Cleaning the air, protecting the climate: Policy, legal and institutional nexus to reduce black carbon emissions in China.

There are significant co-benefits to reducing black carbon emissions for air quality, human health and the climate; yet the pollutant has not yet received sufficient policy attention in China. Overall, realizing co-benefits is complicated by the fact that climate and air quality policy goals have been pursued separately from each other. In this article, we explore the current policy and legal status of black carbon emissions across the domains of air pollution prevention and control, and climate change with a view to identify synergies and opportunities for an integrated approach. We suggest three ways to strengthen the policy, legal and institutional nexus of air pollution and climate change to reduce black carbon emissions in China: improving scientific knowledge and the science-policy interface, increasing policy and legal connections between air quality and climate portfolios, and enhancing institutional linkages. For instance, we argue that more interdisciplinary cooperation and improvements to the black carbon inventory as well as a closer science-policy relationship are necessary. From a legal and policy angle, we identify clear openings through which to integrate reduction of black carbon emissions into the air pollution prevention and control agenda. Institutionally, the recent government reform brings air quality and climate portfolios under the supervision of the same ministry but their integration is still to be ensured. In addition, vertical linkages between different levels of environmental governance - central, provincial and municipal - need to be addressed.

Introduction

Reducing black carbon emissions has numerous co-benefits for air quality, human health and the climate.

Black carbon is a component of particulate matter and as such significantly contributes to the problem of air pollution. Polluted air poses serious risks to human health and has been identified as a leading cause of mortality worldwide.1 In China, the problem of air pollution has already caused significant environmental, social and economic damage.2

Apart from its negative impact on air quality and human health, black carbon has a warming effect on the regional and global climates and is therefore often discussed as a short-lived climate pollutant (SLCP). According to estimates by UN Environment and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), reducing SLCP emissions, especially methane and black carbon, could slow the rate of climate change by 0.5 °C by 2040.3

The Chinese government has prioritised improving air quality in recent years as part of its ‘war on pollution’4 . A number of related policies, measures and legislation have been introduced, and there are some signs that they are having an effect. In parallel, climate policies have also been strengthening in the country. However, on the whole, air quality and climate policies have been developing relatively autonomously from each other. Whereas air pollution is perceived as an environmental problem, climate change has been framed in China as a development issue: as a result, policies on air pollution and on climate change were until recently under the supervision of different parts of the state administration.

In the case of black carbon emissions, this is a missed opportunity as reducing such these emissions has significant co-benefits for human health, climate and the environment. More broadly, a disconnect between climate and air pollution polices can lead not only to more costly policies and the loss of important synergies but also to conflicting regulatory approaches.5 Thus, in order to achieve co-benefits and cost-savings as well as avoid competing policy goals, an integrated approach to policymaking in respect of air quality and climate change is crucial.

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the current policy and legal status of black carbon emissions across the domains of air pollution prevention and control, and climate change in China with a view to identifying opportunities for an integrated approach. Consequently, the paper contributes to the abundant scholarship on China’s policies and law to combat air pollution and climate change with the analysis of a specific pollutant. Thus far, China’s black carbon emissions have been analysed in the literature from a scientific point of view6 but not from a policy and legal perspective.

To achieve this objective, the paper first provides a scientific overview on black carbon emissions, including their impacts and sources, and current and projected emissions in China. This part of the paper explains why it is important for policymakers to pay special attention to reducing black carbon emissions. This is followed by a review of China’s policies, laws and institutions that address air pollution. This entails discussion of the extent to which air quality policies and the law account for climate co-benefits of actions to reduce air pollution and whether the current regulations are relevant to mitigating black carbon emissions. The same type of analysis is then performed in respect of China’s climate policies, laws and institutions. The paper goes on to discuss opportunities for an integrated air quality/climate approach to mitigating black carbon emissions by strengthening the science-policy interface as well as enhancing policy, legal and institutional linkages between air quality and climate portfolios. The concluding part summarises the main arguments set out in the paper.

