| Literature DB >> 32005536 |
Brenda Huneycutt1, Nicole Lurie2, Sara Rotenberg3, Richard Wilder4, Richard Hatchett4.
Abstract
Launched at Davos in January 2017 with funding from sovereign investors and philanthropic institutions, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) is an innovative partnership between public, private, philanthropic, and civil organisations whose mission is to stimulate, finance and co-ordinate vaccine development against diseases with epidemic potential in cases where market incentives fail. As of December 2019, CEPI has committed to investing up to $706 million in vaccine development. This includes 19 vaccine candidates against its priority pathogens (Lassa fever virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Nipah virus, Chikungunya, Rift Valley fever) and three vaccine platforms to develop vaccines against Disease X, a novel or unanticipated pathogen. As an entity largely supported by public funds, ensuring equitable access to vaccines whose development it supports in low- and middle-income countries is CEPI's primary focus. CEPI developed an initial equitable access policy shortly after its formation, with key stakeholders expressing strong views about its content and prescriptive nature. The CEPI board instructed that it be revisited after a year. This paper describes the process of revising the policy, and how key issues were resolved. CEPI will continue to take an iterative, rather than prescriptive, approach to its policy-one that reflects the needs of multiple stakeholders and ensures it can meet its equitable access goals.Entities:
Keywords: Emerging infectious diseases; Epidemic preparedness; Equitable Access; Vaccine development
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Year: 2020 PMID: 32005536 PMCID: PMC7130943 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2019.12.055
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Vaccine ISSN: 0264-410X Impact factor: 3.641
Key Requirements of CEPI’s Original Equitable Access Policy.
| CEPI and awardees agree up front on a transparent and agreed-to methodology for determining the cost of goods for the developed vaccines. Prices for vaccines will be set as low as possible for territories that are or may be affected by an outbreak of a disease for which CEPI funding was used to develop a vaccine. The price will be set [by CEPI] at one affordable to the affected territories and sustainable to the manufacturer. |
| In the circumstance in which a company is sold, is not financially sustainable, or if the original product developer cannot or is unwilling to continue development of the CEPI-supported product, CEPI sought to ensure that vaccine development could progress as originally planned through the use of “step-in rights.” This meant that information, know-how and materials related to vaccine development must be shared with (or transferred to) CEPI so that it can ‘take over’ all aspects of product development including transfer of responsibilities to another developer of CEPI’s choosing. |
| Patents are the type of IP of most potential concern to product developers. The IP of interest to CEPI includes patents protecting inventions that are either (1) pre-existing (i.e., existed prior to the funding agreement with the product developer and CEPI) and needed to develop the product (called here “background IP”) or (2) generated by CEPI funding (called here “project IP”). The original policy stated that CEPI would not take an ownership interest in project IP but that CEPI would have the necessary access to background and project IP – particularly to ensure it could exercise its necessary step-in rights. |
| CEPI would receive a share of financial benefits that might accrue from CEPI-sponsored vaccine development, to re-invest in support of its mission to provide global public health benefit. |
| Data sharing and transparency requirements stated that a product developer would be required to make information and data about development publicly available. |
Key themes from stakeholder comments.
| The policy was deemed ‘inflexible’, requiring provisions worded in a particular way, to be included in all agreements, and that would not allow for different approaches to be taken unless the policy itself was modified. |
The definition of equitable access, and hence the policy, should not include references to price of pre-licensed vaccines (as unlicensed vaccines cannot be sold); it should only refer to cost. Further, price considerations vary depending on the situation and therefore cannot be reduced to a set formula or predicted in advance of commercial scale manufacturing. The policy should include a description of an agreed-upon, transparent methodology on how vaccines will be priced and include affordability commitments or standards. Prices should be set as low as possible and as close as possible to the marginal cost while ensuring the price is sustainable for the awardee to maintain manufacturing, supply, and availability. It is virtually impossible to truly calculate the cost of goods in advance of when market requirements are understood, and unsustainable for a company to price a product as close as possible to the marginal cost. It is not CEPI’s role to set price. CEPI deals with investigational vaccines, which cannot be sold. Vaccine manufacturers set a price, and negotiate that price with other global procurement organizations, such as Gavi and UNICEF. |
Mandating step-in rights, i.e., allowing CEPI to take over, without any pre-defined criteria for doing so, is too prescriptive and unpredictable for developers. This is especially concerning for vaccine platforms which may have complex IP portfolios and broad uses beyond the CEPI-funded program. The requirement to allow step-in rights should be balanced by the amount of investment the awardee has made, the relevant contribution of CEPI and the technical progress in the program, and only used when absolutely necessary. The policy should mandate that step-in rights are only used as a last resort, and under pre-agreed terms. The policy should explicitly describe a pre-agreed commitment to what step-in rights entail for IP, sharing of materials and know-how, e.g., what licenses the awardee will grant to CEPI covering relevant IP in the event that CEPI needs to step-in and/or when and how another developer or manufacturer can replace the awardee. The policy should explicitly allow a developer to identify a trusted partner that will continue the work if the original developer is unwilling or unable. |
