| Literature DB >> 34210721 |
Rachel Williams1, Reham Aldakhil2, Ann Blandford3, Yogini Jani4,5.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: In order to reduce safety risks associated with medication administrations, technologies such as barcode medication administration (BCMA) are increasingly used. Examining how human factors influence adoption and usability of this technology can potentially highlight areas for improvement in design and implementation.Entities:
Keywords: health informatics; qualitative research; quality in health care
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34210721 PMCID: PMC8252881 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2020-044419
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMJ Open ISSN: 2044-6055 Impact factor: 2.692
Figure 1PRISMA flow chart. Detailing selection process of studies reviewed. BCMA, barcode medication administration; CINAHL, Cumulative Index of Nursing, and Allied Health Literature; HIT, health information technology; PRISMA, Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses.
Extracted characteristics of selected studies
| Author | Aim | Study design | Research methods | Framework | Setting | Technology | Research focus |
| Holden | To study workflow alteration following BCMA implementation. | Comparison groups—pre/post BCMA implementation. | Observation of nursing practice (post 47 hours, pre 89.5 hours). Interviews with 45 nurses post BCMA Implementation. Data collection February to March 2008. | Cognitive systems engineering approach. | Paediatric hospital. 236 beds. USA. ICU, haematology/oncology unit and a general medical/surgical unit. | Software vendor: Centricity pharmacy (GE Healthcare). | Notes BCMA research often focused on distal outcomes (adverse events). Often BCMA research does not explore underlying causes. Does not focus on impact on safety as an outcome. Usability and design focus. |
| Holden | To study how BCMA may improve or worsen outcomes using a human factors lens. | Comparison between BCMA and non-BCMA hospitals. | Nurse survey conducted pre/post implementation. Additional data of 200 hours of nurse practice observation and 68 short interviews with BCMA users. Additional data collected during a previous study. | The human factors model of health IT impact. | Two large paediatric hospitals. USA. | Software vendor: Unclear. Integrated BCMA and CPOE with pharmacy checking of orders in place (PIS). BCMA accessible via eMAR. | States that safety is not the outcome of interest. Focus on nursing workflow, usability and design issues. |
| Novak | To identify strategies that mitigate the risks associated with BCMA implementation. | An ethnographic case study. | 50 hours observation of mediator/nurse interaction during BCMA implementation. Additional data: Unstructured interviews, training, meeting minutes and emails. | Technology use mediation framework. | One US hospital with an Informatics support team. | Software vendor: Unclear. CPOE and EHR in use prior to BCMA implementation. | Implementation process may influence safety outcomes, but not examined by this study. Highlights that clinical staff cannot communicate design issues identified with designers. |
| Novak | To study collisions between nursing orientation (practice frame) and the technology orientation (the system frame) and resulting adaptions. | Mixed methods study. | Study (a) 120 hours observation during implementation of BCMA, interviews with 27 nurses post implementation and notes from meetings and emails. Study (b) 90 hours observation pre and 47 hours post BCMA implementation. Interviews with 45 nurses post implementation. | Frames of reference— Author discussed finding in terms of system frame and practice frame. | Two large paediatric hospitals. USA. | Software vendor: Unclear. BCMA and CPOE with pharmacy checking of orders in place (PIS). BCMA accessible via eMAR. Study (a) 2007 BCMA rollout, and study (B) 2006 BCMA rollout. | Implementation and design the focus not safety. Designs impact on workflow and workarounds discussed. Current separation in the research between user concerns (patient safety), and design concerns (usability). A balance of user and design perspectives could improve overall design. |
| Rack | To determine the existence, frequency and potential causes of workarounds and to determine whether workarounds were a factor in serious medication error, to determine if BCMA could have prevented the error. | Mixed method study. | Survey (n=220 respondents). Focus groups with nurses (six conducted, 12 nurses in each). Review of medication errors and how they related to BCMA. Interviews with nurses responsible for medication errors. | Complexity theory. | One 765 beds hospital. USA. Three different BCMA systems implemented in 3 years. | Software vendor: Unclear. BCMA implemented in 2004, CPOE introduced in 2008. | Need for design and clinical collaboration highlighted. Focus on how poor design leads to nurse workarounds. Safety not the outcome of interest. |
