| Literature DB >> 34204845 |
Sonia Nawrocka1,2, Hans De Witte1,3, Margherita Brondino2, Margherita Pasini2.
Abstract
Prior cross-sectional research indicates that the negative effects of quantitative job insecurity (i.e., threat to job loss) on employees' wellbeing are fully mediated by qualitative job insecurity (i.e., threat to job characteristics). In the current longitudinal study, we replicated and further extended this view to include a direct effect of qualitative job insecurity on quantitative job insecurity. We explored these reciprocal relations in the context of their concurrent effects on work related outcomes by means of dual-mediation modelling. We identified a wide range of the outcomes, classified as: job strains (i.e., exhaustion, emotional and cognitive impairment), psychological coping reactions (i.e., job satisfaction, work engagement, turnover intention), and behavioral coping reactions (i.e., in-role and extra role performance, counterproductive behavior). We employed a three-wave panel design and surveyed 2003 Flemish employees. The results showed that the dual-mediation model had the best fit to the data. However, whereas qualitative job insecurity predicted an increase in quantitative job insecurity and the outcome variables six months later, quantitative job insecurity did not affect qualitative job insecurity or the outcomes over time. The study demonstrates the importance of qualitative job insecurity not only as a severe work stressor but also as an antecedent of quantitative job insecurity. Herewith, we stress the need for further research on the causal relations between both dimensions of job insecurity.Entities:
Keywords: burnout; conservation of resources theory; cross-lagged panel model; job performance; qualitative job insecurity; quantitative job insecurity; work attitudes
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34204845 PMCID: PMC8296211 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph18126392
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1Representation of the theoretical model. Note: Paths a, b, and c represent the causal effects implied by the mediation processes. Indirect effects equal a × b; total effects equal c + (a × b).
Means, standard deviations, reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses), and correlation.
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| Quan.1 | 2.45 | 1.01 | (0.93) | ||||||||||||||||
| Quan.2 | 2.38 | 1.01 |
| (0.94) | |||||||||||||||
| Quan.3 | 2.37 | 0.99 |
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| (0.93) | ||||||||||||||
| Qual.1 | 3.17 | 0.95 |
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| (0.9) | |||||||||||||
| Qual.2 | 3.08 | 0.97 |
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| (0.92) | ||||||||||||
| Qual.3 | 3.13 | 0.94 |
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| (0.91) | |||||||||||
| EX.1 | 2.97 | 0.94 |
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| (0.9) | ||||||||||
| EX.2 | 2.83 | 0.9 |
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| (0.9) | |||||||||
| EX.3 | 2.84 | 0.89 |
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| (0.89) | ||||||||
| CC.1 | 2.46 | 0.81 |
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| (0.91) | |||||||
| CC.2 | 2.32 | 0.74 |
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| (0.9) | ||||||
| CC.3 | 2.35 | 0.74 |
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| (0.91) | |||||
| EC.1 | 1.94 | 0.82 |
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| (0.88) | ||||
| EC.2 | 1.84 | 0.76 |
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| (0.89) | |||
| EC.3 | 1.85 | 0.75 |
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| (0.87) | ||
| TI.1 | 2.81 | 1.27 |
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| na | |
| TI.2 | 2.6 | 1.17 |
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| na |
| TI.3 | 2.64 | 1.18 |
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| JS.1 | 5.49 | 2.51 |
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| JS.2 | 6.03 | 2.3 |
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| JS.3 | 5.99 | 2.23 |
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| WE.1 | 3.1 | 0.9 |
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| WE.2 | 3.26 | 0.83 |
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| WE.3 | 3.25 | 0.83 |
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| IP.1 | 4.06 | 0.63 |
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| 0.01 |
| IP.2 | 4.11 | 0.6 |
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| −0.07 |
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| −0.02 | −0.05 |
| IP.3 | 4.08 | 0.59 |
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| −0.03 | −0.02 |
| EP.1 | 3.74 | 0.76 |
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| −0.04 |
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| −0.05 |
| −0.05 | −0.05 |
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| 0.01 |
| EP.2 | 3.78 | 0.75 | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.03 | −0.04 |
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| −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.06 |
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| −0.02 | −0.03 |
| EP.3 | 3.75 | 0.73 | −0.05 |
| −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.06 |
| −0.05 |
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| −0.07 |
| CP.1 | 1.8 | 0.67 |
| 0.03 | 0.02 |
