| Literature DB >> 33012269 |
Michelle V Evans1, Andres Garchitorena2,3, Rado J L Rakotonanahary3, John M Drake1, Benjamin Andriamihaja3,4, Elinambinina Rajaonarifara2,3,5, Calistus N Ngonghala6, Benjamin Roche2,7,8, Matthew H Bonds3,9, Julio Rakotonirina10.
Abstract
COVID-19 has wreaked havoc globally with particular concerns for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where models suggest that the majority of the population will become infected. Conventional wisdom suggests that the continent will bear a higher burden of COVID-19 for the same reasons it suffers from other infectious diseases: ecology, socio-economic conditions, lack of water and sanitation infrastructure, and weak health systems. However, so far SSA has reported lower incidence and fatalities compared to the predictions of standard models and the experience of other regions of the world. There are three leading explanations, each with different implications for the final epidemic burden: (1) low case detection, (2) differences in epidemiology (e.g. low R 0 ), and (3) policy interventions. The low number of cases have led some SSA governments to relaxing these policy interventions. Will this result in a resurgence of cases? To understand how to interpret the lower-than-expected COVID-19 case data in Madagascar, we use a simple age-structured model to explore each of these explanations and predict the epidemic impact associated with them. We show that the incidence of COVID-19 cases as of July 2020 can be explained by any combination of the late introduction of first imported cases, early implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), and low case detection rates. We then re-evaluate these findings in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic in Madagascar through August 2020. This analysis reinforces that Madagascar, along with other countries in SSA, remains at risk of a growing health crisis. If NPIs remain enforced, up to 50,000 lives may be saved. Even with NPIs, without vaccines and new therapies, COVID-19 could infect up to 30% of the population, making it the largest public health threat in Madagascar for the coming year, hence the importance of clinical trials and continually improving access to healthcare.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; Madagascar; age-structured contacts; infectious disease modelling; non-pharmaceutical interventions; outbreak response
Mesh:
Year: 2020 PMID: 33012269 PMCID: PMC7580764 DOI: 10.1080/16549716.2020.1816044
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Glob Health Action ISSN: 1654-9880 Impact factor: 2.640
Timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) implemented in Madagascar.
| Date | Policy/Intervention/Program | Geographic extent (Region) |
|---|---|---|
| By March 19 | Allowing the remaining people outside of the country and willing to return to Madagascar to come back | National level |
| March 20 | Beginning of the epidemic in Madagascar with 3 initial imported cases announced | Analamanga* |
| March 20 | Interruption of all international and regional flights from the outside of the country | National level |
| March 21 | Following-up and testing all passengers entering Madagascar for the last 14 days for COVID-19 | National level |
| March 23 | Lockdown; curfew; interruption of all public transportation (ground and air travel) connecting Antananarivo and Toamasina to the other regions with establishment of health barrier at all national roads; prohibition of all meeting for more that 50 individuals | Analamanga and Atsinanana** |
| March 26 | Reception of 20,000 Antibody RDT kits for COVID-19 testing | NA |
| March 31 to April 02 | Mass Antibody RDT testing for all passengers entering Madagascar on March 11–19 | Analamanga and Atsinanana |
| April 03 | Adding the lockdown to Fianarantsoa after detection of COVID-19 confirmed cases | Haute-Matsiatra***, Analamanga and Atsinanana |
| April 05 | Continuing lockdown and curfew | Analamanga, Atsinanana and Haute-Matsiatra |
| April 07–09 | Temporary opening of national transportation by taxi-brousse to allow people from the other regions but blocked in other cities to return home | National level |
| April 17 | Partial lifting of lockdown, which allow people to go out, as well as taxi and bus to work from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m; curfew maintained; social distancing and mandatory wearing of mask for all person going out | Analamanga, Atsinanana and Haute-Matsiatra |
| April 20 | Launching the COVID Organics tisane based on Artemisia | NA |
| April 22 | All classes preparing official exam resume | National level |
| May 04 | All previous measures maintained, and adding the Alaotra-Mangoro region; church could receive no more than 50 persons | Analamanga, Atsinanana, Haute-Matsiatra and Alaotra-Mangoro**** |
| May 04 | Church could receive no more than 200 persons | The remaining 18 regions |
| May 17 | All previous measures maintained | Analamanga, Atsinanana, Haute-Matsiatra and Alaotra-Mangoro |
| May 31 | Progressive lifting of lockdown allowing people to work from 6:00 a.m to 3:00 p.m | Analamanga |
| May 31 | Toamasina region totally locked to the other location, all classes interrupted, and people can work from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m | Atsinanana |
| May 31 | All previous measures maintained | Alaotra-Mangoro |
| May 31 | Daily life return to the normal because COVID-19 is controlled in Fianarantsoa | Haute-Matsiatra |
| June 14 | Progressive lifting of lockdown allowing people to work from 6:00 a.m to 5:00 p.m, and public transportation until 7:00 p.m | Analamanga |
| June 14 | Progressive lifting of lockdown from 6:00 a.m to 3:00 p.m | Atsinanana and Alaotra-Mangoro |
* (Antananarivo).