| Staggers | To understand how BCMA affects situational awareness in nurses and to identify the usability issues responsible. | Evaluation. | Evaluators completed the BCMA web-based training for nurses in order to develop a list of usability problems. BCMA co-ordinators reviewed and refined usability issues. | Heuristic evaluation (Zhang). Severity rating (Nielsen). | One veteran’s hospital. USA. Hospital included ICU, medical and surgical units. | Software vendor: Vista. Include EHR, computerised patient record system, rated stage 7 HIMSS. BCMA and eMAR implemented in early 2000. | Focus on usability problems, design improvement recommended. Poor design could impact on patient safety but that was not a primary outcome of this study. Designers need to better understand clinic task prior to design. |
| Van der Veen | To study the association between workarounds and medication administration errors when using BCMA and to determine frequency, type of workaround and type of error. | A prospective observational study. | Direct observation of 5793 medication administrations on 1230 inpatients. | No theoretical framework used. | Four Dutch hospitals of varying size. | BCMA and CPOE implemented in all four hospitals using a variety of software. | Safety as outcome measure. Association between med error and workarounds studied. General design issues identified as a possible cause of workarounds but not specifically studied. Need for collaboration not discussed. |
| Holden | To identify predictors of nurses’ acceptance of BCMA. | A cross-sectional survey. | Survey (n=83). August to November 2007. | Technology acceptance model. | Paediatric hospital. Recently implemented BCMA. 236 beds. USA. PICU, haematology/oncology/bone marrow transplant unit and a medical/surgical unit surveyed. | Software vendor: Centricity pharmacy, GE healthcare). BCMA, CPOE, PIS and automated medication-dispensing cabinets. Implementation 2007. | Study of predictors of technology acceptance to influence design. Safety not an outcome of interest. |
| Koppel | To study the occurrences, causes and threats to safety of workarounds. | Mixed method study. | Analysis of BCMA data of 307 698 medication administrations. Observations N=62. Shadowing N=31. Semistructured interviews N=29. 13 specialists, including pharmacists and nurse leaders interviewed. Data collection 2003–2006. | System engineering in patient safety model used. | Two large hospitals for the observed. Five hospitals interviewed. USA. | Software vendor: Siemens medication administration check and McKesson, BCMA and display eMAR. | Poor design and implementation lead to workarounds. Design issues explored, medication error as a result not examined. Importance of collaboration between designer and user highlighted. |
| Patterson | To identify the types and extent of workaround strategies with the use of BCMA. | A prospective ethnographic study. | Direct observation n=15 acute care and n=13 long-term care nurses. 79 hours of observation in total. Opportunistic interviews with observees. BCMA override data analysed. | Standard activity protocol. | Small, medium and large veteran’s administration hospitals. USA. | Software vendor: Unclear. BCMA in use since 2000. CPOE and PIS. | Safety risk of workarounds. Practical hardware design issues. Usability of BCMA not explored. Context of use should be a design consideration. |
| Van der Veen | To identify possible risk factors associated with workarounds using BCMA technology. | A prospective observational study. | Direct observation of 5793 medication administrations on 1230 inpatients. | STROBE checklist for reporting data. | Four Dutch hospitals of varying size. | BCMA and CPOE implemented in all four hospitals using a variety of software. | Workarounds as risk to safety. System design not discussed. Practical factors such as staffing discussed and how they have safety consequences. |
BCMA, barcode medication administration; CPOE, computerised physician order entry; EHR, electronic health record; eMAR, electronic medication administration record; HIMSS, Health Information and Management Systems Society; ICU, intensive care unit; PICU, paediatric intensive care unit; PIS, pharmacy information system; STROBE, Strengthening Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology.
