Katarina M Braun1, Gage K Moreno2, Ashley Buys3, Elizabeth D Somsen2, Max Bobholz2, Molly A Accola3, Laura Anderson3, William M Rehrauer3, David A Baker2, Nasia Safdar4, Alexander J Lepak4, David H O'Connor2,5, Thomas C Friedrich1,5. 1. Department of Pathobiological Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States of America. 2. Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States of America. 3. William S. Middleton Memorial Veterans Hospital, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, WI, United States of America. 4. Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Madison, WI, United States of America. 5. Wisconsin National Primate Research Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States of America.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Healthcare personnel (HCP) are at increased risk of infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We posit current infection control guidelines generally protect HCP from SARS-CoV-2 infection in a healthcare setting. METHODS: In this retrospective case series, we use viral genomics to investigate the likely source of SARS-CoV-2 infection in HCP at a major academic medical institution in the Upper Midwest of the United States between 25 March - 27 December, 2020. We obtain limited epidemiological data through informal interviews and review of the electronic health record. We combine epidemiological information with healthcare-associated viral sequences and with viral sequences collected in the broader community to infer the most likely source of infection in HCP. RESULTS: We investigated SARS-CoV-2 infection clusters involving 95 HCP and 137 possible patient contact sequences. The majority of HCP infections could not be linked to a patient or co-worker (55/95; 57.9%) and were genetically similar to viruses circulating concurrently in the community. We found 10.5% of infections could be traced to a coworker (10/95). Strikingly, only 4.2% of HCP infections could be traced to a patient source (4/95). CONCLUSIONS: Infections among HCP add further strain to the healthcare system and put patients, HCP, and communities at risk. We found no evidence for healthcare-associated transmission in the majority of HCP infections evaluated here. Though we cannot rule out the possibility of cryptic healthcare-associated transmission, it appears that HCP most commonly becomes infected with SARS-CoV-2 via community exposure. This emphasizes the ongoing importance of mask-wearing, physical distancing, robust testing programs, and rapid distribution of vaccines.
BACKGROUND: Healthcare personnel (HCP) are at increased risk of infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We posit current infection control guidelines generally protect HCP from SARS-CoV-2 infection in a healthcare setting. METHODS: In this retrospective case series, we use viral genomics to investigate the likely source of SARS-CoV-2 infection in HCP at a major academic medical institution in the Upper Midwest of the United States between 25 March - 27 December, 2020. We obtain limited epidemiological data through informal interviews and review of the electronic health record. We combine epidemiological information with healthcare-associated viral sequences and with viral sequences collected in the broader community to infer the most likely source of infection in HCP. RESULTS: We investigated SARS-CoV-2 infection clusters involving 95 HCP and 137 possible patient contact sequences. The majority of HCP infections could not be linked to a patient or co-worker (55/95; 57.9%) and were genetically similar to viruses circulating concurrently in the community. We found 10.5% of infections could be traced to a coworker (10/95). Strikingly, only 4.2% of HCP infections could be traced to a patient source (4/95). CONCLUSIONS:Infections among HCP add further strain to the healthcare system and put patients, HCP, and communities at risk. We found no evidence for healthcare-associated transmission in the majority of HCP infections evaluated here. Though we cannot rule out the possibility of cryptic healthcare-associated transmission, it appears that HCP most commonly becomes infected with SARS-CoV-2 via community exposure. This emphasizes the ongoing importance of mask-wearing, physical distancing, robust testing programs, and rapid distribution of vaccines.
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