| Literature DB >> 33048974 |
Shoulin Pang1, Shiting Dou1, Huan Li1.
Abstract
This paper explores the synergy effect of the government subsidies, tax incentives, and government procurement on innovation based on synergy theory, and further analyzes its path and mechanism in the process of innovation. We find that government subsidies, tax incentives, and government procurement exert positive synergy effect on innovation. Furthermore, in the process of innovation, government subsidies are shown to play strongest roles in the stages of innovation input and technological development, while government procurement is the most crucial in the transformation stage of technological innovation, and tax incentives play balanced roles. We also find that innovation resource input, innovation technology spillover, and innovation cooperation all play partial mediating roles in the synergy effect of science and technology policies on innovation. This paper applies the synergy theory to the field of innovation policies, which enriches and expands relevant researches, and provides micro-evidence for in-depth understanding of the effect of science and technology policies on innovation.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2020 PMID: 33048974 PMCID: PMC7553322 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0240515
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Variables.
| Variable type | Variable name | Variable definition |
|---|---|---|
| Innovation performance (inper) | ln(total revenue of new product sales+1) | |
| Government subsidies (sub) | ln(total amount of government subsidies received by enterprises+1) | |
| Tax incentives (tax) | ln(total amount of tax relief received by enterprises+1) | |
| Public procurement (pp) | ln(total amount of government procurement received by enterprises+1) | |
| Firm size (size) | ln (total assets+1) | |
| Firm age (age) | ln (time of establishment of a firm+1) | |
| Leverage (lev) | Total liabilities / total assets | |
| Industry alliance (group) | Dummy, if a firm join the industry alliance equals 1, otherwise equals 0. | |
| Profitability (roa) | (total profit + interest income) / total assets | |
| Revenue (revenue) | ln (revenue+1) | |
| number of employees with bachelor or above (hedu) | ln (number of employees with bachelor or above+1) |
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.
| Mean | Std. dev. | Min. | Max. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 53450.68 | 384139.50 | 0 | 3594695 | |||||||||||
| 705.27 | 3179.65 | 0 | 24945.00 | 1 | ||||||||||
| 5723.93 | 19006.41 | 0 | 140406 | 0.28 | 1 | |||||||||
| 12.25 | 109.19 | 0 | 1068.00 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 1 | ||||||||
| 16.92 | 6.88 | 6.00 | 47.00 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 1 | |||||||
| 11.56 | 2.09 | 6.59 | 16.65 | 0.23 | 0.39 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 1 | ||||||
| 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.01 | 2.83 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.13 | 1 | |||||
| 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.18 | -0.01 | 1 | ||||
| 0.01 | 0.20 | -1.19 | 0.46 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.27 | -0.43 | 0.02 | 1 | |||
| 394094.10 | 1077041 | 168.00 | 6700000 | 0.27 | 0.56 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.51 | 0.01 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 1 | ||
| 72.95 | 220.59 | 0 | 1614.00 | 0.28 | 0.58 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.42 | -0.03 | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.53 | 1 |
Regression results.
| Dependent variable:inper | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 | M7 | M8 | M9 | |
| 0.148 | 0.133 | 0.068 | 0.117 | 0.052 | 0.116 | ||||
| 0.125 | 0.114 | 0.100 | 0.113 | 0.096 | 0.111 | ||||
| 0.236 | 0.208 | 0.106 | 0.016 (0.32) | 0.008 (0.16) | 0.136 | ||||
| 0.049 | 0.040 | ||||||||
| 0.326 | 0.280 | ||||||||
| 0.169 | 0.083 | ||||||||
| 0.161 | |||||||||
| control | control | control | control | control | control | control | control | control | |
| yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | |
| yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | |
| -7.568 | -7.379 | -7.796 | -7.095 | -7.090 | -7.492 | -7.280 | -7.020 | -7.075 | |
| 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | 15552 | |
| 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.11 | |
| 228.50 | 213.58 | 221.70 | 200.15 | 196.58 | 194.11 | 193.89 | 159.75 | 184.77 | |
Note
“***”, “**” and “*”mean significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Fig 1Density function graph before and after Match.
PSM results of the realization path of science and technology policies.
| Dependent variable | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R&D expenditure | number of patent applications | sales revenue of new products | Lag 1 period | |||
| R&D expenditure | number of patent applications | sales revenue of new products | ||||
| sub | 0.524 | 0.576 | 1.217 | 0.863 | 0.546 | 0.918 |
| tax | 0.196 | 0.167 | 1.057 | 0.139 (1.64) | 0.096 | 0.849 |
| pp | 0.202 (1.33) | 0.149 | 2.246 | 0.177 (0.93) | 0.178 | 1.418 |
| controls | control | control | control | control | control | control |
| firm effect | control | control | control | control | control | control |
| time effect | control | control | control | control | control | control |
Note
“***”, “**” and “*”mean significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Mediating effect test results of innovative technology spillover.
| inper M1 | spillover M2 | inper M3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.593 | 0.706 | 3.295 | |
| 0.422 | |||
| control | control | control | |
| yes | yes | yes | |
| yes | yes | yes | |
| -7.728 | -1.888 | -6.932 | |
| 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.12 | |
| 227.92 | 386.34 | 231.56 |
Note
“***”, “**” and “*”mean significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Mediating effect test results of innovation resource input.
| inper M1 | finan M2 | inper M3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.593 | 0.777 | 3.561 | |
| 0.040 | |||
| control | control | control | |
| yes | yes | yes | |
| yes | yes | yes | |
| -7.728 | 1.479 | -7.788 | |
| 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.10 | |
| 227.92 | 1407.61 | 202.93 |
Note
“***”, “**” and “*”mean significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Mediating effect test results of innovation cooperation.
| inper M1 | incoopera M2 | inper M3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| sub_tax_pp | 3.593 | 2.024 | 3.427 |
| incoopera | 0.082 | ||
| controls | control | control | control |
| firm effect | yes | control | control |
| time effect | yes | control | control |
| c | -7.728 | -1.603 | -7.596 |
| R2 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.10 |
| F | 227.92 | 104.45 | 207.07 |
Note
“***”, “**” and “*”mean significant at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.