Scientific overview: sources, impacts, current and projected emissions

Black carbon, or soot, is emitted from natural (forest fires, volcanic eruptions) or anthropogenic sources (diesel engines, biomass and coal usage for cooking and heating, open burning of biomass, industrial boilers, brick kilns, and other sources).7

Black carbon is an important component of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) that contributes to air pollution, which has been declared to be the biggest environmental risk to human health globally.8 It has been suggested that black carbon may have larger health impact than undifferentiated PM2.5.9 Sufficient evidence exists to confirm the link between black carbon exposure and all-cause and cardiopulmonary mortality.10 Research focusing on China has demonstrated the linkages between exposure to black carbon and cardiovascular mortality11 as well as, in general terms, the number of medical appointments attended.12 Chinese scholars have also confirmed that even short-term exposure to black carbon can increase the incidence of acute respiratory inflammation in children.13

Black carbon also accelerates global climate change: in fact, it has been assessed as the second most important individual climate-warming agent after CO2.14 The Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that over a 20-year timescale, the global warming potential of black carbon is 3200 times that of CO2; while over a 100-year timescale, it is 900 times that of CO2.15 Since black carbon stays in the atmosphere for about three to eight days, reducing emissions would lead to quick results. In addition to direct climate impacts, black carbon also reduces the albedo effect of the surface (its ability to reflect sunlight), thereby further contributing to global warming. There are also regional climate impacts, as black carbon affects cloud formation, rainfall and weather patterns: for instance, several studies provide indications that black carbon impacts upon China’s precipitation patterns.16 Furthermore, black carbon emissions have been found to have a larger warming effect on glaciated regions such as the Arctic, the Himalayas and Tibet, among others.17

Black carbon is co-emitted with other long-lived greenhouse gases (GHGs) and short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), which means that measures to reduce its emissions will affect co-emitted compounds. Of particular importance is the fact that black carbon is often co-emitted with cooling substances, including organic carbon, creating significant scientific uncertainty about the net effect of black carbon mitigation options.18 This highlights the importance of a multi-pollutant approach and a strong science-policy interface.

Various estimates have been made as to current emissions of black carbon in China. UNEP’s 2010 report estimates emissions, excluding open biomass burning, at 1.72 Tg/year.19 This made China the highest emitter of black carbon globally: its contribution accounted for 20 to 24% of the global total during the period from 1990 to 2007.20 However, recent research shows that during 2010–2017 emissions of black carbon in China decreased by 27% due to emission control measures.21 Sector-wise, in 2010 black carbon emissions from the residential sector (using biomass, coal or oil for cooking and heating) constituted around 47% of total national emissions, while emissions from the industrial (using biomass, coal or oil in industrial processes) and transportation (including vehicles using diesel fuel) sectors were responsible for 32% and 15% of total emissions, respectively.22 Open agricultural burning has been identified as the fourth largest contributor to total black carbon emissions in China.23

Research on projections of black carbon emissions in China is scarce.24 The available literature is inconclusive, pointing either to an increase or a decrease in future emissions depending on the implementation of emission reduction policies.25

Policies, laws and institutions that address air pollution

Air pollution is severe in China and has been recognised as a grave problem for some time. However, recent episodes of haze and smog in major cities have been particularly serious. One such episode – a 2013 air pollution outbreak in central and eastern China involving extremely high PM2.5 concentrations and poor visibility26 – resulted in a public outcry that had the effect of lifting the need to improve air quality to the top of the policy agenda.27

Combating air pollution has not only been prioritised by the Chinese government – it has also become an issue of unprecedented public engagement as opposed to being a cause taken up solely by environmental NGOs.28 As evidence of this new focus, the latest air quality policy documents reframe fighting air pollution as ‘a project involving all members of Chinese society’ and not only a matter for the government.29

Policies and laws

In China, the State Council, which is chaired by the Premier and comprises the heads of the government departments and agencies, is the chief administrative organ.30 On economic matters it acts through the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).31 The National People’s Congress is a legislative body consisting of delegates from provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and the armed forces.32

Environmental policy in China is defined by state ideology, state planning, and legislation.

are important in China. Although declarative in nature, they reflect – to some extent – the political consensus and guide national planning.33 Most recently, the Chinese government has adopted ‘ecological civilisation’ as a slogan denoting transformation of the current growth model towards environmental sustainability.34 This concept, which is actively promoted by China’s President Xi Jinping, underpins China’s development policies and has already resulted in a closer focus on environmental issues.

According to some experts, plays a dominant role in environmental governance in China.35 National Five-Year Plans (hereinafter ‘FYPs’ or ‘Plans’) for Economic and Social Development are highly important as they establish the main policy priorities and specific goals for a specific time period.36 The FYPs are developed by the NDRC, vetted by the State Council and adopted formally by the National People’s Congress.37 The process of developing the FYPs is quite complex and involves many actors – as a result, they reflect a broad consensus.38

Recent FYPs have included targets relating to energy and the environment, for instance on reducing pollution from sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide or decreasing the economy’s carbon intensity. Targets are implemented through specific instruments, which delegate responsibilities to lower levels of the state administration and allocate resources.39 The policy areas outlined in the national FYPs are further specified in FYPs by individual ministries and local governments.40

The latest 13th FYP for 2016–2021 includes, for the first time, a specific target for the reduction of PM2.5 emissions – by at least 25% in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region (Jing-Jin-Ji).41 Furthermore, among its main indicators for economic and social development is a target for the percentage of ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ air quality days experienced, which, for prefecture level cities, should reach more than 80% by 2020. The FYP states that cities that fail to meet this target will have to reduce PM2.5 concentrations by 18% over five years. Furthermore, numerous other measures have been set that will have a positive impact on air quality, such as reducing emissions from coal burning and transportation, and the promotion of clean energy.

