| Literature DB >> 32479218 |
Matthew D Eisenberg1, Elizabeth M Stone2, Harlan Pittell3, Emma E McGinty4.
Abstract
Direct-to-physician opioid marketing by pharmaceutical companies is widespread and may contribute to opioid overprescribing, an important driver of the US opioid crisis. Using a difference-in-differences approach and Medicare Part D prescriber data, we examined the effects of academic medical centers' conflict-of-interest policies that restrict direct-to-physician marketing of all drugs on opioid prescribing by physicians at eighty-five centers in the period 2013-16. We examined restrictions on gifts and meals, speaking and consulting engagements, and industry representatives' access to academic medical centers, as well as rules requiring conflict-of-interest disclosures. Bans on sales representatives were associated with a 4.7 percent reduction in the total volume of opioids prescribed and disclosure requirements with a 2.5 percent reduction, while having all four marketing restriction policies was associated with an 8.8 percent reduction. Policies that restrict direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing may curb opioid prescribing, but additional patient-level research is needed to understand how such policies affect the delivery of evidence-based treatment for chronic pain.Entities:
Keywords: Academic medical centers; Diseases; Health policy; Medicare Part D; Medicare savings programs; Opioid use disorder; Opioids; Pharmaceutical companies; Pharmaceuticals; Prescription drugs; medical education; public health
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Year: 2020 PMID: 32479218 PMCID: PMC7876632 DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01289
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Health Aff (Millwood) ISSN: 0278-2715 Impact factor: 6.301