| Literature DB >> 32218872 |
Gwendolyn L Gilbert1,2, Chris Degeling3, Jane Johnson1,2.
Abstract
Surveillance is essential for communicable disease prevention and control. Traditional notification of demographic and clinical information, about individuals with selected (notifiable) infectious diseases, allows appropriate public health action and is protected by public health and privacy legislation, but is slow and insensitive. Big data-based electronic surveillance, by commercial bodies and government agencies (for profit or population control), which draws on a plethora of internet- and mobile device-based sources, has been widely accepted, if not universally welcomed. Similar anonymous digital sources also contain syndromic information, which can be analysed, using customised algorithms, to rapidly predict infectious disease outbreaks, but the data are nonspecific and predictions sometimes misleading. However, public health authorities could use these online sources, in combination with de-identified personal health data, to provide more accurate and earlier warning of infectious disease events-including exotic or emerging infections-even before the cause is confirmed, and allow more timely public health intervention. Achieving optimal benefits would require access to selected data from personal electronic health and laboratory (including pathogen genomic) records and the potential to (confidentially) re-identify individuals found to be involved in outbreaks, to ensure appropriate care and infection control. Despite existing widespread digital surveillance and major potential community benefits of extending its use to communicable disease control, there is considerable public disquiet about allowing public health authorities access to personal health data. Informed public discussion, greater transparency and an ethical framework will be essential to build public trust in the use of new technology for communicable disease control.Entities:
Keywords: Big Data; Communicable Disease Surveillance; Electronic Medical Records; Pathogen Genomics
Year: 2019 PMID: 32218872 PMCID: PMC7091643 DOI: 10.1007/s41649-019-00087-1
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Asian Bioeth Rev ISSN: 1793-9453
In late February 2003, a man, who had recently travelled to China, presented to a hospital in Hanoi with what an astute clinician recognised as an unusual, severe acute respiratory syndrome (which would come to be known as SARS). At about the same time, the Chinese Ministry of Health announced, belatedly, that an outbreak of severe atypical pneumonia in Guangdong province had already claimed at least 300 lives, since November 2002. Scientists and epidemiologists, from WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance (GISN) and Global Outbreak and Response (GOARN) networks, immediately began collecting and analysing microbiological, clinical and epidemiological data. By mid-March, another 150 suspected cases of SARS had been identified in Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada (Heymann and Rodier Despite China’s delayed outbreak report, a massive global effort, led by WHO and GOARN, rapidly identified a novel coronavirus (SARS CoV) as the cause. They documented modes of transmission, nosocomial infections, risk factors and a high mortality, which enabled WHO to develop evidence-based guidance for diagnosis, management, hospital infection control, quarantine and travel. Within 6 months, the global spread of SARS had ceased, albeit only after it had spread to 29 countries on six continents, caused 8437 cases (of which 92% were in China) and 813 deaths, and cost the global economy an estimated US$54 billion (Knobler et al. Similar delays in recognition and reporting of the 2013–2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa led to unprecedented cross-border transmission and, ultimately, > 28,000 cases and 11,000 deaths—mostly in the three affected countries—before it was eventually brought under control by a massive, coordinated international effort (Koch |
Two very premature infants aged 9 and 11 days, respectively, who were nursed in the same room of a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), developed fulminating methicillin-resistant No patient or staff member was identified as carrying the MRSA outbreak strain by initial screening, but over the next 7 months, 13 additional infants became colonised, indicating that nosocomial transmission was continuing, despite enhanced infection control measures. Several of these infants were already colonised with the MRSA outbreak strain within hours of delivery, by caesarean section. Therefore, operating suite and NICU staff (again) were screened. One colonised NICU staff member was assumed to have acquired it from a colonised infant, whom she was nursing and no one was identified as a likely source. However, soon after this, another NICU staff member attended the hospital emergency department, with an infected leg abrasion, from which the MRSA outbreak strain was isolated. She was treated and returned to work. Subsequently, for several months, no newly MRSA-colonised infants were identified; the outbreak was apparently over. This raised the possibility that this latter NICU staff member had been the an unwitting source or vector of ongoing transmission. Her screening swabs had been negative, but sites of MRSA colonisation other than the nasal mucosa (the only site swabbed) are not uncommon. The outbreak strain reappeared in the NICU 7 months later and, subsequently, was isolated from patients in the emergency department and other hospital wards, most of whom had some contact with the NICU. WGS was not available at the time of the outbreak, but it was performed, 5 years later, on stored MRSA outbreak isolates to determine, if possible how this unusual, highly virulent MRSA strain was introduced. What/who were the source and/or vector(s) of continued transmission? Was the reappearance of the outbreak strain, after seven months, due to ongoing transmission or a new introduction? |