This Plan is complemented by the 13th FYP for Eco-Environmental Protection,42 which specifies targets to be met and the measures by which to achieve them. In particular, the Plan details regional actions in the three most industrialised regions: Jing-Jin-Ji, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. For instance, in the Jing-Jin-Ji area, the Plan suggests focusing on winter coal consumption for heating, emissions-heavy industries and the automotive sector. Specific targets in this region include a 10% decrease in total coal consumption by 2021.

In addition to its FYPs, China also frequently resorts to short-term administrative measures the cost-effectiveness of most of which has not been analysed. If such measures achieve their targets, they may then be strengthened and sometimes become part of regular policies. For example, the 2013 air pollution crisis led to the introduction of the Ambient Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan.43 This included targets for reducing PM2.5 and PM10 for heavily polluted regions and the rest of China, respectively, as well as many measures to achieve these targets.44 The Plan, which ended in 2017, signalled the reframing of air quality protection as a political issue relevant at all levels of governance.45 It required local governments to formulate implementation plans adjusted to local circumstances and offered local leaders the opportunity to take a prominent role in the fight against air pollution.46 This led to significant improvements in air quality in the key geographical areas. For example, Beijing saw dramatic decreases in air pollution in the winter of 2017/18 and average PM2.5 concentrations decreased by 35% from 2013 to 2017 in 74 Chinese cities.47

The new Three-year Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War (2018–2020) is more detailed than the 2013–2017 Plan and has a wider coverage but offers no new targets; instead, it is aligned with the PM2.5 targets proposed in the 13th FYP.48

China’s consists of a number of basic laws, various standards and administrative rules. The relationship between FYPs and legislation is not always clear but generally the former set short-term policy goals and specific targets whereas the latter have a longer-term horizon and define the main principles and instruments of regulation. Approaches successfully piloted through FYPs or other short-term plans are frequently incorporated into legislation: for instance, some of the measures from the 2013 Ambient Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan were legislated as amendments to the Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution (see below).

Several national laws are relevant to improving air quality including the following: the Environmental Protection Law of 1979 (amended in 2014), the Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution of 1987 (amended in 2015), the Cleaner Production Promotion Law of 1988 (amended in 2000), the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of 2003 (amended in 2012), and others.49

The Environmental Protection Law was amended in 2014, partly in response to the 2013 air pollution crisis. The amendments included new measures to improve air quality including total emission control, regional coordination for pollution prevention, information disclosure and public participation, and the imposition of daily penalties on polluters as opposed to one-off fines (as had previously been used).50 Notably, the amendments also incorporated environmental performance into the bureaucracy promotion system (the veto targets) and gave NGOs the right to bring court proceedings against polluters in the public interest.51

The main piece of legislation on air pollution is the Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution (hereinafter the ‘Air Law’).52 The Air Law aims at ‘protecting and improving the environment, preventing and controlling atmospheric pollution, safeguarding public health, advancing ecological civilisation and promoting the sustainable development of economy and society’.53 The last round of amendments, in 2015 – which were also in line with the amendments to the Environmental Protection Law – strengthened the Air Law by making local governments accountable for achieving air quality standards, introducing stricter measures to control coal use, promoting clean transportation, enhancing public participation, and improving emission monitoring and management.54

Furthermore, the Air Law specifically targets such sectors as coal and transportation that emit high levels of black carbon emissions. For instance, Section 1 of chapter IV is devoted in its entirety to reducing atmospheric pollution from the usage of coal. In particular, authorities are required to ‘adopt measures to improve energy structure and popularize the production and utilization of clean energy; optimize the utilization of coal to be cleaner and more effective; and reduce the proportion of coal in primary energy consumption and the discharge of atmospheric pollutants during the production, utilization and transformation of coal’.55 Section 3 of the same chapter lists various measures to prevent and control pollutants emitted by motor vehicles and vessels. These measures seek to achieve ‘low-carbon and eco-friendly transportation’ and bring about a reduction in the number of vehicles that use petroleum fuels.