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| 0.05 |
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| CP.2 | 1.69 | 0.59 | 0.04 |
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| CP.3 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
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| Gender | 1.58 | 0.49 | 0 | 0.04 | −0.01 |
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| 0.04 | 0.03 |
| 0.03 |
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| 0.04 |
| Education | 4.05 | 0.88 |
| −0.03 | −0.06 |
| 0.01 | −0.01 |
| −0.03 | −0.05 |
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| −0.02 | −0.03 | −0.02 | 0 |
| Positional tenure | 10.66 | 9.43 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
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| 0.01 | 0 | −0.04 |
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| 0.02 |
| 0.02 |
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| Quan.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Quan.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Quan.3 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Qual.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Qual.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Qual.3 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EX.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EX.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EX.3 | |||||||||||||||||||
| CC.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| CC.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| CC.3 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EC.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EC.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| EC.3 | |||||||||||||||||||
| TI.1 | |||||||||||||||||||
| TI.2 | |||||||||||||||||||
| TI.3 | na | ||||||||||||||||||
| JS.1 |
| na | |||||||||||||||||
| JS.2 |
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| na | ||||||||||||||||
| JS.3 |
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| na | |||||||||||||||
| WE.1 |
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| (0.86) | ||||||||||||||
| WE.2 |
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| (0.84) | |||||||||||||
| WE.3 |
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| (0.85) | ||||||||||||
| IP.1 | 0 |
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| (0.86) | |||||||||||
| IP.2 | 0 |
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| (0.88) | ||||||||||
| IP.3 | −0.02 |
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| (0.85) | |||||||||
| EP.1 | −0.01 |
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| (0.78) | ||||||||
| EP.2 | −0.03 |
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| (0.77) | |||||||
| EP.3 |
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| (0.75) | ||||||
| CP.1 |
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| (0.66) | |||||
| CP.2 |
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| (0.63) | ||||
| CP.3 |
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| −0.05 | −0.06 |
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| (0.64) | |||
| Gender | 0.04 | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.01 | −0.04 | −0.05 | 0 | 0.04 | −0.02 | 0.03 |
| 0.05 |
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| 0 | −0.02 | na | ||
| Education | 0.04 |
| −0.01 | 0 | 0.04 | 0.02 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.05 | −0.04 |
| −0.03 | −0.03 | 0.04 |
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| 0.03 | na | |
| Positional tenure |
| −0.01 |
| −0.05 |
| 0.02 | 0 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.03 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 |
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| na |
Note: N = 2003. Bold numbers indicate statistically significant correlation at the 5% level. QN = quantitative job insecurity; QL = qualitative job insecurity; EX = exhaustion; CC = cognitive impairment; EC = emotional impairment; TI = turnover intention; JS = job satisfaction; WE = work engagement; IP = in-role performance; EP = extra-role performance; CP = counterproductive behavior.
Fit indices of competing nested factor models and standardized maximum likelihood estimates.
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| M1 | Hypothesized: | 7246.195 | 3852 | 0.967 | 0.961 | 0.021 | 0.043 | ||||||
| M2 | Alternative: | 24,273.882 | 4269 | 0.805 | 0.792 | 0.048 | 0.094 | M1 | 17,027.687 *** | 417 | <0.001 | 0.162 | 0.027 |
| M3 | Alternative: | 31,563.306 | 4308 | 0.734 | 0.719 | 0.056 | 0.109 | M1 | 24,317.111 *** | 456 | <0.001 | 0.233 | 0.035 |
| M4 | Alternative: | 49,055.402 | 4371 | 0.564 | 0.545 | 0.071 | 0.112 | M1 | 41,809.207 *** | 519 | <0.001 | 0.403 | 0.05 |
| Longitudinal Measurement Invariance of the Hypothesized 33-factor Model | |||||||||||||
| M5 | Metric | 7305.662 | 3894 | 0.967 | 0.961 | 0.021 | 0.043 | M1 | 59.467 * | 42 | 0.039 | 0 | 0 |
| M6 | Strong | 7481.112 | 3954 | 0.966 | 0.96 | 0.021 | 0.043 | M5 | 175.450 *** | 60 | <0.0001 | 0.001 | 0 |
| M7 | Strict | 7838.118 | 4014 | 0.963 | 0.958 | 0.022 | 0.043 | M6 | 357.006 *** | 60 | <0.0001 | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Note: N = 2003; p < 0.05 *, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.001 ***; χ2 = chi-square; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean squared error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean squared residual.
