Literature DB >> 33271038

Social reward, punishment, and prosociality in paranoia.

Nichola Raihani1, Daniel Martinez-Gatell1, Vaughan Bell2, Lucy Foulkes3.   

Abstract

Paranoia is the exaggerated belief that harm will occur and is intended by others. Although commonly framed in terms of attributing malicious intent to others, recent work has explored how paranoia also affects social decision-making, using economic games. Previous work found that paranoia is associated with decreased cooperation and increased punishment in the Dictator Game (where cooperating and punishing involve paying a cost to respectively increase or decrease a partner's income). These findings suggest that paranoia might be associated with variation in subjective reward from positive and/or negative social decision-making, a possibility we explore using a preregistered experiment with U.S.-based participants (n = 2,004). Paranoia was associated with increased self-reported enjoyment of negative social interactions and decreased self-reported enjoyment of prosocial interactions. More paranoid participants attributed stronger harmful intent to a partner. Harmful intent attributions and the enjoyment of negative social interactions positively predicted the tendency to pay to punish the partner. Cooperation was positively associated with the tendency to enjoy prosocial interactions and increased with participant age. There was no main effect of paranoia on tendency to cooperate in this setting. We discuss these findings in light of previous research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

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Year:  2020        PMID: 33271038      PMCID: PMC7832736          DOI: 10.1037/abn0000647

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Abnorm Psychol        ISSN: 0021-843X


  46 in total

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Authors:  Paul E Bebbington; Orla McBride; Craig Steel; Elizabeth Kuipers; Mirjana Radovanovic; Traolach Brugha; Rachel Jenkins; Howard I Meltzer; Daniel Freeman
Journal:  Br J Psychiatry       Date:  2013-05-09       Impact factor: 9.319

4.  A comparative fMRI meta-analysis of altruistic and strategic decisions to give.

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Journal:  Neuroimage       Date:  2018-09-07       Impact factor: 6.556

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Authors:  John F Edens; David K Marcus; Leslie C Morey
Journal:  J Abnorm Psychol       Date:  2009-08

6.  Exploring the Motivations for Punishment: Framing and Country-Level Effects.

Authors:  Jonathan E Bone; Katherine McAuliffe; Nichola J Raihani
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2016-08-03       Impact factor: 3.240

7.  Paranoia and conspiracy: group cohesion increases harmful intent attribution in the Trust Game.

Authors:  Anna Greenburgh; Vaughan Bell; Nichola Raihani
Journal:  PeerJ       Date:  2019-08-16       Impact factor: 2.984

8.  Routes to psychotic symptoms: trauma, anxiety and psychosis-like experiences.

Authors:  Daniel Freeman; David Fowler
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9.  The neural basis of theory of mind and its relationship to social functioning and social anhedonia in individuals with schizophrenia.

Authors:  David Dodell-Feder; Laura M Tully; Sarah Hope Lincoln; Christine I Hooker
Journal:  Neuroimage Clin       Date:  2013-11-27       Impact factor: 4.881

10.  Paranoia and the social representation of others: a large-scale game theory approach.

Authors:  Nichola J Raihani; Vaughan Bell
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2017-07-03       Impact factor: 4.379

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