| Literature DB >> 34206874 |
Carlos Gonzalez-Amarillo1, Cristian Cardenas-Garcia2, Miguel Mendoza-Moreno2, Gustavo Ramirez-Gonzalez1, Juan Carlos Corrales1.
Abstract
Sensor devices that act in the IoT architecture perception layer are characterized by low data processing and storage capacity. These reduced capabilities make the system ubiquitous and lightweight, but considerably reduce its security. The IoT-based Food Traceability Systems (FTS), aimed at ensuring food safety and quality, serve as a motivating scenario for BIoTS development and deployment; therefore, security challenges and gaps related with data integrity are analyzed from this perspective. This paper proposes the BIoTS hardware design that contains some modules built-in VHDL (SHA-256, PoW, and SD-Memory) and other peripheral electronic devices to provide capabilities to the perception layer by implementing the blockchain architecture's security requirements in an IoT device. The proposed hardware is implemented on FPGA Altera DE0-Nano. BIoTS can participate as a miner in the blockchain network through Smart Contracts and solve security issues related to data integrity and data traceability in an Blockchain-IoT system. Blockchain algorithms implemented in IoT hardware opens a path to IoT devices' security and ensures participation in data validation inside a food certification process.Entities:
Keywords: Blockchain-IoT ecosystem; IoT-Device; VHDL; food traceability; hardware development
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34206874 PMCID: PMC8272220 DOI: 10.3390/s21134388
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Security issues, threats, and technologies.
| Architecture Layer | Threats in Security | Weaknesses | Related Works | Attacks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Internet | Confidentiality | Access Centralization | [ | Pishing, Malware |
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| Wireless | Rogue access points, Misconfiguration | Hacking, Signal lost | [ | DoS, War dialing, protocol tunneling; man-in-the-middle |
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| Sensor Nodes | DoS, Exhaustion, Unfairness, Sybil | Flooding, Routing Protocols | [ | Jamming, Tampering, Collisions |
Figure 1IoT security issues and threats.
Figure 2The Blockchain-IoT-based food traceability systems.
Figure 3BIoTS System Operation.
Figure 4Blockchain-IoT Architecture Matching. (A) Blockchain Ethereum Architecture Approach by Lee Thomas based on [55]. (B) IoT-Sensor Architecture.
Figure 5Path 1: conventional data transmission in an IoT system. Path 2: architecture and transmission path proposed by (BIoTS-Paths).
Figure 6Blockchain system architecture and transaction validation mechanism.
Generic Features Analysis of Consensus Algorithms (based on [17,57]).
| Consensus Algorithm | Blockchain Type | Mining | Consensus Category | Reference | Experiment Setup | Communication Model | Energy Consumption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PoW | Permission-less | Based on computational power | Proof-based | [ | Real implementation | Asynchronous | 538 KWh |
| Implicit Consensus | Permissioned | Proof based mining | Proof-based | [ | Theoretically evaluated | Asynchronous | Unknow |
| PoV | Consortium | Vote-based mining | Vote-based | [ | Simulation, Single machine | - | Unknow |
| Ripple | Permissioned | Vote-based mining | Vote-based | [ | Simulation, Single machine | Asynchronous | Unknow |
| DBFT | Permissioned | Non-proof of work based mining | Vote-based | [ | Proposed solution is not validated through experiments | Asynchronous | Unknow |
| PoT | Permission-based consortium | Probability and vote based mining | Vote-based | [ | Simulation, Single machine | Asynchronous | Unknow |
Figure 7Proof of work implementation on hardware.
Figure 8Structure of architectural development.
Logic elements used on DE0-Nano FPGA.
| FPGA | Total Logic Elements | Percentage Available |
|---|---|---|
| DE0-Nano | 22,320 | 100% |
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| SHA-256 and PoW | 10,347 | 46% |
| I2C-Master | 168 | ≤1% |
| I2C-Slave | 114 | ≤1% |
| SD-CARD | 289 | 1% |
| Total Area Used | 10,556 | 47% |
Figure 9Diagram block of BIoTS.
Figure 10Full-scale modeling of BIoTS prototype.
Figure 11Evaluation scenario
Evaluated parameters.
| Step-Time | Transaction Rate | Data Send | Latency |
|---|---|---|---|
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| 0.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0.16 | 0.43 | 14 | 0.03 |
| 0.31 | 0.54 | 30 | 0.05 |
| 0.46 | 0.69 | 46 | 0.06 |
| 0.52 | 0.68 | 62 | 0.07 |
| 0.71 | 0.87 | 78 | 0.09 |
| 0.8 | 0.93 | 94 | 0.13 |
| 0.9 | 0.99 | 110 | 0.103 |
Figure 12Transaction rate and data size sent by BIoTS.
Figure 13Transaction made by BIoTS in Blockchain Ethereum.
BIoTS-Security behavior.
| Attack | Description | Attack likelihood | Resistance to Attack |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensor Tampering | Manipulate sensors to acquire data readings | Unlikely | High |
| Sensor Feed Modification | Modify the sensor feed and firmware during communications process | Possible | High |
| Sybil Attack | Creates multiple identities and manipulates the device’s reputation. | Unlikely | High |
| DoS, Protocol tunneling; man-in-the-middle | Shut down a machine or network and The attacker sets up rogue hardware pretending to be a trusted network as Wi-Fi | Unlikely | High |
| Jamming, Collisions | Is an attempt to find two input strings of a hash function that produce the same hash result | Possible | Moderate |