Literature DB >> 3226134

Patterns of ESS's. I.

G T Vickers1, C Cannings.   

Abstract

A matrix may have several evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS's). It is thus possible for different populations of a species to adopt a different ESS even when the pay-offs for the populations are the same. The occurrence of different strategies does not imply different circumstances. However, there are constraints upon the collection of supports of the ESS's (i.e. pattern) that any matrix can have. The best-known of these is that the support of one ESS cannot be contained in that of another and this gives bounds on the number of different patterns possible for n x n matrices. Other general constraints are presented here. The enumeration of the patterns for 3 x 3 and 4 x 4 matrices is completed and considerable progress made on 5 x 5 matrices where the number of (permutationally distinct, maximal) patterns exceeds 16.

Mesh:

Year:  1988        PMID: 3226134     DOI: 10.1016/s0022-5193(88)80080-8

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Theor Biol        ISSN: 0022-5193            Impact factor:   2.691


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