Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims.

The dual-strategy model of reasoning proposes that people tend to use one of two reasoning strategies: either a statistical or a counterexample strategy, with the latter being more sensitive to potential counterexamples to a given conclusion. Previous studies have examined the effects of reasoning strategy in a variety of contexts. In the present study, we looked at the effects of gist repetition and disconfirmation on belief in an unknown claim. This is particularly interesting since there is no single normative analysis of this situation. We examine the hypotheses that (a) increasing gist repetition will result in higher levels of belief with both counterexample and statistical reasoners, and (b) that counterexample reasoners will have lower belief levels following a single disconfirming instance than will statistical reasoners. In a large-scale online study, over 2,000 adult participants received a False Claim procedure along with a Strategy Diagnostic. Results are consistent with the hypotheses. This provides strong evidence that the dual-strategy model captures a clear difference in information processing that is not captured by any normative/non-normative distinction.