| Literature DB >> 32581783 |
Michael Heinrich1, Francesca Scotti1, Adolfo Andrade-Cetto2, Monica Berger-Gonzalez3, Javier Echeverría4, Fabio Friso5, Felipe Garcia-Cardona6, Alan Hesketh7, Martin Hitziger8, Caroline Maake9, Matteo Politi5,10, Carmenza Spadafora11, Rita Spadafora12.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Global challenges related to access and benefit sharing (ABS) of biological resources have become a key concern in the area of research on herbal medicines, ethnopharmacology, drug discovery, and the development of other high value products for which Intellectual Property protection can be secured. While the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, Rio 1992) has been recognized as a huge step forward, the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol (NP) and of new forms of collaboration often remain unresolved, especially in the context of "the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources" (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011). The vision and the specific implementation of this international treaty vary from country to country, which poses additional challenges. AIMS: Using a case study approach, in this analysis we aim at understanding the specific opportunities and challenges for implementing international collaborations regarding ABS in six Latin American countries-Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, México, Panama, and Peru. Based on that analysis, we provide recommendations for the path ahead regarding international collaborations under ABS agreements in ethnopharmacological research. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS: The implementation of the NP varies in the six countries; and while they are all rich in biodiversity, access and benefit sharing mechanisms differ considerably. There is a need to engage in a consultation process with stakeholders, but this has often come to a halt. Institutional infrastructures to implement national policies are weak, and the level of knowledge about the NP and the CBD within countries remains limited.Entities:
Keywords: Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS); Nagoya Protocol; benefit sharing; biological resources; natural products; traditional medicine
Year: 2020 PMID: 32581783 PMCID: PMC7294742 DOI: 10.3389/fphar.2020.00765
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Pharmacol ISSN: 1663-9812 Impact factor: 5.810
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Case study Chile.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • Since Dec 28, 1994, Chile has been a Party to the CBD, by ratification. | • Chile has not signed and is not a party to the NP, nor has it an official competent agency concerned with ABS under the terms of the NP. More broadly, Chile lacks an official inspection body safeguarding ABS. |
| • The Chilean flora includes over 4500 highly endemic species (ca. 50%). | • Chile lacks officially recognized “checkpoints” and “checkpoint communiqués” under the terms of Article 17,1(a), (i) of the NP, as well as Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance—IRCC under the terms of Article 17 of NP. |
| • Nine hundred ninety-five species of useful vascular plants (23% of Chile's flora), including 501 with medicinal uses, 228 with edible uses, 341 used for animal fodder, 300 with ornamental uses, 102 used as dyes, 89 for ritual purposes, 75 for timber, and 51 species as a source of fiber, are known. | • Chile lacks a strong institutional framework for ABS. Access to genetic resource has been nearly exclusively via contracts for academic research purposes, very few for commercial purposes. |
| • Chile has a well-developed Industrial Property Law, also safeguarding and respecting the biological and genetic heritage as well as the national traditional knowledge. | • There is a great ignorance in the academic sector regarding knowledge of ABS and intellectual property, generating scarce research with commercial opportunities. |
| • Granting of industrial property rights guarantees that this material has been acquired in accordance with the current legal system. | • A free and informed Indigenous Consultation on the NP (Convention C169 ILO) has not been implemented. |
| • Despite of a lack of an ABS framework, the Government has already entered into individual ABS agreements, which lack definitions of benefit sharing. ( | |
|
|
|
| • Chile, being a tricontinental country, presents a great cultural and biological diversity that could be developed. | • With most ecozones being fragmented and small, many endemic species are increasingly threatened, as well as traditional knowledge associated with the Chilean flora due to anthropogenic impact including economic activities, e.g., mining, forestry and agriculture industries, and climatic factors, e.g., mega-droughts. |
| • Socio-economic development and preservation of indigenous cultures, in the extreme north and south and on Rapa Nui, with a wealth of traditional knowledge can improve the living conditions in these regions. | • The lack of a legal framework on access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge could potentially result in major conflicts regarding ABS. |
| • There is no specific ABS framework, but several proposals have been developed (some of them drafted by the agriculture sector), and few ABS agreements have been concluded based on general legal clauses. |
Common abbreviations used in all tables: A, Academic infrastructure and capacity; B, Biodiversity and its use; G, General; I, Industrial capacity and potential; K, Knowledge related to NP and CBD, and R, Regulatory framework including the national legal/policy basis.
