| Loopstra 2015a [42] | European countries including UK | Not stated | Commencement of austerity | 2005–2013 | Time trend analysis‘Can I just check whether your household could afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day if you wanted it?’Outcome: Eurostat data (food insecurity) | Food Insecurity:Since 2010, the prevalence of food insecurity was about 2.71 (95% CI: 0.56, 4.85) percentage points greater than expected based on previous trends. This corresponds to an excess of 13.5 million people (95% CI: 2.8, 24.2) living with food insecurity. | Low |
| Loopstra 2015b [43] | UK | Not stated (375 local authorities) | Sanctions, cuts in central government or local authority welfare spending | 2006–2007,2007–2008, 2008–2009, 2009–2010.2010–2011,2011–2012,2012–2013,2013–2014 | Logistic regression with lagged variable approach for foodbank opening, adjusted for the unemployment, Gross Value added (local economic conditions) and proportion of people identifying as Christian.Linear regression used for food parcel distribution, adjusting for the local authority's capacity to provide food (accounting for number of foodbanks and years of foodbank operations).OR of foodbank opening and percentage point change in foodbank use.Outcome: Data from The Trussell Trust (foodbank use) | Each one percentage point higher rate of adverse sanction decisions per claimant on foodbank opening: one year later: 1.08 (95% CI: 0.95, 1.22); on foodbank use: 0.09 (95% CI: 0.01,0.17) p < 0.05Increase of 100 sanctions per 100,000 adults associated with an increase of 1.95 food parcels per 100,000 adults (calculated by authors) (2010–2013).Each 1% cut in central government welfare spending on foodbank opening: one year later: OR: 1.16 (95% CI: 0.95, 1.41), two years later: OR: 1.59 (95% CI: 1.25, 2.03) p < 0.001; on foodbank use: β: 0.16 (95% CI: 0.10, 0.22) p < 0.001.Each 1% cut in local authority spending on foodbank opening: one year later: 1.07 (95% CI: 1.03, 1.11) p < 0.001, two years later: 1.06 (95% CI: 1.02, 1.11) p < 0.001; on foodbank use: −0.021 (95% CI: −0.05, 0.01) | Medium |
| Loopstra 2018 [41] | UK | 424 food banks in 259 local authorities | Sanctions | 2012–2013,2013–2014,2014–2015,2015–2016 | Fixed effects model for rate of sanctions in local authority population and number of food parcels distributed.First difference model for increasing sanctions and number of Job Seekers Allowance Claimants from previous quarter and adult foodbank usage.Model 1: no linear and quadratic time trends; Model 2: adjusting for the scale of foodbank operations and foodbank operating time, Model 3: adjusting for linear and quadratic time trends including dummy variables for seasons and first quarter a foodbank operated, and local authority fixed effects.Outcome: Data from The Trussell Trust. (foodbank use) | Relationship between sanctions applied/ JSA claimants and number of adult foodbank users in local authorities with foodbanks, 2012–2015:Per 10 additional sanctions per 100,000 adults:Model 1) 6.44 (SE: 0.87) <0.001Model 2) 6.35 (SE: 0.87) p < 0.001Model 3) 3.36 (SE: 0.84) p < 0.001Increase of 100 sanctions per 100,000 adults associated with an increase of 33.6 food parcels per 100,000 adults (calculated by authors) (2012–2016).Per 10 additional JSA claimants per 100,000 adults:Model 1) −1.81 (SE: 0.20) p < 0.001;Model 2) −1.73 (SE: 0.20) p < 0.001;Model 3) −0.76 (SE: 0.24) p < 0.01Dynamic relationship between the change in number of sanctions applied/ JSA claimants from quarter-to-quarter and change in numbers using foodbanks:Per 10 additional sanctions applied from previous quarter: Model 1) 5.20 (SE: 1.12) p < 0.001Per 10 fewer sanctions applied from previous quarter:Model 1) n/a; Model 2) −1.79 (SE: 0.73) p < 0.05Per 10 additional Job Seekers Allowance claimants from previous quarter:Model 1) 0.11 (SE: 0.28); Model 2) −0.038 (SE: 0.28) | High |
| MacLeod 2018 [44] | UK (Glasgow) | 3614 | Being impacted by welfare reforms (binary) as a self-reported exposure | 2015 | Logistic regression with covariates: gender, age, household structure, longstanding illness of disability, mental health problems, employment status, citizenship status, experience of life events, food affordability difficulties and fuel affordability difficulties.Outcome: Foodbank useUser vs. non-user (did not need to use a foodbank) vs. non-accessor (did not use a foodbank because they did not want to or because they were unable to access one).Glasgow Community Health and Wellbeing Study (GoWell). | Proportion of respondents impacted by welfare reforms by foodbank user group (n in brackets):Under-occupation deduction – user: 13.6%, non-user: 3.6%, non-accessor: 6.3%, chi-squared: 36.0 p < 0.01 Personal Independence Payment/ Disability Living Allowance changes – user: 15.7%, non-user: 3.3%, non-accessor: 12.8%, chi-squared: 77.7 p < 0.01 Employment and Support Allowance changes – user: 18.8%, non-user: 3.0%, non-accessor: 11.3%, chi-squared: 104.5 p < 0.01 Housing benefit changes – user: 18.0%, non-user: 4.0%, non-accessor: 17.9%, chi-squared: 138.2 p < 0.01 Working tax credit changes – user: 7.2%, non-user: 3.4%, non-accessor: 6.6%, chi-squared: 8.5 p < 0.05 Sanctions – user: 19.0%, non-user: 2.8%, non-accessor: 22.1%, chi-squared: 190.4 p < 0.01 Odds ratios of reporting use of foodbanksImpacted by welfare reforms, OR: 2.293 (95% CI: 1.459, 3.604) p < 0.05 | Medium |
