| Literature DB >> 33276540 |
Linni Gu1, Rui Zhu2, Zhen Li1, Shengfa Zhang3, Jing Li3, Donghua Tian3, Zhijun Sun1.
Abstract
Historically, cooperative medical insurance and village doctors are considered two powerful factors in protecting rural residents' health. However, with the central government of China's implementation of new economic policies in the 1980s, cooperative medical insurance collapsed and rural residents fell into poverty because of sickness. In 2009, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance (NRCMI) was implemented to provide healthcare for rural residents. Moreover, the National Basic Drug System was implemented in the same year to protect rural residents' right to basic drugs. In 2013, a village doctor contract service was implemented after the publication of the Guidance on Pilot Contract Services for Rural Doctors. This contract service aimed to retain patients in rural primary healthcare systems and change private practice village doctors into general practitioners (GPs) under government management.Entities:
Keywords: NRCMI; drug treatment effect; family doctor; reimbursement rate; rural area; trust; village doctor contract service
Year: 2020 PMID: 33276540 PMCID: PMC7730573 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph17238969
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Pairwise correlation between contract service and drug utilization, New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance (NRCMI), trust, service quality, and demographic variables.
| Variables | Contract Service | Drug Treatment Effect | Drug Price | Reimbursement Rate | Reimbursement Procedure | Trust | Service Quality | Age | Education | Family Income |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contract service | 1 | |||||||||
| Drug treatment effect | 0.20 *** | 1 | ||||||||
| Drug price | −0.12 * | −0.26 *** | 1 | |||||||
| Reimbursement rate | 0.19 *** | 0.21 *** | −0.24 *** | 1 | ||||||
| Reimbursement procedure | −0.07 | −0.16 *** | 0.26 *** | −0.25 *** | 1 | |||||
| Trust | 0.26 *** | 0.30 *** | −0.34 *** | 0.19 *** | −0.09 | 1 | ||||
| Service quality | 0.19 *** | 0.39 *** | −0.48 *** | 0.24 *** | −0.22 *** | 0.58 *** | 1 | |||
| Age | 0.03 | 1 | ||||||||
| Education | 0.04 | −0.25 *** | 1 | |||||||
| Family income | 0.02 | −0.28 *** | 0.21 | 1 |
* p < 0.1; *** p < 0.01.
Hierarchical multivariate logistic regression of the influence factors associated with contract service.
| Variables | β | SE | (95% CI) | OR | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
| |||||
| Male vs. female | −0.362 | 0.187 | 0.053 | (−0.730, 0.005) | 0.696 | |
|
| ||||||
| 41–59 vs. ≤40 | −0.385 | 0.223 | 0.084 | (−0.822, 0.052) | 0.681 | |
| ≥60 vs. ≤40 | −0.091 | 0.281 | 0.745 | (−0.642, 0.459) | 0.913 | |
|
| ||||||
| Middle school vs. primary school or lower | 0.134 | 0.424 | 0.751 | (−0.697, 0.966) | 1.144 | |
| High school or higher vs. primary school or lower | 0.281 | 0.466 | 0.547 | (−0.633, 1.195) | 1.324 | |
|
| ||||||
| 10,000–29,999 vs. ≤9999 | −0.429 | 0.219 | 0.051 | −0.858, 0.001 | 0.651 | |
| ≥30,000 vs. ≤9999 | 0.191 | 0.273 | 0.484 | −0.344, 0.726 | 1.211 | |
|
| 0.471 | 0.100 | <0.001 | 0.274, 0.668 | 1.601 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.053 | |||||
| Log likelihood | −359.035 | |||||
| Chi-squared | 25.357 | |||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 721.866 | |||||
| Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 747.780 | |||||
|
| 574 | |||||
|
|
| |||||
| Male vs. female | −0.422 | 0.193 | 0.029 | −0.801, −0.042 | 0.656 | |
|
| ||||||
| 41–59 vs. ≤40 | −0.405 | 0.228 | 0.075 | −0.851, 0.041 | 0.667 | |
| ≥60 vs. ≤40 | −0.225 | 0.291 | 0.440 | −0.796, 0.346 | 0.799 | |
|
| ||||||
| Middle school vs. primary school or lower | 0.098 | 0.440 | 0.824 | −0.765, 0.962 | 1.103 | |
| High school or higher vs. primary school or lower | 0.193 | 0.481 | 0.688 | −0.750, 1.137 | 1.213 | |
|
| ||||||
| 10,000–29,999 vs. ≤9999 | −0.241 | 0.230 | 0.294 | −0.692, 0.209 | 0.785 | |
| ≥30,000 vs. ≤9999 | 0.326 | 0.284 | 0.251 | −0.230, 0.883 | 1.386 | |
|
| ||||||
