Analysis of Farmland Abandonment and Government Supervision Traps in China.

Farmland abandonment has become relatively common in rural China. In the context of food security, the Chinese government has introduced policies for farmland abandonment supervision, but the effect of these policies has proven to be marginal. By constructing an evolutionary game model, our research explores the evolutionary logic during the supervision of farmland abandonment by governments and rural households. The results indicate that low food yield and high opportunity costs are the leading causes of farmland abandonment. The probable punishment administered by the central government for dereliction is a major motivation for the local government to practice farmland abandonment supervision. The low supervision avoidance cost for rural households leads local governments and households to form collaborations to jointly cope with central government supervision. When this occurs, local governments' supervision of farmland abandonment falls into a trap, as it leads to continued supervision practices that are costly and ineffective. Food security risk comes from the contradictory population and land resources demands. To improve food security while managing these contradictory demands, it is both necessary and feasible for the government to control population growth and focus on farmland protection, whereas it is unnecessary and unfeasible for the government to supervise whether or not farmland should be abandoned.