** (Toamasina).
*** (Fianarantsoa).
**** (Moramanga, Ambatondrazaka, Anosibe an’Ala).
Figure 1.The lower-than-expected daily incidence can be explained by detection rates of 0.1–1% or NPI efficiencies of 30% alone. Predicted epidemic trajectories for the unmitigated scenario (a), range of detection rates (b), and range of NPI efficiencies (c). Results from 100 simulations are shown in A with the black line representing the median number of cases. Shaded regions represent the 95% confidence intervals around the median in panels B and C. All simulations began on the date of the first positive imported case in Madagascar, 20 March 2020. The y-axis is plotted on the log10-scale.
Figure 2.Low reported cases can be explained by different combinations of NPI effectiveness and detection rates. (a) The predicted number of daily cases (7 day average) that would be detected based on models of the epidemic at different combinations of NPI effectiveness and case detections rates. The dark contour line corresponds to the parameter space where the median number of predicted cases from 25 simulations equals the daily reported cases (7 day average) on June 22 (71.71 cases). High NPI effectiveness would thus require relatively high detection rates to explain the data based on these standard models. Similarly, if NPI were not effective, then the data could be explained with low detection rates. (b) Total cases after 1 year (approximating the final epidemic size) and (c) total deaths that correspond to the combination of NPI effectiveness and detection rates that explain daily cases in A. Shaded diamonds correspond to specific scenarios explored in panel D, illustrating the dynamics of detected infections, all infections, and cumulative deaths over the first year of the epidemic.
Figure 3.The simple modeled scenarios can accurately explain early, but not later, epidemic dynamics in Madagascar. Time series of predictions from the three scenarios explored in Figure 2D are plotted here (median and 95% CI), with line-shade corresponding to the scenario. Reported case data from the Madagascar Ministry of Health are plotted in the red points.
Summary of evidence supporting or opposing three possible explanations for the low number of reported cases of COVID-19 in Madagascar.
| Supporting | Opposing | |
|---|---|---|
| Low detection rates | High proportion of asymptomatic cases [ Strict testing criteria Low healthcare seeking rates for acute respiratory infections [ Diagnostic practices that limit the window of detection | Recent evaluation of health system preparedness via the International Health Regulations meant health systems were on high alert for an outbreak [ |
| Epidemiological differences | Trained-immunity due to vaccinations or high prevalence of endemic disease could increase population’s resistance to infection [ Transmission rate may be lower in sparsely populated areas [ Virus survival is lower in humid, warm environments | Limited role for climate during pandemic phase of the outbreak [ Past influenza outbreaks were not limited by sparse transport networks in SSA [ |
| Early and effective NPIs | Lockdown in population centers implemented three days after first imported case Limiting travel on fragmented paved road network can easily disrupt within-country movement |