Literature DB >> 33556071

Freedom to choose between public resources promotes cooperation.

Mohammad Salahshour1.   

Abstract

As cooperation incurs a cost to the cooperator for others to benefit, its evolution seems to contradict natural selection. How evolution has resolved this obstacle has been among the most intensely studied questions in evolutionary theory in recent decades. Here, we show that having a choice between different public resources provides a simple mechanism for cooperation to flourish. Such a mechanism can be at work in many biological or social contexts where individuals can form different groups or join different institutions to perform a collective action task, or when they can choose between collective actions with different profitability. As a simple evolutionary model suggests, defectors tend to join the highest quality resource in such a context. This allows cooperators to survive and out-compete defectors by sheltering in a lower quality resource. Cooperation is maximized, however, when the qualities of the two highest quality resources are similar, and thus, they are almost interchangeable.

Entities:  

Mesh:

Year:  2021        PMID: 33556071      PMCID: PMC7895419          DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008703

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  PLoS Comput Biol        ISSN: 1553-734X            Impact factor:   4.475


  32 in total

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3.  Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions.

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4.  Fission-fusion populations.

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Journal:  Curr Biol       Date:  2009-08-11       Impact factor: 10.834

5.  Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.

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6.  Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games.

Authors:  Christoph Hauert; Silvia De Monte; Josef Hofbauer; Karl Sigmund
Journal:  Science       Date:  2002-05-10       Impact factor: 47.728

7.  Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating.

Authors:  Jing Wang; Siddharth Suri; Duncan J Watts
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2012-08-17       Impact factor: 11.205

8.  Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite.

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Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2014-02-24       Impact factor: 4.379

10.  Microbial communication, cooperation and cheating: quorum sensing drives the evolution of cooperation in bacteria.

Authors:  Tamás Czárán; Rolf F Hoekstra
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2009-08-17       Impact factor: 3.240

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  3 in total

1.  Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation.

Authors:  Mohammad Salahshour
Journal:  PLoS Comput Biol       Date:  2022-09-29       Impact factor: 4.779

2.  Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods.

Authors:  Mohammad Salahshour
Journal:  Commun Biol       Date:  2021-11-29

3.  Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games.

Authors:  Mohammad Salahshour
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2021-12-09       Impact factor: 4.379

  3 in total

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