Interestingly, the Air Law suggests in passing that ‘coordinated control should be taken upon air pollutants and GHGs including particles, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and ammonia etc.’.56 Although this provision is not expanded upon anywhere with respect to GHGs,57 the fact that they are mentioned could in principle be interpreted as an opportunity to integrate climate considerations within air pollution legislation.

The national laws are complemented by various emission and environmental quality standards and other administrative regulations, some of which have been enacted by the State Council, while others have been developed by ministries. The Ambient Air Quality Standards of 2012 (GB3095-2012), which were developed by what was then the Ministry of Environmental Protection, are relevant in this regard. They included PM2.5 for the first time in Chinese law and are generally in line with the air quality guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO).58

Finally, with respect to the choice of policy instruments, most Chinese environmental policies are of the command-and-control type, especially in respect of air pollution mitigation. At the first stage, when the need to tackle pollution is urgent, especially in the context of public discontent, these kinds of policies are highly effective. However, in the long run the Chinese government often integrates market-based solutions: it has, for instance, introduced pricing policies into environmental regulation system through environmental taxation.59 Key components of PM2.5, including soot and organic carbon (not black carbon specifically), are covered by the tax.60 In parallel, the environmental fee policy, which is considered to be no longer efficient, is being phased out.61

Institutional framework

Institutionally, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), which was formerly the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has been responsible for the implementation of air pollution policies cooperating with other departments when necessary. As it is also often the case in other countries, the Ministry has a weaker standing in the government compared to other ministries, which reportedly contributes to implementation problems.62 It has, however, been strengthened as a result of the administrative reform announced in March 2018, and is now the controlling government agency in respect of environmental pollution.

Environmental departments known as provincial and municipal environmental protection bureaux also exist at regional levels. The system of environmental administration is currently undergoing important changes in order to combat local protectionism and strengthen the enforcement of environmental legislation. In particular, municipal environmental enforcement and monitoring agencies are undergoing reform so that they will report directly to provincial environmental protection bureaux and not to local governments as was previously the case.63 The reform is expected to be completed in 2018.

Chinese air pollution policies have been effective in reducing, for instance, emissions of sulphur dioxide64 and PM2.5. Nevertheless, generally speaking, implementation and enforcement of environmental plans and legislation pose a continuous challenge in China.65 Many reasons for this have been put forward, including the fast pace of economic growth and associated rise in fossil fuel usage.66 The decentralised system of environmental enforcement where local authorities are more interested in stimulating regional economies than in environmental protection is another possible reason.67 Other factors include insufficient budgets and human resources, poor coordination among various authorities, and the promotion system for state bureaucrats, which used to focus on economic indicators but not on environmental performance.68

Some of these challenges have recently been addressed by the Chinese government in the effort to improve the enforcement of environmental regulations and meet policy targets. In particular, mandatory targets on air quality in FYPs have been linked to the promotion of local officials and emissions data management has been centralised at national level in order to combat data manipulation.69 The recent administrative reform aims at strengthening the MEE. The state administration also sends environmental supervision and inspections to audit the implementation and enforcement of air quality legislation and targets at local level which have resulted in fines and polluting plant closures. Amendments to the basic environmental Laws, allocating responsibility to local governments for achieving air quality targets and opening a path to environmental litigation for NGOs – as explained above – also serve the goal of better implementation of environmental rules in China.

To conclude, the air quality agenda in China constitutes a mature field characterized by an established legal and institutional framework and an evolving enforcement system. It also enjoys political momentum and wide public support. Despite continuing implementation challenges, recent policies and laws have been effective in reducing air pollution. At present, they do not address black carbon emissions per se but there are quantified policy targets to reduce PM2.5. A number of provisions regulating specific pollution sources will also lead to reductions in black carbon emissions as co-emitted substances. The precise degree of these reductions is unclear although Zheng et al for instance estimate them as 27% for 2010–2017.70

Policies, laws and institutions that address climate change

China is the world’s top emitter of GHGs: its 2016 emissions constituted about 26% of global total emissions.71 Consequently, the policies China puts in place to limit its emissions have a significant impact on the global climate.

In the recent decade, the status of climate change has risen on China’s policy agenda. Domestically, there are concerns about energy security and the impacts of global warming as well as recognition of the economic benefits of clean energy. Addressing climate change also forms part of the general trend towards combating pollution, especially air pollution, and of achieving the transition to ecological civilization recently stated as an aim by the Chinese leadership. Internationally, participation in cooperation on climate change is seen by China as an opportunity for all states to build ‘a community of common destiny for all mankind’72 as well as a way to contribute to global affairs and improve China’s international image as a responsible developing country.