CEPI should not seek ownership of any IP (background or generated by CEPI funding). CEPI’s potential ownership of IP is especially problematic for vaccine platforms because the patents protecting them can cover broad uses beyond the CEPI-funded program. The policy should describe a flexible system that recognizes each manufacturer will have unique issues regarding the management of their assets and resources; these must be specifically addressed within the funding agreement. The policy should contain a bright-line requirement that CEPI owns all IP generated with CEPI funding and seek licenses to all background IP, and that IP should not be used in a way that impedes equitable access to CEPI-funded vaccines or blocks additional research on vaccines to treat epidemic diseases. Also, any downstream use of CEPI’s IP by any licensee should meet equitable access policy requirements. The policy should include a clear statement that CEPI will not pursue additional, secondary patents to “evergreen” the relevant technology (that is, to keep patent protection in force indefinitely), and CEPI should consider a strategy of “publication” of such IP to make it available immediately in the public domain for widespread use. The policy should include a requirement that the equitable access policy obligations travel with ownership of all IP generated with CEPI funding. |
The policy should avoid including broad statements about shared benefit. Instead, CEPI should work with manufacturers to determine how any revenue or commercial benefits should be addressed on a case-by-case basis for a given funding agreement. There should be no requirement for further benefit sharing other than to ensure that any vaccine developed is made available. For platforms, benefit sharing can be especially problematic given broad uses of the platform in manufacturing numerous products. |
The policy should not mandate overbroad disclosure (e.g., of all underlying data). The policy should mandate data sharing and transparency in line with WHO’s Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results, as well as requirements for publication of results in open-access journals. |
CEPI should establish a transparent approach of external review to ensure that negotiated funding agreements are consistent with CEPI policies and intents. |
Terms for key provisions in CEPI’s most recent call for proposals.
| Key Provision | Brief Description of Terms for Negotiation |
|---|---|
| Vaccines and other products developed with CEPI’s financial support must first be made available to populations when and where they are needed to end an outbreak or curtail an epidemic. | |
| An investigational stockpile of vaccines having completed Phase II clinical trials will be established and available for distribution free of charge upon the occurrence of a disease outbreak or for use in clinical trials, as needed. Contractual obligations to expand or replenish stockpiles as needed and to ensure access to vaccines if they successfully complete the necessary field efficacy trials will also be a condition for CEPI support. Those access conditions include agreed upon methodologies to determine the cost of vaccines and their price. CEPI will work with other stakeholders to develop approaches to replenish the stockpile and maintain a manufacturing base, understanding the need for creative solutions for vaccines with very limited markets. | |
| If CEPI determines that the awardee is unable or unavailable to develop the product as agreed, then CEPI will have the access to and the right to use materials, data, information and relevant background intellectual property to continue product development (through a “Public Health License” or “PHL”). A PHL consists of the package of materials (such as cell lines) and rights necessary to enable the research, development and manufacturing work on a given project to proceed. Such a license will enable CEPI to find another manufacturer (agreed-upon by both CEPI and awardee) to use the information and IP to continue the development of the product. | |
| Awardees may choose to obtain intellectual property rights (such as patents or copyrights) for inventions, research materials, data bases and the like developed using funding from CEPI. If they seek such intellectual property protection, it will be at their own cost and they must promptly notify CEPI. Awardees commit themselves to manage the Project IP in a manner that complies with CEPI’s equitable access obligations. CEPI will monitor awardees adherence to that commitment. | |
| In cases where CEPI-funded vaccines become commercially viable, CEPI will take an equitable and proportional share of any commercial revenues received by the awardee from the sale of the product in a non-outbreak situation. Either by sharing of funds or services to support CEPI’s work (e.g., funds used to support CEPI’s future awards, using a certain number of CEPI-funded vaccine doses for distribution as determined by CEPI, use of awardee services in support of CEPI’s mission), CEPI will secure the full value of its inputs and reinvest those in pursuing its mission. | |
| CEPI requires the timely publication and other dissemination of project data, including clinical study data. | |
| CEPI will include a review of compliance with equitable access in its stage-gate reviews, which are reviews conducted by CEPI at key points in the technical development of vaccines or platforms it funds. The CEPI Board will maintain oversight on implementation of the equitable access policy through reviews of provisions in the funding agreements it concludes. | |