| Suitable vs. low | −0.056 | 0.363 | 0.877 | −0.768, 0.656 | 0.945 | |
| High vs. low | 0.839 | 0.385 | 0.029 | 0.084, 1.594 | 2.314 | |
|
| 0.283 | 0.109 | 0.009 | 0.070, 0.497 | 1.328 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.087 | |||||
| Log likelihood | −346.227 | |||||
| Chi-squared | 38.262 | |||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 712.015 | |||||
| Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 746.552 | |||||
|
| 574 | |||||
|
|
| |||||
| Male vs. female | −0.441 | 0.196 | 0.025 | −0.826, −0.057 | 0.643 | |
|
| ||||||
| 41–59 vs. ≤40 | −0.404 | 0.230 | 0.080 | −0.856, 0.048 | 0.668 | |
| ≥60 vs. ≤40 | −0.197 | 0.294 | 0.502 | −0.773, 0.379 | 0.821 | |
|
| ||||||
| Middle school vs. primary school or lower | 0.073 | 0.445 | 0.870 | −0.799, 0.944 | 1.076 | |
| High school or higher vs. primary school or lower | 0.160 | 0.485 | 0.741 | −0.791, 1.112 | 1.174 | |
|
| ||||||
| 10,000–29,999 vs. ≤9999 | −0.219 | 0.233 | 0.349 | −0.676, 0.239 | 0.804 | |
| ≥30,000 vs. ≤9999 | 0.316 | 0.288 | 0.274 | −0.205, 0.881 | 1.371 | |
|
| ||||||
| Suitable vs. low | −0.096 | 0.366 | 0.794 | −0.813, 0.622 | 0.909 | |
| High vs. low | 0.757 | 0.391 | 0.053 | −0.008, 1.523 | 2.133 | |
|
| 0.213 | 0.125 | 0.050 | −0.033, 0.458 | 1.237 | |
|
| ||||||
| Common vs. bad | 0.710 | 0.517 | 0.170 | −0.304, 1.723 | 2.033 | |
| Good vs. bad | 1.108 | 0.538 | 0.039 | 0.053, 2.163 | 3.029 | |
|
| ||||||
| Suitable vs. low | 0.011 | 0.298 | 0.971 | −0.573, 0.595 | 1.011 | |
| High vs. low | 0.036 | 0.377 | 0.924 | −0.704, 0.776 | 1.037 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.094 | |||||
| Log likelihood | −343.094 | |||||
| Chi-squared | 58.133 | |||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 694.144 | |||||
| Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 732.998 | |||||
|
| 574 | |||||
|
|
| |||||
| Male vs. female | −0.383 | 0.200 | 0.055 | −0.774, 0.008 | 0.682 | |
|
| ||||||
| 41–59 vs. ≤40 | −0.528 | 0.238 | 0.026 | −0.994, −0.062 | 0.590 | |
| ≥60 vs. ≤40 | −0.388 | 0.302 | 0.200 | −0.980, 0.204 | 0.679 | |
|
| ||||||
| Middle school vs. primary school or lower | 0.039 | 0.450 | 0.931 | −0.843, 0.921 | 1.040 | |
| High school or higher vs. primary school or lower | 0.032 | 0.492 | 0.948 | −0.932, 0.997 | 1.033 | |
|
| ||||||
| 10,000–29,999 vs. ≤9999 | −0.178 | 0.237 | 0.452 | −0.642, 0.286 | 0.837 | |
| ≥30,000 vs. ≤9999 | 0.285 | 0.291 | 0.327 | −0.285, 0.854 | 1.329 | |
|
| ||||||
| Suitable vs. low | −0.038 | 0.367 | 0.918 | −0.756, 0.681 | 0.963 | |
| High vs. low | 0.758 | 0.391 | 0.052 | −0.008, 1.524 | 2.134 | |
|
| 0.006 | 0.138 | 0.964 | −0.265, 0.277 | 1.006 | |
|
| ||||||
| Common vs. bad | 0.847 | 0.519 | 0.103 | −0.170, 1.863 | 2.332 | |
| Good vs. bad | 1.166 | 0.539 | 0.030 | 0.111, 2.222 | 3.211 | |
|
| ||||||
| Suitable vs. low | 0.072 | 0.299 | 0.808 | −0.513, 0.658 | 1.075 | |
| High vs. low | 0.166 | 0.382 | 0.664 | −0.583, 0.915 | 1.180 | |
|
| 0.504 | 0.138 | <0.001 | 0.233, 0.774 | 1.655 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.112 | |||||
| Log likelihood | −336.092 | |||||
| Chi-squared | 71.064 | |||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 710.183 | |||||
| Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 792.850 | |||||
|
| 574 | |||||
|
| High reimbursement | −1.279 | 0.749 | 0.088 | −2.748, 0.189 | 0.278 |
| rate × trust | ||||||
| Drug treatment effect common × trust | 2.151 | 1.132 | 0.057 | −0.0682, 4.371 | 8.596 | |
| Drug treatment effect | ||||||
| good × trust | 2.158 | 1.150 | 0.061 | −0.097, 4.412 | 8.655 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.107 | |||||
| Log likelihood | −337.590 | |||||
| Chi-squared | 92.051 | |||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 709.201 | |||||
| Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 804.920 | |||||
|
| 574 | |||||
β: regression coefficient; SE: standard error; OR: odds ratio; CI: confidence interval.
Figure 1Relationship between trust and drug treatment effect on patient willingness to contract.
Figure 2Relationship between trust and reimbursement rate of NRCMI on patient willingness to contract.