Domestically, the policy approach to addressing climate change has evolved from considering climate change as an issue area to mainstreaming climate change into the country’s economic and energy development paradigm.73 The recent government reform (see below) integrates climate change into the process of constructing ecological civilization.74

China’s participation in international processes has been one of the drivers of the development of domestic climate policy.75 China is party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. It has played an important role in the development and negotiation of the Agreement, for instance through the three joint announcements with President Barack Obama of the United States (US) concerning action on climate change in 2014,76 201577 and 201678 respectively. China reiterated its support for the Paris Agreement following the 2017 announcement by US President Donald Trump of his intention to withdraw79 and has also pledged around $3.1 billion in climate finance to developing countries.80

The Paris Agreement adopts a country-driven approach to climate change mitigation whereby parties define and regularly update their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Accordingly, in its NDC, China stated that it would achieve peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and make best efforts to achieve peaking earlier, as well as decrease CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65% of 2005 levels by 2030.81 It also intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% and increase forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic metres from 2005 levels. These policy targets rely on extensive analyses and modelling and it is possible to have a high degree of confidence as to their achievability.82

The most recent FYPs seek to decrease emissions from fossil fuels through energy efficiency/intensity goals and carbon intensity goals. The targets set in the 12th FYP for 2011–2015 were exceeded.83 The latest 13th FYP set binding targets to reduce energy intensity by 15% and CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 18% from 2005 levels by 2020. It also set a target to increase the share of non-fossil fuel in primary energy consumption by 3% over the five-year period.84 Furthermore, the FYP promises action to restrict the development of coal resources, to achieve clean and efficient coal utilisation, to bring about a shift from coal to natural gas, and to control coal consumption in all regions, with particular focus on the Jing-Jin-Ji region and adjacent areas, the Yangtze River delta, the Pearl River delta, and northeast China.85 This FYP is the first to lay down a quantified target for limiting energy consumption (to five billion tons of standard coal equivalent), which is important given that the energy sector is the largest source of CO2 emissions.86

The 13th FYP also devotes an entire – albeit short and vague – chapter to climate change.87 The Plan accordingly elaborates on GHG emissions control by setting forth plans for peaking CO2 emissions in leading development regions, pilot programmes for low-carbon development and near-zero carbon emissions zones, control of non-CO2 GHGs, establishment of the national carbon emissions trading scheme and development of measuring, reporting and verification systems.

The targets and actions specified in the 13th FYP are further elaborated in the Work Plan for Controlling GHG Emissions during the 13th FYP Period, which, among other things, requires provinces to include plans to reduce of CO2 intensity into their planning documents and to develop related implementation plans.88

China does not currently have any overarching climate change law. This law has been under development since 201189 but it is not at present clear when it will be enacted. The general national policy is defined in the National Plan to Address Climate Change (2014–2020), which covers mitigation, adaptation, pilot projects, regional measures, scientific and technological support, capacity building, and international activities.

China’s climate and energy policies are closely interlinked.90 Consequently, it is important to consider planning documents and legislation in the energy sector. For example, the 13th FYP is complemented by plans for energy conservation, renewable energy development, energy technology innovation, solar power, wind power, building energy efficiency and green buildings, and various other documents.91 Among energy policies that seek to reduce GHG emissions, a prominent role is played by policies concerning the restructuring of the energy sector by limiting coal consumption and promoting clean utilisation of fossil fuels and the development of non-fossil fuels, including hydro, nuclear, wind and solar.92

China’s climate policy has mainly focused on CO2 emissions reductions. Non-CO2 GHGs, primarily methane and HFCs, have received less attention although they are significant and could almost double by 2030 from 2005 levels under existing policies.93 The 13th FYP notes the importance of controlling non-CO2 GHGs but so far this has not been operationalised in concrete terms.

The Chinese government has also explored the potential of market approaches. Emissions trading has been piloted at sub-national level in two provinces and five cities, including Beijing and Shanghai.94 The pilot covered only CO2.95 The national carbon market was officially launched in late 2017 although it will be fully operational no earlier than 2019.96 It is expected initially to focus on the power sector and grow to include eight sectors in total.97 Overall, the use of emissions trading schemes is viewed as a complementary approach to command-and-control policies for emissions reductions.98

Low-carbon cities represent another idea piloted at sub-national level. The pilot started with eight cities (and five provinces) in 2010,99 and by 2017 a total of 66 cities were participating in the scheme.100 The cities formulate FYP for low-carbon development setting the targets and specific tasks. They also develop capacities for regular GHG inventories and develop legislation. Several local governments, including, for example, Shijiazhuang and Nanchang, have adopted legislation on climate change and low-carbon development.101 Overall, assessments of the pilots vary, with many experts being of the view that Chinese cities have a long way to go in terms of achieving low-carbon urban development.102

Prior to the reform, climate change fell within the domain of the NDRC – a ‘super-agency’ with coordinating powers among ministries on issues concerning economic development.103 In March 2018, however, climate change was moved to the MEE as part of the institutional reform.104 The MEE has, therefore, taken over pollution-related functions from the NDRC and other state agencies, making it the most significant regulator of pollution in the country.105 The relevance of the reform to the nexus of air quality and climate change is further discussed in the next section.