Human factors related themes from the studies
| Author, date | Misaligned design and workflow | Adaptation and workarounds | Usability and design | Factors which mediate BCMA use | User perception | Safety |
| Holden | BCMA limited ability to plan ahead. Narrowed field of vision of user. Focused on specific timepoints. Limited user access to vital patient information. Did not reflect the complexity of clinical work. Did not fulfil user need. | Workarounds mask design flaws. The designer and organisation maybe unaware of these design flaws and/or workarounds. | Poor BCMA usability. Poor fit between BCMA and existing technology. Paper documentation used to communicate information lost between BCMA and existing technology. | Safety concerns regarding the use of paper documentation identified. | ||
| Holden | BCMA transformed existing workflow. Changed health outcomes. Poor designer understanding of original workflow led to poor acceptance of technology. | Healthcare workers adapt to new work systems with their own goal achieving strategies. Poor compliance with design use is frequently observed. | Studying user perception of BCMA can improve design and acceptance. | |||
| Novak | BCMA was misaligned to technology use practices. | Workarounds frequently identified in study. | Iterative process of design and evaluation advocated. | Implementation mediators can help mitigate negative unintended consequences caused by BCMA implementation and limit the development of workarounds. | Expectations should be set for nurses prior to implementation of BCMA so they understand its advantages and disadvantages. | |
| Novak | Temporal design focused on timepoints. Difficulty planning ahead. Design not reflective of the complexity of clinical work. Inflexible when a plan changes. Design based too rigidly around the five rights. Clinical judgement of nurses not considered. Poor design led to the use of paper handover documents for communication. | Workarounds implemented to improve efficiency. · Safety features of BCMA not aligned with user safety concerns, resulting in workarounds. | Iterative process of design and evaluation advocated. | Stigma of late doses, resulting in nurse’s avoidance strategies. Compliance with BCMA used as a performance measure. Nurses show willingness to comply with BCMA but are still having the resort to workarounds to complete tasks. | Rigid design can reduce critical thinking in nurses, potentially increasing risk of error. Simply implementing BCMA does not improve medicines safety. Safety features of BCMA not aligned with user safety concerns. | |
| Rack | Design focused user on single timepoint. Difficulty accessing information on previous medication administration. Reduced ability to communicate concerns/errors with wider team. Vital patient information difficult to access, delaying administration. Five rights used as BCMA design basis too rigid. | Workarounds in response to poor design. | BCMA technology should be designed in such a way that using it appropriately is easier than working around the system. | Regular Maintenance of hardware reduces frustration for users and improves compliance with use. Responsibility for the maintenance of hardware should be considered prior to implementation. | Nurses should not be given the impression that BCMA use is faster. Safety benefits should be emphasised. | |
| Staggers | Workflow twice as long with BCMA use. Poor fit with existing workflow and user need. Temporal focus on time point can blinker users to wider issues. Design too inflexible for the complexity of clinical work. Five rights interpreted too rigidly during design process. | Workarounds discussed in relation to misaligned design and workflow. Workarounds developed in response to poor design. | High volume of usability issues identified. Better design needed to improve user situational awareness. User-centred design advocated. Design should support patient journey through the hospital. | User perception discussed in relation to misaligned design and workflow. | Poor usability and design are a safety risk. Safety features of BCMA compromised by workarounds. Reduced situational awareness led to increased safety risk. | |
| Van de Veen | BCMA did not fit well with existing workflow. Issues with hardware and software identified. | Statistically significant association between workarounds and medication administration errors | Poor human–machine interface result in healthcare workers working around the system, compromising safety. | Post implementation evaluation recommended for BCMA to achieve it full benefits. | Poor design resulting in workarounds produces a safety risk. | |
| Holden | May not be financially worthwhile for organisation. | Poor design results in a lack of acceptance and workarounds. | Design and usability discussed in relation to workarounds. BCMA difficult for some to use. | BCMA users’ perceptions of new technologies should be studied in order to influence their acceptance. Studies of acceptance can predict technology use. | ||
| Koppel | SEIPS model used to identify causes of workarounds. Workarounds can increase medication error risk. Workarounds have multiple causes and cause subsequent workarounds. | Organisational and technology related causes were found to be associated with all 15 of the identify workarounds. | Study of workarounds can highlight design issues and find solutions. | Workarounds have the potential to present a safety risk. | ||
| Patterson | Design did not reflect context of use. To prevent adverse events following BCMA implementation, existing workflow should be studied and designed accordingly. | Workarounds increase error risk by bypassing safety technology of BCMA. Workarounds may go undetected or be acknowledged and tolerated by organisations. Nurses expressed concern of how workarounds reflect on them as professionals. | Redesign could reduce frequency of workarounds. Redesign could improve efficiency. User perception of inefficiency increased workarounds. Improved reliability of hardware would reduce workarounds. | Nurses who felt their goals were jeopardised by inefficient BCMA justified the use of workarounds. Disciplining non-compliance found to be ineffective if the nurse felt they were acting in the interest of the patient. | Workarounds are a safety risk. | |
| Van der Veen | Workarounds more frequent on busy weekdays than weekends. More likely to occur with a higher patient to nurse ratio. Not associated with ability to scan barcode. Increased work pressure increased workarounds. | Increased staffing. Redesign to make BCMA more efficient. | As work pressure increases, the frequency of workarounds also increases. |
BCMA, barcode medication administration; SEIPS, system engineering in patient safety.