| Prayago 2018 [45] | UK (London Boroughs of Islington, Wandsworth, Lambeth) | 515 (270 from foodbank, 245 from Advice Centre) | Not receiving benefits due to sanction or delay. Also comparison of characteristics of foodbank users vs. advice centres | Apr – Aug 2016 | Number and proportions of foodbank users compared to advice centre users(foodbank use).Pooled regression analysis for changes in household food security score (step 1: gender, age, education attainment, employment status and benefits entitlement; step 2: financial strain, adverse life events).Outcome: 10-item Household Food Security Model which assesses food insecurity over the past 12 months and categorises as high food security, marginal, low, or very low food insecurity(food insecurity) | Foodbanks: high proportion of foodbank users affected by welfare reform (higher than advice centres).Benefit entitlementsYes, Foodbanks n: 175 (64.8%) p < 0.01, Advice Centres n: 157 (64.1%);No—due to sanction or delay,Foodbanks n: 57 (21.1%), Advice Centres n: 8 (12.3%);Formerly receiving,Foodbanks n: 8 (17.4%), Advice Centres n: 38 (15.5%);Never received,Foodbanks n: 30 (11.0%), Advice Centres n: 42 (17.1%)Food Insecurity:Association of benefit entitlement with food insecurity, β value and 95% CI):Benefits entitlement (never received = ref)Currently receiving benefits 0.41 (95% CI: −0.33, 1.08)Not receiving due to sanction or delay 1.01 (95% CI: 0.02, 1.97), p < 0.05Formerly receiving benefits 0.117 (95% CI: −1.02, 1.21) | Medium |
| Reeves 2017 [46] | 21 countries in Europe including UK | Not stated (21 countries and 166 country-years) | Austerity defined as a government reducing expenditure in any two years between 2008 and 2012 (Y/N) | 2004–2012 | First difference regression models with covariates: percentage change in consumer prices for food minus the percentage change in wages, GDP, unemployment rate, year and type of welfare regime of country.Outcome: ‘Can I just check whether your household could afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day if you wanted it?’Eurostat Data (food insecurity) | Announced and begun implementing austerity (Yes = 1) β 0.636 (95% CI: −0..006, 1...293) (percentage point change in food deprivation) | Medium |
| Reeves 2020 [48] | UK | 76,734 observations from 2656 postcode districts (ie. postcode-district months) | Number of households receiving UC in each postcode district available | August 2015 – December 2017 | Linear regression with covariates: proportion of working age population receiving Job Seekers Allowance or claiming Universal Credit for unemployment at the Local Authority level, linear time trends, and seasonality. Also used a Granger causality test and multi-level approaches to examine different aspects of the relationship.The multi-level model clustered at Job Centre Office and local authority levels while adjusting for number of foodbank distribution centres in postcode district and an interaction term between proportion of households on Universal Credit and number of food bank distribution centres in postcode district.Outcome: Food parcel distribution.Trussell Trust data (foodbank use). | Modelling association between change in proportion of households receiving universal credit over time and change in proportion of households receiving food parcels:1 percentage-point increase in proportion of households on Universal Credit: 0.011 (SE: 0.0018) p < 0.011 percentage-point increase in the proportion of households on Universal Credit in the previous month:0.011 (SE: 0.0019) p < 0.011 percentage-point increase in the proportion of households on Universal Credit in the previous month (including lagged measure of food parcel distribution – in effect Granger Causality Test): 0.086 (SE: 0.0016) p < 0.01Multilevel model enabling clustering at job centre level and local authority level:1 percentage-point increase in the proportion of households claiming Universal Credit in month prior: 0.0085 (SE: 0.0024) p < 0.01Per additional 1 percentage-point more households claiming from the month prior: 0.012 (SE: 0.00061) p < 0.01 | High |
| Sosenko 2017 [47] | UK | 1130 from main foodbank users survey, 206 for referral agency survey, 28 for foodbank manager survey | Sanctions, failed Personal Independence Payment assessments, removal of the spare room subsidy | Oct-Nov 2018 (foodbank user survey), April-May 2019 (manager survey) | Fixed effects regression controlling for number of foodbanks, real weekly value of out-of-work benefits, number of work seekers per 1000 working age population, percent of working age benefit claimants on Universal Credit, number of people on health-related benefits per 1000 working age population.Outcome: Data from The Trussell Trust (foodbank use) | Number of Job Seekers Allowance /Employment and Support Allowance sanctions per 1000 working age population: β: 0.31 (SE: 0.10, 95% CI: 0.11–0.50),p = 0.002.Increase of 100 sanctions per 100,000 adults associated with an increase of 31 food parcels per 100,000 adults (calculated by authors) (2011/12–2018/19).Number of failed Personal Independence Payment assessments per 1000 working age population β: 0.93, (SE: 0.37, 95% CI: 0.21, 1.65), p = 0.012,Number of households subject to the removal of the spare room subsidy per 1000 working age population:β: 0.68 (SE: 0.13, 95% CI: 0.41, 0.94) p < 0.001.94% of people referred to foodbanks classified as food insecure. 80% of food insecure households classified as severely food insecure. | Medium |