Test of alternative structural and time invariance.
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| M8 | Autoregressive with | 11,797.757 | 4580 | 0.930 | 0.927 | 0.028 | 0.086 | ||||||
| M9 | Chirumbolo’s | 11,665.309 | 4551 | 0.931 | 0.928 | 0.028 | 0.076 | M8 | 132.45 *** | 29 | <0.001 | 0.001 | 0 |
| M10 | Alternative mediation model | 11,737.036 | 4551 | 0.930 | 0.927 | 0.028 | 0.078 | M8 | 60.721 *** | 29 | <0.001 | 0 | 0 |
| M11 | Hypothesized: | 11,606.381 | 4522 | 0.931 | 0.928 | 0.028 | 0.072 | M9 | 58.928 *** | 29 | <0.001 | 0 | 0 |
| Stability of the Hypothesized Dual-Mediation Model | |||||||||||||
| M12 | M11 + equal | 11,630.851 | 4533 | 0.931 | 0.928 | 0.028 | 0.072 | M11 | 24.47 * | 11 | 0.011 | 0.001 | 0 |
| M13 | M12 + equal paths “a” | 11,630.988 | 4535 | 0.931 | 0.928 | 0.028 | 0.072 | M12 | 0.14 | 2 | 0.934 | 0 | 0 |
| M14 | M13 + equal paths “b” | 11,663.687 | 4553 | 0.931 | 0.928 | 0.028 | 0.072 | M13 | 32.7 * | 18 | 0.018 | 0 | 0 |
Note: N = 2003; p < 0.05 *, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.001 ***; χ2 = chi-square; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean squared error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean squared residual.
Figure 2Autoregressive cross-lagged panel model with unstandardized path coefficients. Note: p < 0.05 *, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.001 ***; T1/T2/T3 indicate measurement waves; control variables as well as autoregressive and insignificant pathways are omitted for clarity.
Multinomial logistic regression of dropout.
| T1T3 vs. T1T2T3 | T1T2 vs. T1T2T3 | T1 vs. T1T2T3 | |||||||
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| b | SE | OR | b | SE | OR | b | SE | OR | |
| Intercept | −1.667 | 1.242 | 0.189 | −2.352 * | 1.138 | 0.095 | 0.921 | 0.921 | 2.512 |
| Age ( | −0.005 | 0.011 | 0.995 | −0.003 | 0.009 | 0.997 | −0.028 *** | 0.008 | 0.973 |
| Gender | −0.162 | 0.184 | 0.851 | 0.150 | 0.168 | 1.161 | 0.084 | 0.139 | 1.088 |
| Middle education 1 | 0.001 | 0.404 | 1.001 | 0.104 | 0.372 | 1.109 | −0.287 | 0.288 | 0.75 |
| High education 1 | −0.083 | 0.431 | 0.92 | 0.15 | 0.398 | 1.161 | −0.337 | 0.310 | 0.714 |
| Professional level | 0.369 | 0.205 | 1.446 | −0.021 | 0.175 | 0.98 | 0.101 | 0.148 | 1.107 |
| Contract | 0.9 ** | 0.486 | 2.46 | 0.661 * | 0.466 | 1.937 | 0.756 | 0.409 | 2.131 |
| Employment | −0.024 | 0.231 | 0.976 | 0.284 | 0.192 | 1.328 | −0.129 | 0.174 | 0.879 |
| Positional tenure ( | −0.004 | 0.011 | 0.996 | −0.008 | 0.010 | 0.992 | 0.003 | 0.009 | 1.003 |
| Quan.1 | 0.056 | 0.104 | 1.057 | −0.029 | 0.094 | 0.971 | 0.144 | 0.078 | 1.155 |
