Literature DB >> 32546673

Protections against the Risk of Airborne SARS-CoV-2 Infection.

Clement J McDonald.   

Abstract

Entities:  

Keywords:  COVID-19; HEPA filters; N95 respirator; SARS-CoV-2; airborne microorganisms; negative-pressure rooms; route of infection

Year:  2020        PMID: 32546673      PMCID: PMC7300362          DOI: 10.1128/mSystems.00390-20

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  mSystems        ISSN: 2379-5077            Impact factor:   6.496


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LETTER

Dietz at al. (1) call attention to issues that affect the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) within the built environment. Policymakers have emphasized the importance of contact transmission of SARS-CoV-2 strongly but airborne transmission minimally. The CDC recommends both contact and airborne precautions for CoV disease 2019 (COVID-19) patients (https://www.cms.gov/files/document/qso-20-09-all.pdf). The virus is present in the air of hospital rooms holding COVID-19 patients and in the hallways outside those rooms and exists in particles small enough to persist in the air (2). Further, airborne SARS-CoV-2 can remain infective for 3 hours (3). Body parts touched by air—the nose, pharynx, and lung—are the first to be infected, and those same parts supply the ambient air with large quantities of the virus when the infected patient coughs, sneezes, speaks, or breaths (4). SARS-CoV-2 does not have the multi-mile airborne reach of hoof-and-mouth disease (5). However, it does have a reach of 26 feet and a loft time of 3+ hours in simulation studies of coughs and sneezes (6). Policy makers should not discount the risk of airborne transmission. Nominally, N95 respirators block 95% of particles larger than 3 μm. Coronaviruses are roughly 0.1 μm in size. Given the virus’s small size, Dietz et al. (1) and others have questioned whether N95 respirators block them. They do. N95 respirators exceed their nominal rating in NIOSH testing. They block particles as small as 0.1 μm with 98% efficiency (7) and viruses of 0.1 μm in direct-challenge tests (8). The explosive spread of COVID-19 to cruise ship passengers mostly confined to their cabins and the fact that SARS-CoV-2 may loll in the room air of infected individuals raises the question of cabin-to-cabin transmission through ship ventilation systems (https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2020/Q1/cruise-ship-ac-systems-could-promote-rapid-coronavirus-spread,-prof-says.html). Cruise ships recirculate shared air from many cabins without much filtering. One could ask a similar question about the rapid spread in some nursing homes. Virus testing of the ventilation ducts in nursing home hot zones may help to answer this question. Dietz et al. (1) describe mechanisms to reduce the risk of airborne COVID-19 infection. HEPA filters have the same 3-μm pore size as N95 respirators but a greater, 99.7%, filtering efficiency. Installing them in the air handling systems of care systems will reduce the viral load in ambient air and eliminate the risk of air duct transmission mentioned above. Hospitals protect some spaces with HEPA filters. They should review their air system and add HEPA filters where needed around COVID-19 care areas. Negative-pressure rooms continually exhaust room air to the outside. They shrink the room’s airborne viral load and keep infected air out of hallways and other rooms. Ideally, COVID-19 patients should all reside in negative-pressure spaces. However, in many cities, the number of such spaces will be inadequate (9). The Minnesota health department published a practical guide (https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/ep/surge/infectious/airbornenegative.pdf) for making temporary negative-pressure rooms to fill this gap. Every hospital facility manager in COVID-19 hot zones should review the Minnesota guide. We should employ all available defenses against airborne SARS-CoV-2.
  8 in total

Review 1.  Methods for sampling of airborne viruses.

Authors:  Daniel Verreault; Sylvain Moineau; Caroline Duchaine
Journal:  Microbiol Mol Biol Rev       Date:  2008-09       Impact factor: 11.056

2.  Estimation of Needed Isolation Capacity for an Airborne Influenza Pandemic.

Authors:  Shobha S Subhash; Gio Baracco; Shelly L Miller; Aaron Eagan; Lewis J Radonovich
Journal:  Health Secur       Date:  2016-07-22

3.  Turbulent Gas Clouds and Respiratory Pathogen Emissions: Potential Implications for Reducing Transmission of COVID-19.

Authors:  Lydia Bourouiba
Journal:  JAMA       Date:  2020-05-12       Impact factor: 56.272

4.  Aerosol emission and superemission during human speech increase with voice loudness.

Authors:  Sima Asadi; Anthony S Wexler; Christopher D Cappa; Santiago Barreda; Nicole M Bouvier; William D Ristenpart
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2019-02-20       Impact factor: 4.379

5.  Filter performance of n99 and n95 facepiece respirators against viruses and ultrafine particles.

Authors:  Robert M Eninger; Takeshi Honda; Atin Adhikari; Helvi Heinonen-Tanski; Tiina Reponen; Sergey A Grinshpun
Journal:  Ann Occup Hyg       Date:  2008-05-13

6.  Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1.

Authors:  Neeltje van Doremalen; Trenton Bushmaker; Dylan H Morris; Myndi G Holbrook; Amandine Gamble; Brandi N Williamson; Azaibi Tamin; Jennifer L Harcourt; Natalie J Thornburg; Susan I Gerber; James O Lloyd-Smith; Emmie de Wit; Vincent J Munster
Journal:  N Engl J Med       Date:  2020-03-17       Impact factor: 91.245

7.  A comparison of facemask and respirator filtration test methods.

Authors:  Samy Rengasamy; Ronald Shaffer; Brandon Williams; Sarah Smit
Journal:  J Occup Environ Hyg       Date:  2017-02       Impact factor: 2.155

Review 8.  2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Built Environment Considerations To Reduce Transmission.

Authors:  Leslie Dietz; Patrick F Horve; David A Coil; Mark Fretz; Jonathan A Eisen; Kevin Van Den Wymelenberg
Journal:  mSystems       Date:  2020-04-07       Impact factor: 6.496

  8 in total

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