| Literature DB >> 33921336 |
Yinhao Wu1, Shumin Yu1, Xiangdong Duan2.
Abstract
Pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) have both scale effect and environmental sensitivity. Therefore, this paper studies how environmental regulation (ER) affects the location dynamics of PIIs under the agglomeration effect. Our results show that, ER can increase the production costs of pollution-intensive firms (PIFs) by internalizing the negative impact of pollutant discharge in a region, and thus, directly reduces the region's attractiveness to PIFs. Meanwhile, ER can indirectly reduce the attractiveness of a region to PIFs by reducing the externality of the regional agglomeration effect. Moreover, these influences are regulated by the level of local economic development. Based on the moderated mediating effect model, we find evidence from the site selection activities of newly built chemical firms in cities across China. The empirical test shows that compared with 2014, the proportion of the direct effect of ER to the total effects significantly decreased in 2018, while the proportion of indirect effects under the agglomeration effect increased significantly. Our findings provide reference for the government to design effective environmental policies to guide the location choice of new PIFs.Entities:
Keywords: agglomeration effect; economic development level; environmental regulation (ER); influence mechanisms; location of pollution-intensive industries (PIIs); moderated mediation model
Year: 2021 PMID: 33921336 PMCID: PMC8070159 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph18084045
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1Influence mechanism of ER on the location of new PIFs under agglomeration effect.
Calculation methods, sources of variables and their basic statistical characteristics.
| Variable Set | Variable Definition | Calculation Methods (Dimension) | Data Sources | Basic Statistics | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean | Std. | Min. | Max. | Obs. | ||||
| Dependent variable | The number of new chemical firms in each city, | Y = N + 1, N is the number of new chemical firms with registered capital of more than 1 RMB | ★☆* | 3.069 | 1.158 | 0.000 | 6.571 | 562 |
| Independent variables | Environmental regulation, | ●@○ | 0.712 | 0.116 | 0.426 | 0.996 | 562 | |
| Agglomeration economy, | ∆ | 0.719 | 1.568 | 0.000 | 14.776 | 562 | ||
| Control variables | Economic development level, | Percapita gross national product, taking the natural logarithm | ● ※ | 10.624 | 0.605 | 9.037 | 12.050 | 562 |
| Traffic condition, | Highway freight volume, taking the natural logarithm (10 K tons) | ● | 9.048 | 0.874 | 6.324 | 17.013 | 562 | |
| Labor wages, | Wages of on-the-job employees, taking the natural logarithm) | ● ※ | 10.550 | 0.212 | 9.876 | 11.233 | 562 | |
★ National Enterprise Credit Information Public System. http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/ (accessed on 7 February 2021); ☆ Credit China. https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/ (accessed on 7 February 2021); * Global Enterprise Database from Wind Information; ● National Bureau of Statistics of China. China City Statistical Yearbook (2013 and 2017); @ National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Environmental Statistical Yearbook (2013 and 2017); ο National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Industrial Statistical Yearbook (2013 and 2017); Δ China Development Zone Audit Catalog (2018 Edition); ※ Statistical Yearbook of each prefecture-level city of China (2013 and 2017).
Figure 2Location dynamics of new chemical firms in prefecture-level cities in China.
Regression results of the moderated mediation model (Bootstrap = 5000) (2014).
| Mediation Effect Test | Moderated Mediation Effect Test | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | |
|
| −0.16 ** | −2.15 | [−0.14, −0.01] | −0.05 ** | −2.29 | [−0.13, −0.04] | −0.08 *** | −2.65 | [−0.16, −0.02] | −0.06 ** | −2.04 | [−0.07, −0.02] |
|
| 0.32 *** | 4.57 | [0.18, 0.45] | 0.30 *** | 4.61 | [0.18, 0.46] | ||||||
| 0.11 *** | 2.72 | [0.11, 0.71] | −0.26 *** | −2.35 | [−0.70, −0.19] | |||||||
|
| 0.32 *** | 4.61 | [0.18, 0.46] | 0.04 | 0.91 | [−0.05, 0.13] | ||||||
|
| 0.52 *** | 3.78 | [0.09, 0.32] | 0.21 *** | 9.59 | [0.42, 0.63] | 0.14 *** | 3.03 | [0.05, 0.23] | 0.11 *** | 9.43 | [0.41, 0.63] |
|
| −0.03 | 1.08 | [−0.04, 0.10] | −0.05 | −0.62 | [−0.07, 0.16] | −0.07 | −0.92 | [−0.28, 0.04] | −0.03 | −0.65 | [−0.10, 0.16] |
|
| 0.04 ** | 2.06 | [0.00, 0.07] | 0.17 *** | 4.26 | [0.09, 0.25] | −0.07 ** | −2.20 | [−0.13, −0.01] | 0.15 *** | 4.11 | [0.07, 0.22] |
|
| 0.14 | 0.38 | 0.15 | 0.44 | ||||||||
|
| 15.26 *** | 41.46 *** | 9.88 *** | 28.26 *** | ||||||||
Note: The bootstrap test shows that under the 95% confidence interval, if the interval formed by CI does not contain the value 0, the test result is significant at the 5% level (the same below). ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%.
Figure 3Moderating role of the economic development level (simple slope analysis). (a) Simple slope analysis of regions with high levels of economic development; (b) Simple slope analysis of regions with low levels of economic development.
Mediating effects at different economic development levels.
| Economic Development Level | Effect Value | Boot SE | Boot 95% | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The mediating effect of AE (with moderating variable) | Effect1 ( | 0.009 | 0.012 | [−0.02, 0.03] |
| Effect2 ( | 0.028 | 0.011 | [0.01, 0.05] | |
| Effect3 ( | 0.047 | 0.020 | [0.01, 0.09] |
Regression results of the moderated mediation model (Bootstrap = 5000) (2018).
| Mediation Effect Test | Moderated Mediation Effect Test | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
|
| |||||||||
| β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | β |
| 95% | |
|
| −0.23 *** | −2.63 | [−0.12, −0.01] | −0.01 ** | −2.17 | [−0.08, −0.01] | −0.14 ** | −2.44 | [−0.21,−0.02] | −0.03 ** | −1.99 | [−0.06, −0.01] |
|
| 0.39 *** | 3.94 | [0.26,0.77] | 0.32 *** | 4.51 | [0.23, 0.56] | ||||||
| 0.15 ** | 2.10 | [0.17, 0.33] | −0.28 *** | −2.47 | [−0.78, −0.13] | |||||||
|
| 0.36 *** | 6.09 | [0.24, 0.48] | 0.01 | 0.34 | [−0.06, 0.04] | ||||||
|
| 0.61 *** | 8.03 | [0.01, 0.12] | 0.27 *** | 5.16 | [0.54, 0.82] | 0.41 *** | 5.77 | [0.10, 0.43] | 0.06 ** | 2.01 | [0.05, 0.23] |
|
| −0.01 | −0.40 | [−0.07, 0.04] | −0.05 | −1.25 | [−0.04, 0.12] | −0.02 | −0.71 | [−0.03, 0.29] | −0.03 | −0.34 | [−0.13, 0.09] |
|
| 0.04 ** | 2.06 | [0.00, 0.07] | 0.04 ** | 2.06 | [0.04, 0.83] | −0.05 | 0.13 | [−0.13, −0.01] | 0.14 *** | 6.17 | [0.08, 0.62] |
|
| 0.03 | 0.35 | 0.07 | 0.43 | ||||||||
|
| 6.71 *** | 37.20 *** | 4.32 *** | 34.70 *** | ||||||||
** p < 5%, *** p < 1%.