| Literature DB >> 31862547 |
Cristóbal Cuadrado1, Jocelyn Dunstan2, Nicolas Silva-Illanes2, Andrew J Mirelman3, Ryota Nakamura4, Marc Suhrcke5.
Abstract
Chile is one of several countries that recently implemented a fiscal policy to reduce soft drink (SD) intake and obesity. In 2014 the government increased the existing ad-valorem tax on high-sugar SD by 5% and decreased by 3% the tax on low-sugar SD, based on a 6.25gr/100 ml sugar threshold. This study aims to evaluate the tax modification passed-on to consumers through prices, and to calculate changes in affordability of SDs. We analysed nationally representative consumer price index data of 41 soft drinks within 6 beverage categories between 2009 and 2016. Price change post-tax implementation was estimated for different categories (carbonates, juices, concentrates, waters and energy-sport drinks), using time-series analyses. In addition, changes in affordability were evaluated by estimating the changes in prices relative to wages. The price of carbonates increased by 5.60% (CI 95% 3.18-8.03%) immediately after the tax was implemented. A sustained increase in the prices of concentrates was observed after the implementation. Unexpectedly, a smaller increase was also seen for the price of bottled water - a category that saw no tax change. There were no effects for juices and energy-sports drinks. There was a reduction in affordability for carbonates, concentrates and waters. Overall, the fiscal policy was effective in increasing prices and there are some signs of reduced affordability. Results varied substantially among categories directly affected by the tax policy. While for carbonates the price increase exceeded the tax change ('over-shifting'), in other categories subject to a tax cut, a price reduction was expected but the opposite occurred. As the effect of the tax on prices differed between categories, the effects of the tax policy on consumption patterns are likely to be mixed. Our findings underline the need to better understand and anticipate price setting behaviour of firms in response to a tax.Entities:
Keywords: Affordability; Chile; Fiscal policy; Price; Soda; Soft drink; Sugar-sweetened beverage; Tax; Taxation
Year: 2019 PMID: 31862547 PMCID: PMC7267770 DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112708
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Soc Sci Med ISSN: 0277-9536 Impact factor: 4.634
Fig. 1Trends in soft drinks prices 2009–2016, CHILE*. * Carbonates, juices, sports and energy drinks were affected by a tax increase (expected price effect of 4.0%, 3.8% and 18%, respectively), while bottled waters and concentrates were affected by a tax decrease (expected price effect of −1.2% and −2.8%, respectively). Grey line: policy announcement. Red line: policy implementation. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Price effect (% change) on SOFT drink after the taxation implemented in Chile.
| Carbonates | Juices | Concentrates | Bottled water | Energy and sport drinks | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | |
| Implementation effect | 0.52 | −0.01 | −0.17 | 0.29 | ||||||
| [2.77; 6.33] | [3.18; 8.03] | [0.55; 3.69] | [-1.19; 2.24] | [-2.93; 2.91] | [-4.28; 3.95] | [1.25; 4.53] | [0.74; 4.35] | [0.08; 4.23] | [-2.78; 3.35] | |
| Announcement effect | 1.02 | −0.16 | −0.68 | −1.72 | ||||||
| [-0.62; 2.67] | [-3.63; −0.33] | [-3.09; 2.78] | [-2.25; 0.90] | [-3.79; 0.35] | ||||||
| Time trend (monthly) | −0.04 | −0.06 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | ||
| [-0.29; 0.20] | [-0.30; 0.20] | [-0.08; 0.31] | [-0.08; 0.31] | [-0.53; 0.56] | [-0.53; 0.57] | [-0.17; 0.26] | [-0.18; 0.25] | [-0.95; −0.13] | [-0.84; −0.01] | |
| Post-tax trend (monthly) | 0.13 | 0.14 | −0.04 | −0.14 | ||||||
| [-0.20; 0.46] | [-0.18; 0.47] | [-0.35; −0.06] | [-0.35; −0.15] | [0.07; 1.81] | [0.06; 1.81] | [-0.25; −0.02] | [-0.25; −0.03] | [-0.42; 0.34] | [-0.49; 0.23] | |
| Selected ARIMA model | (1,1,0) | (1,1,0) | (1,0,1) | (1,0,0) | (0,1,1) | (0,1,1) | (1,0,0) | (1,0,0) | (1,0,0) | (1,0,0) |
Model 1: ARIMAX model without announcement effect. Model 2: ARIMAX model with announcement effect. Point estimates in percent change. 95% Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. *p < 0.05. ♦ Expected change in prices per category for pass-through estimates were: carbonates 4.0%; concentrates −2.8%; juices 3.8%; bottled waters −1.2%; sports and energy drinks 18%.
Fig. 2Trends in soft drinks affordability 2009–2016, Chile. Grey line: policy announcement. Red line: policy implementation. . (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Affordability of soft drinks (% change) after the taxation implemented in Chile.
| Carbonates | Juices | Concentrates | Bottled water | Energy and sport drinks | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | |
| Implementation effect | −0.78 | 0.42 | 0.70 | −1.18 | ||||||
| [-5.78; −2.67] | [-7.80; −3.73] | [ −3.71; −0.70] | [-2.38; 0.83] | [-2.25; 3.08] | [-3.15; 4.54] | [-5.13; −2.28] | [-4.44; −0.90] | [-5.33; −0.45] | [-4.73; 2.36] | |
| Announcement effect | −1.14 | 0.27 | 0.53 | 1.63 | ||||||
| [-2.59; 0.31] | [0.33; 3.41] | [-2.41; 2.94] | [-0.99; 2.05] | [-0.86; 4.12] | ||||||
| General time trend (monthly) | 0.08 | 0.05 | −0.08 | −0.09 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.53 | |
| [-0.16; 0.32] | [-0.13; 0.23] | [-0.27; 0.10] | [-0.28; 0.10] | [-0.46; 0.56] | [-0.46; 0.56] | [-0.21; −0.09] | [-0.21; 0.21] | [-0.02; 1.29] | [-0.12; 1.19] | |
| Post-tax time trend (monthly) | −0.17 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.11 | ||||||
| [-0.52; 0.18] | [-0.33; −0.04] | [0.03; 0.30] | [0.12; 0.31] | [-1.80; −0.12] | [-1.80; −0.12] | [0.00; 0.19] | [-0.00; 0.22] | [-0.70; 0.76] | [-0.61; 0.84] | |
| Selected ARIMA model | (2,1,2) | (2,1,1) | (1,0,1) | (1,0,0) | (1,1,0) | (1,1,0) | (2,0,0) | (1,0,0) | (0,1,0) | (0,1,0) |
Model 1: ARIMAX model without announcement effect. Model 2: ARIMAX model with announcement effect. Point estimates in percent change. 95% Confidence Intervals in parenthesis. *p < 0.05.