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Case study Colombia.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • One of the top megadiverse countries globally. | • Access to the genetic resource has been concentrated in contracts for research purposes, very few for commercial purposes. |
| • Colombia has a strong institutional framework for ABS, led by the Ministry of Environment. It has achieved important results especially in the granting of contracts for research purposes, especially with the academy. | • Although the country has made significant efforts in regulating access to genetic resources, with an important institutional framework, it still has great weaknesses in access to the biological resources with access being in the hands of regional environmental authorities, institutionally weak to process this type of permits. |
| • The country has important policy documents, CONPES 3697 of 2011 and CONPES 3934 of 2018, which have allowed defining institutional, legal, and economic actions and goals promoting the sustainable use of biodiversity through access to genetic resources. | • Despite of a sound academic infrastructure, there are great weaknesses in the academic sector regarding knowledge of ABS and intellectual property, resulting in only very few investigations with commercial opportunities. |
| • The ‘bioeconomy' is an important axis of its development (Law 1955 of 2019 of the National Development Plan). It has prioritized actions in research, development, and innovation, and committed important financial resources. | • The Colombian private sector is conservative and has been risk-averse in investing in initiatives to use genetic resources. There is still distrust between academia and industry that prevents capitalizing on important initiatives for the development of new products. |
|
|
|
| • Building further collaboration with foreign partners could be based on the great biodiversity linked with a relatively active research program relevant to the sustainable use of biodiversity. | • There is still a great distrust of local communities regarding access to genetic resources and negotiation with the private sector. This hinders development in many regions of the country with a large presence of ethnic groups. |
| • There is a great interest from international biotech companies, in investing in Colombia, given the wide range of existing biodiversity, with regions with great possibilities for doing business. | • There is still a very high expectation regarding royalties resulting from access contracts for commercial purposes, making collaborations commercially unattractive and discouraging companies from investing in such initiatives. |
| • The country has been diversifying its export offer; sectors with great opportunities such as food, cosmetic, and pharmaceutical are emerging rapidly. | |
| • Stakeholders among the local industry could be interested in the use of biodiversity. |
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Case study Guatemala.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • The Central American country with the most endemic species and rich in natural resources. | • The suspension of the NP created a situation of uncertainty for foreign entities interested in accessing and potentially developing local resources, pushing potential involvement abroad to countries such as Panama with easier routes to access. |
| • One of the countries with the biggest proportion of indigenous population in Latin America with a long-standing tradition of use and reliance on natural resources (conservation). | • No framework in place to support the evaluation of who is the owner of TK and GRs. |
| • CONAP's extensive experience of CBD and NP initiatives and established position for the safeguarding of the environment and indigenous rights. | • No policy in place to regulate Intellectual Property rights and limitations. |
| • A strong sense of community/belonging/identity around natural resources. | • Unrealistic expectations in relation to potential royalties arising from commercialization of products deriving from genetic resources. |
| • The NBSAP, even though published before the suspension of NP, shows a definite intention of the State to engage with such issues. | • General mistrust of authorities and a widespread misinformation on the content of the NP manipulated for political purposes, surfing on indigenous' people malcontent. |
| • There is a very weak local industry interested in the use of biodiversity. | |
| • Weak academic infrastructure. | |
|
|
|
| • There is a long track record of research collaborations with a variety of international partners based on the local expertise and international links. | • Major concerns about corruption and political instability result in a lack of willingness of international stakeholders to develop links with institutions in Guatemala. |
| • As highlighted by a previous project ( | • High levels of poverty. |
| • Agricultural expansion and unsustainable practices. | |
| • Drug cartels control over land management and development. |
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Case study Mexico.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • Mexico, as a megadiverse country, signed the NP in 2011. | • Mexico lacks specific legal instruments that grant attributions to the government; a precise legal definition of what comprises a genetic resource is lacking. |
| • There have been several ABS agreements; some of them have involved benefit-sharing for the local communities (indigenous groups) from the commercialization the biodiversity. | • Further implementation of the NP is needed to legally define responsibilities of the competent national authorities regarding ABS. |
| • The infrastructure is well-developed, including strong academic stakeholders and an active pharmaceutical industry. | • Indigenous consultation, particularly Prior Informed Consent (PIC), is lacking. |
| • There is a loophole for those cases of genetic resources that are not specifically stated in current laws, for example, some microorganisms or aquatic species that are not in any category of risk, in compliance with NOM-059-SEMARNAT-2010 or that are of aquaculture or fishing interest. | |
| • In many cases, research and development processes are carried out in a different country and not in the one the resource was obtained from; therefore, the exchange of information between "user" country and the provider of the genetic resources, to verify legal and legitimate access, remains a challenge. | |