In summary, the climate agenda in China is still evolving: the legal framework has yet to be developed and climate action is mostly defined through policy documents such as FYPs. The institutional framework is also currently undergoing transition. In terms of its scope, climate policy in China primarily focuses on CO2 emissions. It has been developed in close connection with energy development policies but not with the air quality policy agenda. At the same time, in its focus on the coal sector, climate policy has a direct impact on air quality and black carbon emissions.

How to combine air quality and climate protection goals

In general, the nexus between air quality and climate in China’s policies has been weak, not least due to institutional barriers to combining them. This separation is not unique to China, since in many other jurisdictions, and under international law, air quality and climate protection goals are often pursued separately.106 One of the reasons for this is that air pollution is traditionally seen as an issue of local concern whereas climate change is clearly of a global nature. Lately, however, further scientific evidence has emerged that demonstrates the global impacts of air pollution and its linkages with climate change.

In relation to black carbon, this type of integrated approach has only recently started taking shape in the context of international and national law.107 A notable example is the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP),108 which addresses air pollution in North America, Europe and the Eurasian region. The Convention’s Gothenburg Protocol109 sets emissions reduction targets for PM2.5 while encouraging states party to it to prioritise the reduction of emissions of black carbon. The same approach, whereby reductions in black carbon emissions are encouraged as part of broader action on PM2.5 but not quantitatively specified, is mirrored in recent EU legislation.110 Measures aimed at mitigating black carbon emissions in international shipping have been discussed in the International Maritime Organization.111 Furthermore, action on black carbon emissions has been promoted by the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, which is a voluntary state-led partnership on SLCPs.112 The Arctic Council has also combined climate change and air quality concerns in its 2015 Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions.113 Furthermore, under the Paris Agreement the country-driven approach to mitigation offers scope for accommodating SLCP actions: several countries specifically mentioned black carbon reductions in their NDCs to the UNFCCC.114 As illustrated by these examples, policy focus on black carbon emissions has been increasing internationally, particularly in the northern hemisphere. In operational terms, legal action has mostly taken the form of integrating black carbon emissions reductions in a generic way into air quality legislation as part of wider action on mitigating PM2.5.

As shown in the two preceding sections, mitigating black carbon emissions has not yet received policy attention in China. Although many policies focus in principle, for air quality or climate reasons, on sources of black carbon emissions, none target black carbon as such. Furthermore, air pollution and climate policies in China have developed largely in isolation from each other. This means that there is significant scope to explore interconnections between the two domains to achieve co-benefits for air quality, public health and the climate in a cost-effective way. Three areas across which an integrated approach can be developed – the science-policy interface, linkages between policy and law and institutional linkages – are discussed below.

The science-policy interface

Insufficient data on black carbon emissions and limited understanding of their sources, impacts and mitigation pathways represent a systemic barrier to focusing policy attention on black carbon. Therefore, improving scientific knowledge is crucial to bringing about a more synergetic policy approach.

Greater cooperation between atmospheric and climate scientists and with health experts is needed to fill gaps in the available knowledge about black carbon emissions. This can be encouraged, for example, by means of dedicated state funding for interdisciplinary projects on black carbon or, more broadly, on linkages between air pollution, climate change and public health.

The national inventory of black carbon emissions needs to be improved by reference to the current state of Chinese economic development. This includes developing guidelines on the methodology to improve a database of black carbon emission factors and improving statistics on household fossil fuel combustion behavior. The National Pollutant Survey and relevant monitoring system should be modified with respect to emission factors and activity data to cover black carbon. This would also be in line with the increasing international attention being paid to accounting for black carbon emissions: the revision of the 2006 Guidelines for National GHG Inventories and the addition of guidelines on black carbon inventory were discussed at the recent IPCC Expert Meeting on Short-lived Climate Forcers in May 2018.115

Strengthening the scientific basis for action does not in itself guarantee effective policies. Consequently, improving the science-policy interface is another important step that needs to be taken. Chinese scientists need to convey a strong message to policymakers as to the importance of tackling black carbon emissions from air quality, public health and climate perspectives. This message should be supported by the provision of clear information on potential pathways to controlling black carbon emissions.

