Outbreak control by a contact tracing app can be achieved when adoption is sufficient, and is combined with testing and social distancing. Cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 can within 8 months (depending social distancing and testing intensity) be reduced to: 13%–24% at an app adoption of 27%. 17%–35% at an app adoption of 40%. 36%–59% at an app adoption of 61%. 47%–76% at an app adoption of 80%. |
| Ferrari 2020 | Italy | Modelling | 5500 simulations (per scenario) | 50 days | General population (Italy) | – | Contact tracing app (not specified) with quarantine and symptom monitoring | – | R. Outbreak control. Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2 (symptomatic). Mortality. | Reduction of R below 1.0 can be achieved when contact tracing apps have sufficient adoption, efficacy of case identification and compliance to quarantine. Outbreak control can be achieved using contact tracing apps combined with voluntary self-quarantine and efficient case isolation, depending population density and transportation. Outbreak control was achieved with 75% app adoption rate. Cumulative incidence can be suppressed with 25% app adoption rate, but outbreaks will be sustained by districts with high population density. Mortality was reduced by: 10% at 25% app adoption rate. 25% at 50% app adoption rate. 40%–60% at 75% app adoption rate. |
| Ferretti 2020 | China | Modelling | 40 simulations (pairs) | 12 days | General population (China) | Home. Train. Work. | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | Manual contact tracing | R | Manual contact tracing is not able to stop outbreaks due to delays (~3 days), whereas contact tracing apps are able to prevent outbreaks. Reduction of R below 1.0 is feasible using instantaneous (red. without delays) contact tracing apps. |
| Grimm 2020 | Germany | Modelling | N/R | 500 days | General population (Germany) | High risk of severe course of infection. Low risk of severe course of infection. | Contact tracing app (not specified) with quarantine | No intervention. Uniform social distancing. Group-specific social distancing. | Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. Number of days ICU capacity exceeded. Mortality. | ICU capacity and mortality can be kept low by using contact tracing apps combined with tailored social distancing and personal protection measures. ICU capacity was not exceeded at any point with a contact tracing app adoption of 20% or more. Mortality was reduced by 85% when a high (80%) adoption rate of the contact tracing app was achieved. |
| Guttal 2020 | N/R | Modelling | N/R | 150–200 days | General population | – | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2 | Peak cumulative incidence can be flattened significantly even when a small fraction of cases are identified using contact tracing apps, tested and isolated. Peak cumulative incidence can strongly be reduced even if contact tracing app testing is only performed in the most probable individuals (p>0.8). |
| Kendall 2020 | UK | Empirical | Population-size Isle of Wight | <2 months | General population (Isle of Wight and UK (except Wales)) | – | NHS contact tracing app (V.1) (Bluetooth) with social distancing | – | R. Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. | Reduction of R from 1.3 to 0.5 was achieved after implementation of a contact tracing app. Cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 reduced by 87% in 2–3 weeks after implementation of a contact tracing app. |
| Kretzschmar 2020 | Netherlands | Modelling | 1000 simulations | N/R | General population | Close contacts. Casual contacts. | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | Social distancing without contact tracing app | R | Contact tracing apps, with short delays and high coverage for testing and tracing, could substantially reduce the R, alleviating more stringent control measures. Reduction of the R from 1.2 with social distancing alone to 0.8 (95% CI 0.7 to 1.0) by adding a contact tracing app with an adoption of 80%. Reduction of the R through contact tracing apps is more effective compared with manual contact tracing, with respectively 17.6% and 2.5% reduction of R compared with no contact tracing. Reduction in transmission rate (reflective of R) depends on tracing delay: 79.9% with 0-day testing delay. 41.8% with 3-day testing delay. 4.9% with 7-day testing delay. |
| Kucharski 2020 | UK | Modelling | 25 000 simulations | N/R | General population (UK) | Household. Work. School. Other. | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | R. Outbreak control. | Combining contact tracing app with quarantine and reduce transmission more than mass testing or self-isolation alone. Reduction in transmission rate (reflective of R) was 47% when contact tracing app was used at 53% adoption rate. Maintaining an R<1.0 requires a combination of self-isolation, contact tracing and physical distancing. Outbreak control in a scenario where incidence is high requires a considerable number of individuals to be quarantined after contact tracing. |
| Kurita 2020 | Japan | Modelling | N/R | 5 months | General population (Japan) | – | COCOA contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | R | Reduction of R<1.3 using a contact tracing app is not feasible if there are no voluntary restrictions. Reduction of R<1.0 is feasible if contact tracing app adoption is 10% combined with 15% compliance for voluntary restrictions against going out. |