|
|
|
| • Once the country has fully implemented, the national regulations based on the NP will be of great benefit especially for rural populations (around 30 M) or to those who speak indigenous languages (around 12 M), as well as helping the country in the preservation of biodiversity. | • Major concerns about drug trafficking, corruption, and political instability result in a lack of willingness of international stakeholders to develop links with institutions and companies (like agricultural cooperatives) in México and specifically in regions of high risk. |
| • For a country in which more of the half of the population lives in poverty, a legally binding and enforceable implementation of the NP could result in social and environmental benefits, especially for them. | • High levels of poverty result in illicit exploitation of biodiversity including clandestine logging and illegal trade in biodiversity. |
| • Stakeholders among the local industry could become more interested in the sustainable use of biodiversity. |
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Panama.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • Before ratifying the NP, Panama had already implemented ABS projects through interinstitutional and multi-stakeholder agreements. This led to Panama being the first country ever to receive funding under the CBD convention. | • Working with traditional knowledge of indigenous groups is still a challenge. The lack of trust by indigenous people might hinder negotiations, to the point where external stakeholders could only look for opportunities outside indigenous territories. |
| • Panama ratified the NP in 2012. An executive decree regulating access to genetic resources was issued in 2009 and reviewed in 2018, indicating a very high level of experience in translating the international agreements into national practice. | • The sharing of benefits is not well understood by the general population. |
| • Panama has a network of research institutions already collaborating with local environmental NGOs and the government in order to ensure that CBD guidelines are compatible with stakeholder requirements. | • The traditional knowledge or rights of some minorities might be in conflict with the potential contribution to humanity of that knowledge. |
| • The new ABS decree has established a level royalty for the Government of 1% of net sales, which is acceptable to the relevant industries. | • The inventory of traditional knowledge is incomplete. Traditional knowledge is anecdotal and needs to be registered. |
| • The fact that the decree does not indicate the geographic or jurisdictional extension of the benefit rights of the traditional knowledge means that demands could arise from members of the same ethnic groups located outside of the collections site(s) of the traditional knowledge owners. | |
|
|
|
| • There is considerable commercial interest in working in Panama. | • When governments have to negotiate MATs on behalf of both communities and industries, the former could perceive that the government is not protecting their right, resulting in internal conflicts within the country. |
| • Local research organizations have experience in bioprospection studies. | |
| • The well-established democracy of Panama and its stable economy give confidence to the industries interested in working with Panama with shared resources under ABS rules. | |
| • There are reputable and ABS knowledgeable organizations other than the Government, the traditional knowledge owners, and the Industry that help to ease the lack of trust of the negotiation processes, especially prevalent within the indigenous groups. |
SWOT analysis of access and benefit sharing—Case study Perú.
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| • The Peruvian Amazon holds great biodiversity, and over 1000 medicinal and food plants with commercial potential have been recorded. | • There is generally poor information about the legal framework for access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, and indigenous and local communities have no control over an illegal access by national or foreign users. |
| • As a signatory to the NP with a few signed contracts, Peru is ahead of other signatory countries. So far, the application of the NP has generated both monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits, the latter considered greater than the former. | • The ambiguity of Peruvian regulations generates concerns for many stakeholders. |
| • Peru's CNBio is recognized internationally for its achievements in fighting illegal extraction of biodiversity. | • Peru is struggling to update its procedures and regulations in order to provide a timely response to researchers and other interested parties that request formal access to genetic resources. |
| • The National Council of Science, Technology and Technological Innovation (CONCYTEC), the General Directorate of Environmental Health (DIGESA), and the Directorate General of Medicines, Supplies and Drugs (DIGEMID) are all competent authorities potentially able to verify and monitor the stages of research, development, and commercialization following an ABS agreement. NGOs and international cooperation agencies are well established to complement this effort, helping to balance the power relations between North and South in the field of intellectual property and distribution of benefits. | • The mandatory monetary benefits (5% to provider organization and 10% of gross sales to the national Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples) are considered too high from a commercial perspective. |
| • There is a relatively weak local industry interested in the use of biodiversity. | |
|
|
|
| • Peru could participate much more actively in the research and development processes relating to patenting of plants and biological materials in collaboration with foreign partners from more developed countries. | • Gaps between the regular access that passes through the ABS system and ones outside of it pose major risks for R&D. |
| • Existing examples of products under development offer the chance to demonstrate how collaborative projects can be developed. | • Peru's neighbors such as Colombia and Brazil have not signed up to the NP and international companies, and researchers can access there the very same genetic resources with the associated traditional knowledge avoiding the complexity of the Peruvian procedure. |
| • Inflexible attitude of regulators can crush well-intended development initiatives (like Biotrade). |