The recent institutional reform provides an opportunity to create a stronger science-policy interface on climate and air pollution, for instance through the National Expert Panel on Climate Change, the National Environmental Advisory Committee, and the Science and Technology Committee of the MEE. In addition, the dozens of think tanks, science communities and associations that work on climate change and the environment should engage with the topic more closely in order to develop concrete policy recommendations.

Policy and legal linkages

At present, black carbon emissions do not fall within the scope of air quality or climate policies and legislation. In operational terms, action taken in China on black carbon emissions could be incorporated into air pollution control and prevention policies. This would also guarantee the effectiveness of these policy measures as the air pollution agenda is backed by strong political, institutional and civil society support. Integration of black carbon into air quality agenda can take several forms, as outlined below.

First, air quality and climate co-benefits are explicitly mentioned in policy documents and key legislation. For instance, the Air Law hints at taking into account synergies with climate change concerns, as do policy planning documents such as the recent 2018–2020 Three-year Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War.116 This opens the door to the possibility of a stronger focus on substances with dual effect, for instance through integrating policy documents and streamlining various policy targets.

Second, current policy plans and legislation aimed at combating air pollution contain specific measures to reduce PM2.5, of which black carbon is a component. As noted above, in other countries the mitigation of black carbon emissions has been combined with mitigating PM2.5. At present, the Chinese policy approach envisages the pathway to reducing PM2.5 as mainly involving a focus on the reduction of volatile organic compounds without regard to black carbon emissions. Therefore, there is a need to improve scientific understanding of the impact on black carbon emissions involved in taking this approach, and to promote the possibility of taking stronger action against such emissions.

Third, black carbon can be included in air quality legislation as a pollutant. The Air Law does not contain a list of air pollutants, but black carbon can be classified as such due to its scientific characteristics as an aerosol and its negative impacts on air quality and public health.

At the same time, climate policies and laws should also take air quality concerns into account. There are clear synergies between air pollution and climate policies in their sectoral foci: both target the same sectors and sources of pollution, which are high in black carbon emissions, namely the residential sector and transportation. Measures to reduce the use of coal in household cooking and heating and the use of diesel in transportation will have positive effects both for the climate and for air quality. The dual impacts of these measures need to be explored to maximize their co-benefits. At the same time, integration with other sectoral policies is also crucial as some sources of pollution are regulated outside of the air quality or climate portfolios.

To date, climate policy in China has mainly targeted CO2 emissions, while other GHGs or climate warming agents have been somewhat neglected. However, the process of developing China’s NDC can serve as a framework for a more integrated approach in respect of climate, air quality and energy.117 Inventories of black carbon emissions and better science on its climate impacts are needed in order to bring that about. On a broader level, it remains important to further strengthen the interlinkages between air quality and climate policies in policy discourse and include them in policy planning and target development processes.

Institutional synergies

Both horizontal and vertical institutional linkages exist: the former refer to intra- and inter-agency cooperation at central government level, while the latter arise from various levels – central, provincial and municipal – of environmental governance in China. Both dimensions are characterized by fragmented and overlapping structures,118 which is the problem that the recent government reform seek to address.

As noted above, prior to the institutional reform of 2018, air pollution and climate matters were dealt with by different organs of China’s central government: while the air quality agenda was the responsibility of what was the Ministry of Environmental Protection, climate issues formed part of the portfolio of the NDRC. Institutional barriers undoubtedly contributed to the disconnect between the two issue areas.

Under the recent reform, the entire climate department was transferred from the NDRC to the MEE, bringing air pollution and climate policies under the control of the same ministry. The reform is viewed as further strengthening the focus on environmental affairs in the Chinese policy agenda and as an aspect of the implementation of the concept of ‘ecological civilisation’.119 While details of the merger are still being finalized and it remains too early to assess the significance of the reform, some preliminary observations can be made.

First, bringing the air quality and climate agendas under the control of the same organ of the government should in principle help bring about a more synergistic approach to air pollution and climate change by eliminating institutional barriers. Such synergies can be more clearly emphasized and operationalized, for instance, through the sectoral planning documents. The MEE also has a well-established framework for environmental data collection and monitoring, covering heavy polluting industries. This system offers a means of integrating GHG inventories into the applicable frameworks at national, provincial and municipal levels, thus providing a platform to achieve climate-air synergies.