| Nuzzo 2020 | USA | Modelling | N/R | 400 days | Susceptible individuals | – | Contact tracing app (GPS, WiFi and/or Bluetooth) with quarantine | Shelter in place | Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. Mortality. | Contact tracing apps can mitigate infection spread similar to universal shelter-in-place, but with considerably fewer individuals isolated. Cumulative peak incidence can be reduced by 49% at 20% app adoption rate. Cumulative peak incidence can be reduced by 90% at 50% app adoption rate (similar to 40% compliance to shelter in place). Mortality can be reduced by 23% at 20% app adoption rate. |
| Pollmann 2020 | Germany | Modelling | 100 simulations | 500 days | General population | – | Contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | R. Outbreak control. Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. | Recursive tracing by contact tracing apps is more efficient than 1-step-tracing. Contact tracing apps alone cannot bring R below 1.0, unless 100% adoption is approached, and app notifications are strictly followed by quarantining and testing. Reducing an Ro of >3.0, in which 40% are asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carriers, below 1.0, can only be achieved by a contact tracing app if combined with other interventions such as social distancing and/or random testing. Reducing R significantly requires a contact tracing app adoption rate of at least 60%. Cumulative incidence is reduced at any percentage of contact tracing app adoption. |
| Scott 2020 | Australia | Modelling | N/R | 3.5 months | Susceptible population (Victoria, Australia) | Various* | COVIDSafe contact tracing app (Bluetooth) with quarantine | – | Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2 | Impact of policy changes on cumulative incidence can take >2 months to become apparent. Opening pubs/bars was identified as the greatest risk for increasing incidence of SARS-CoV-2. This could be mitigated by either of these measures: 30% app adoption rate is achieved. Transmission within venues was reduced by >40% through physical distancing policies. Manual contact tracing was used that enabled >60% of contacts to be traced. Cumulative incidence is unlikely to be significantly impacted when app adoption rates are low-moderate. |
| Shamil 2020 | Bangladesh | Modelling | N/R | 60 days | Susceptible population | Healthcare workers. Students. Service holders. Unemployed people. | Contact tracing app (not specified) with quarantine | Lockdown. Extra personal protection. | R. Cumulative incidence SARS-CoV-2. | Reduction of R below 1.0 can be achieved within 3 weeks at 60% app adoption rate. Cumulative incidence approach 0 within 3 months when 75% app adoption rate is achieved. Cumulative incidence is reduced by 3.5% when using a contact tracing app compared with not using one. Cumulative incidence is reduced by 4.6% after 90 days when either: All doctors, nurses, healthcare workers and 50% of service holders are using a contact tracing app for 2 days. 75% of the population are using a contact tracing app for 2 days. |
Characteristics of empirical epidemiological and model-based studies looking at effectiveness of contact and tracing apps for SARS-CoV-2.
*Household, school, work, community, church, professional sports, community sports, beaches, entertainment, cafés/restaurants, pubs/bars, public transport, national parks, public parks, large events, child care, social networks and aged care.
ICU, intensive care unit; N/R, not reported; R0, baseline reproduction number; R, reproduction number.
Properties of model-based studies
| Study | Model-related properties | Contact- and tracing app related properties | Disease-related properties | Modifyable properties | ||||||||
| Model type | Input parameter properties | Tracing direction | Sequential generations (n) | Adoption rate app (%) | R | Incubation time | Infectious period | Probability of disease transmission | Delay symptom onset and testing | Delay testing and feedback app | Quarantine effectiveness | |
| Bradshaw 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Branching-process model | Distributions | Bidirectional | Infinite generations | 53; 80 | 2.5 | 5.5 days | Fitted to curve, value not specified | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 1 days | 0 days | 90% |
| Bulchandani 2020 (preprint) | Branching-process model | Based on exponential distributions | Bidirectional | 3-infinite generations | 0–100 | 3.0 | N/A* | N/A | N/R | N/A† | 0 days | 100% |
| Cencetti 2020 (preprint) | Continuous weighted temporal network | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 60; 80; 100 | 1.2; 1.5; 2.0 | Fitted to curve, value not specified | Fitted to curve, value not specified | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 2 days | 0 days | 0%–100% |
| Currie 2020 (peer-reviewed) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 0; 27; 40; 61; 80 | 2.5 | 2.0 days | 11 days | N/R | 3 days | N/R | 90% |
| Ferrari 2020 (peer-reviewed) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 0; 25; 50; 75 | 1.5 | 5.1 days | 10 days | 10% | 2 days | N/R | 90% |
| Ferretti 2020 (peer-reviewed) | PDE compartmental model | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 0–100 | 2.0 | 5.5 days | 12 days | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 1.6 days | 0 days | 0%–100% |
| Grimm 2020 (preprint) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 20–80 | 2.2; 3.0 | 5.0 days | 10;12.5;14;20 days | N/R | N/R | N/R | 100%‡ |
| Guttal 2020 (preprint) | Individual-based network model | Based on exponential distributions | Bidirectional | >1 generation | 100 | 3.0; 4.0 | N/A | 20 days | 0.2% | N/R | N/R | 100% |
| Kretzschmar 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Branching-process model | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 20; 40; 60; 80; 100 | 2.5 | 6.4 days | 10 days | 2%–12% | 0 days | 0 days | 0%; 20%; 40%; |