| Qual.1 | −0.22 | 0.122 | 0.803 | −0.057 | 0.108 | 0.945 | −0.19 * | 0.093 | 0.827 |
| TI.1 | 0.26 ** | 0.091 | 1.296 | 0.133 | 0.082 | 1.142 | 0.268 *** | 0.069 | 1.307 |
| JS.1 | 0.02 | 0.061 | 1.02 | −0.016 | 0.056 | 0.984 | −0.029 | 0.046 | 0.971 |
| WE.1 | −0.158 | 0.151 | 0.854 | 0.056 | 0.136 | 1.057 | −0.157 | 0.114 | 0.855 |
| EX.1 | 0.222 | 0.117 | 1.248 | 0.091 | 0.105 | 1.096 | −0.010 | 0.087 | 0.99 |
| CC.1 | 0.085 | 0.142 | 1.089 | −0.051 | 0.130 | 0.95 | 0.005 | 0.108 | 1.005 |
| EC.1 | 0.076 | 0.127 | 1.079 | 0.200 | 0.116 | 1.221 | 0.081 | 0.096 | 1.085 |
| IP.1 | −0.048 | 0.139 | 0.953 | 0.179 | 0.130 | 1.196 | −0.063 | 0.105 | 0.939 |
| EP.1 | 0.052 | 0.117 | 1.054 | 0.014 | 0.105 | 1.014 | 0.021 | 0.088 | 1.021 |
| CP.1 | −0.16 | 0.145 | 0.852 | −0.079 | 0.132 | 0.924 | 0.09 | 0.107 | 1.095 |
Note: N = 2003. p < 0.05 *, p < 0.01 **, p < 0.001 ***; T1T2T3—respondents who participated in all three waves; T1T3—participants who did not respond in the second wave; T1T2—participants who dropped out after the second wave; T1—participants who dropped out after the first wave. All variables are measured at time 1. Quan.1—quantitative job insecurity at time 1; Qual.1—qualitative job insecurity; TI.1—turnover intention; JS.1—job satisfaction; WE.1—work engagement; EX.1—exhaustion, CC.1—cognitive impairment; EC.1—emotional impairment; IP.1—in-role performance; EP.1—extra-role performance; CP.1—counterproductive behavior. 1 Middle and High education are compared with low education (0 = low education).
Sample vs. Flemish population; source: Statistics Belgium (www.statbel.fgov.be: accessed on 28 August 2020).
| Variables | Sample | Percentages | Population (K) | Percentages | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male | 833 | 42% | 1501 | 53% |
| Female | 1170 | 58% | 1300 | 46% | |
| Age | 15–24 years | 74 | 4% | 180 | 6% |
| 25–54 years | 1701 | 85% | 2179 | 77% | |
| 55–65 years | 228 | 11% | 411 | 15% | |
| Education level | Low | 90 | 4% | 383 | 14% |
| Middle | 1252 | 63% | 1137 | 40% | |
| High | 661 | 33% | 1249 | 44% | |
| Contract | Permanent | 1525 | 76% | 2199 | 78% |
| Temporary | 83 | 4% | 219 | 8% | |
| Time frame | Full-time | 1607 | 80% | 1740 | 61% |
| Part-time | 396 | 20% | 678 | 24% | |
| Sector | Private | 1608 | 80% | 2271 | 80% |
| Public | 395 | 20% | 559 | 20% | |
| Job industry | Primary | 11 | 1% | 36 | 1% |
| Secondary | 551 | 28% | 633 | 22% | |
| Tertiary | 874 | 44% | 1190 | 42% | |
| Quaternary | 567 | 28% | 971 | 34% | |
| Total | 2003 | 100% | 2830 | 100% |
Note: Data on the Flemish population were taken from the first quarter of 2017.