At the same time, bringing the air quality and climate agendas into the same ministerial ‘house’ does not per se guarantee better coordination between the two policy areas, meaning that it is necessary to put specific arrangements in place. These arrangements may include, for example, dedicated work programmes through which to integrate the air quality and climate agendas and regular meetings between the two teams. Personnel secondments between the climate and air quality divisions, capacity building on the science of SLCPs, and ensuring a budgetary focus on multiple rather than single benefits are among other the initiatives that have been suggested.120

Second, the effects of the administrative reshuffle are not clear for the climate mitigation agenda. On the one hand, moving it away from the NDRC – a powerful agency with coordinating powers and a key role in China’s involvement in international climate negotiations – to the MEE arguably makes domestic climate policymaking less political and more technocratic. How this will affect the ambition and implementation of climate mitigation action remains to be seen. It is also unclear to what extent the MEE will be able to coordinate the climate portfolio and energy policies – the connection between these areas had previously been strong when the NDRC had responsibility for them. Indeed, interagency cooperation is highly important for dealing with SLCPs: for instance, some of the key sources, such as cookstoves, transportation and open agricultural burning, lie outside the scope of the MEE’s portfolio. On the other hand, as a result of the reform, MEE emerges as the key ministry for putting the principles of ecological civilization into practice, thus signaling that its political weight may also increase.

Vertical linkages can play a significant role, especially when it comes to the implementation of key policies on the ground. Provincial and municipal governments are responsible for operationalizing policy targets by developing and implementing specific measures. The effectiveness of centrally developed policies is, therefore, highly dependent on the capacity and attitude of regional governors. Substantive capacity-building and training programmes are needed at regional level in order to successfully implement policies focusing on black carbon emissions. Region-specific policy goals explicitly targeting black carbon emissions will also boost the effectiveness of local implementation.

Furthermore, the institutional reform should be extended beyond the central government to encompass regional levels. In the course of the past few FYPs, the NDRC has developed climate change capacities in local development and reform commissions. These capacities have, for instance, been instrumental in constructing pilot carbon markets and low-carbon cities. The MEE now faces the challenge of maintaining these units and personnel. One possibility is to combine them with local environmental bureaux as they have been active in large scale environmental supervision and inspections relating to air pollution. However, following this path would require close coordination between the climate and air quality divisions of the MEE.

Conclusions

Overall, black carbon emissions in China have not yet been the focus of sustained policy attention as a result of a weak air-climate nexus and insufficient scientific knowledge. This represents a lost opportunity to realize significant co-benefits from reducing black carbon emissions for human health, the climate and the environment.

To elaborate, the current air quality policy does not target black carbon, although it does include quantified policy targets to reduce PM2.5, of which black carbon is a component. The climate agenda in China, on the other hand, has so far focused primarily on CO2 emissions.

We suggest three ways to strengthen the policy and legal nexus of air quality and climate change for reducing black carbon emissions: improving the science-policy interface, increasing policy and legal connections, and enhancing institutional linkages. For instance, it is necessary to bring about greater interdisciplinary cooperation and improvement of the black carbon inventory as well as strengthen the science-policy relationship. From a legal and policy angle, there are clear openings to integrate reductions of black carbon emissions into the air pollution agenda. Institutionally, the recent reform brings the air quality and climate portfolios under the responsibility of the same ministry but close cooperation between those responsible for these two areas still needs to be ensured. In addition, vertical linkages between different levels of environmental governance – central, provincial and municipal – need to be addressed.

Finally, China could enhance its participation in international cooperation on black carbon. Active cooperation occurs, for instance, in the context of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition. This has emerged as the main global arena for knowledge and information exchange on SLCPs through scientific assessments, sharing of best practices, and capacity building. To date, 60 countries have joined the Coalition,121 together with a number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. Another opportunity to engage in global cooperation specific to black carbon lies in the Arctic Council, which has invited observer states to participate in the implementation of its Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. Several observer states have, for instance, submitted their black carbon inventories under the Framework. By engaging in Arctic cooperation on black carbon, China, which has observer status and has otherwise been active in the Arctic policy agenda, could demonstrate its commitment to the preservation of the Arctic environment.

In summary, black carbon emissions lie at the nexus between air pollution and climate policies, and their reduction will facilitate the achievement of significant co-benefits for air quality, human health and the climate. Developing policies to mitigate these emissions represents an opportunity for China to improve the fragmented approach to climate/energy and air pollution agendas taken thus far in the country. Although it may appear that there are already good prospects of achieving greater synergy between air pollution and climate policies, substantial scientific, legal, policy, and institutional challenges remain. These should be considered and addressed by Chinese policymakers with a view to realizing the overall goal of constructing an ecological civilization.