| Kucharski 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Individual-based network model | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 53 | 2.6 | 5.0 days | 5 days | 20% within HH | 0 days | 0 days | 90% |
| Kurita 2020 (peer-reviewed) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions | N/R | 1 generation | 0; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; | 1.5 | 6.6 days | N/R | N/R | 2 days | 0 days | N/R |
| Nuzzo 2020 (peer-reviewed) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions | N/A§ | N/A§ | 0; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; | 3.02 | 5.1 days | N/R | Fitted to curve, value not specified | N/R | N/R | 100% |
| Pollmann 2020 (preprint) | ODE compartmental model | Based on exponential distributions and distributions | Bidirectional | >1 generation | 60; 75; 90; 100 | 2.0–3.0–4.0 | 4.0; 7.4 days | 10 days | 7%¶ | 0; 2; 4; 6 days | N/R | 100% |
| Scott 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Agent-based model | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 0–50 | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 4.6 days | 8–14 days | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 1 day | 1 day | 0% in HH |
| Shamil 2020 (preprint) | Agent-based model | Distributions | Forward | 1 generation | 60; 75 | Fitted to curve, value not specified | 6.0 days | 10 days | N/R | 0 days | 0 days | 100% |
Model-specific characteristics of model-based studies looking at effectiveness of contact and tracing apps for SARS-CoV-2. Dashes (–) indicate a continuous range between numbers, semicolons indicate separate distinct values.
*Fraction of infections before symptoms are relevant.
†Isolation based on positive notification, not a positive test.
‡Changing app coverage covers imperfect isolation.
§No true tracing, fixed proportion cases will self-isolate.
¶Time-dependent, maximum value reported in table.
HH, household; N/A, not applicable; N/R, not reported; ODE, ordinary differential equations; PDE, partial differential equations; R, reproduction number.
Critical appraisal of empirical studies
| Study | Confounding? | Selection bias: participants? | Selection bias: missing data? | Information bias: intervention misclassification/non-compliance? | Information bias: misclassification of the outcome? | Other concerns? | Overall risk of bias |
| Chen 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes* | No | Unclear | No | Unclear | None | High |
| Kendall 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | No | Unclear | No | No | Competing interests and funding not reported | High |
Critical appraisal empirical epidemiological studies looking at effectiveness of contact and tracing apps for SARS-CoV-2.
*Only adjusted for age.
Critical appraisal of model-based studies
| Study | Were empirical distributions used for a varying infectiousness since time of infection? | Were various different scenarios evaluated for important model assumptions and parameter values? | Were models reported transparently? (ie, no black box) | Other concerns? | Overall study validity |
| Bradshaw 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | External funding* | High |
| Bulchandani 2020 (preprint) | No | Yes | Yes | Competing interests and funding not reported | High |
| Cencetti 2020 (preprint) | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | High |
| Currie 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | High |
| Ferrari 2020 (peer-reviewed) | No | Yes | Yes | Competing interests† | High |
| Ferretti 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | High |
| Grimm 2020 (preprint) | No | Yes | Yes | No | High |
| Guttal 2020 (preprint) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Competing interests and funding not reported | High |
| Kretzschmar 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | High |
| Kucharski 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Funding‡, though no influence of funder on study results | High |
| Kurita 2020 (peer-reviewed) | No | No§ | Unclear | Type of model used unclear | Low |
| Nuzzo 2020 (peer-reviewed) | No | No§ | Yes | Potential competing interests¶ | Low |
| Pollmann 2020 (preprint) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Competing interests and funding not reported | High |
| Scott 2020 (peer-reviewed) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Funding** | High |
| Shamil 2020 (preprint) | No | Yes | Unclear | No | Low |
Critical appraisal model-based studies looking at effectiveness of contact and tracing apps for SARS-CoV-2.
*This work was supported by gifts from the Reid Hoffman Foundation and the Open Philanthropy Project (to KME) and cluster time granted by the COVID-19 HPC consortium (MCB20071 to KME). ECA was supported by a fellowship from the Open Philanthropy Project. ALL is supported by the Drexel Endowment (NC State University). The funders had no role in the research, writing or decision to publish.
†ES works for Bayer, is collaborating to COVID-19 Safe Paths app, by MIT, and advising LEMONADE tracing app, by Nuland. ASC works for Roche Pharma. MTF is a consultant for Ely Lilly.
‡Wellcome Trust, UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission, Royal Society, Medical Research Council.
§Scenarios were limited only to variation in rate of adoption of the contact and tracing app and voluntary quarantine.
¶Dr Raskar is the founder of a non-profit to facilitate digital contact tracing. The other authors report no potential competing interests.
**Funding by the Burnet Institute.