| Literature DB >> 31817579 |
Gratiela Georgiana Noja1, Mirela Cristea2, Nicoleta Sirghi3, Camelia-Daniela Hategan4, Paolo D'Anselmi5.
Abstract
Good governance promotes the fundamental grounds of participation and democracy in contemporary public administration, whilst institution building and the (in)effectiveness of public administration is linked to economic growth. This synergy brings forth sheer implications on the sustainable economic development. On this composite setting, the paper examines several fundamental credentials of public administration in the European Union (EU) countries, in relation to economic development, but also poverty, research, and development support, as representative socio-economic credentials. The empirical analysis is based on data covering the 1995-2017 lapse of time, processed through three econometric procedures, namely robust regression, structural equation modeling, and Gaussian graphical models. The main results emphasize that there are significant joint implications of public administration on the considered socio-economic dimensions. General government spending and, particularly, the environmental support, have positive implications on the European Union economies, leading to significant increases in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and downsize in poverty risk (more emphasized in regard to the government expenditures than the environmental protection). Overall, the quality of governance in EU countries requires an additional effort dedicated to leverage good public governance in order to support the long-term economic development.Entities:
Keywords: economic development; environmental support; good governance; poverty; public administration
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31817579 PMCID: PMC6950230 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph16244940
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Indicators included within the econometric models.
| Acronym | Details | Unit of Measure | Database |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gen_GOV_exp | Total general government expenditure | % of GDP | Eurostat |
| Env_GOV_exp | Expenditure of general government on environmental protection | % of GDP | Eurostat |
| COR_CTRL | Control of corruption grasps the “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests” [ | Rank −2. to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| GOV_effect | Government Effectiveness, which, “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” [ | Rank −2.5 to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| POL_stab | Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, “measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism” [ | Rank −2.5 to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| REG_quality | Regulatory Quality grasps for, “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” [ | Rank −2.5 to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| Rule_law | Rule of Law that measure “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” [ | Rank −2.5 to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| Voice_acc | Voice and accountability, “captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” [ | Rank −2.5 to 2.5 | The World Bank |
| GDP_cap | Gross domestic product per capita | constant 2010 USD | OECD |
| GDP_tot | Gross domestic product total | constant 2010 USD | OECD |
| POV | People at risk of poverty or social exclusion | % of population | Eurostat |
| GERD | Research and development (R and D) expenditure | % of GDP | Eurostat |
| EDU_Tert | Educational attainment for tertiary education (levels 5–8) | % of the population aged 30–34 | Eurostat |
| Edu_att | Educational attainment for upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3–4) | % of the population aged 15–64 years | Eurostat |
| Net_earn | Annual net earnings for, “two-earner married couple, with two children” [ | Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) | Eurostat |
| ER | Employment rate, 20–64 years | % of total population | Eurostat |
Source: authors’ process.
Summary statistics, EU-28, 1995–2017.
| Variables |
| Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gen_GOV_exp | 634 | 44.75694 | 6.715879 | 26.3 | 65 |
| Env_GOV_exp | 634 | 0.724448 | 0.349929 | −0.3 | 1.9 |
| COR_CTRL | 532 | 1.039589 | 0.7993224 | −0.615191 | 2.469991 |
| GOV_effect | 532 | 1.140354 | 0.6204506 | −0.5690975 | 2.353998 |
| POL_stab | 532 | 0.7999119 | 0.4288635 | −0.4737767 | 1.760102 |
| REG_quality | 532 | 1.186079 | 0.4545325 | −0.1844347 | 2.098008 |
| Rule_law | 532 | 1.117348 | 0.6240554 | −0.6342322 | 2.100273 |
| Voice_acc | 532 | 1.122446 | 0.3433722 | −0.2924617 | 1.800992 |
| GDP_cap | 644 | 29,976.13 | 19,970.28 | 3781.904 | 110,001.1 |
| GDP_tot | 644 | 5.74e+11 | 8.77e+11 | 5.56e+09 | 3.87e+12 |
| POV | 378 | 24.54021 | 8.072291 | 12.2 | 61.3 |
| GERD | 644 | 1.385272 | 0.8714707 | 0 | 3.914 |
| EDU_Tert | 564 | 30.11117 | 11.60818 | 7.4 | 58.7 |
| Edu_att | 640 | 67.18289 | 14.87782 | 17.1 | 88 |
| Net_earn | 590 | 41,122.07 | 36,279.75 | −10,186.6 | 311,052 |
| ER | 585 | 68.57812 | 6.130499 | 51.7 | 81.8 |
|
| 644 |
Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 1Public governance credentials in European Union (EU) countries, 2017: (a) COR_CTRL, (b) GOV_effect, and (c) POL_stab. Source: Own contribution in Stata.
Figure 2Public governance credentials in EU countries, 2017: (a) REG_quality, (b) Rule_law, and (c) Voice_acc. Source: Own contribution in Stata.
Unit-root tests of crude variables, EU-28, 1995–2017.
| Variables | Statistic | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| t-bar | t-tilde-bar | z-t-tilde-bar | ||
| Gen_GOV_exp | −2.4628 | −2.0926 | −4.6655 | 0.0000 |
| Env_GOV_exp | −2.3353 | −2.0326 | −4.2556 | 0.0000 |
| COR_CTRL | −1.5610 | −1.4237 | −0.2621 | 0.3966 |
| GOV_effect | −1.8705 | −1.6323 | −1.7033 | 0.0443 |
| POL_stab | −2.7935 | −2.2078 | −5.6788 | 0.0000 |
| REG_quality | −1.6026 | −1.4433 | −0.3969 | 0.3457 |
| Rule_law | −1.9147 | −1.6050 | −1.5146 | 0.0649 |
| Voice_acc | −1.9054 | −1.6657 | −1.9337 | 0.0266 |
| GDP_cap | −1.2322 | −1.1258 | 1.9503 | 0.9744 |
| GDP_tot | −0.9110 | −0.8534 | 3.8074 | 0.9998 |
| POV | −1.9591 | −1.5555 | −1.6386 | 0.9979 |
| GERD | −1.5676 | −1.4113 | 0.0035 | 0.5014 |
| EDU_Tert | −0.1715 | −0.1494 | 8.5613 | 0.9999 |
| Edu_att | −1.5457 | −1.2821 | 0.8795 | 0.8104 |
| Net_earn | −1.4297 | −1.0637 | 2.3129 | 0.9896 |
| ER | −0.7492 | −0.7679 | 4.2929 | 0.9999 |
Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 3General configuration of the structural equations modeling (SEM) model. Source: Own contribution in Stata. Note: COR_CTRL—control of corruption; GOV_effect—government effectiveness; POL_stab—political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; REG_quality—regulatory quality; Rule_law—rule of law; Voice_acc—voice and accountability; Gen_GOV_exp—total general government expenditures; Env_GOV_exp—expenditure of general government on environmental protection; GDP_cap—Gross Domestic Product per capita; POV—people at risk of poverty or social exclusion.
Results of public administration implications upon GDP per capita within the EU, 1995–2017.
| Independent Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | log_GDP_Cap | |
| log_COR_ CTRL | 0.583 *** (0.0186) | |||||||
| log_GOV_ effect | 0.988 *** (0.0254) | |||||||
| log_POL_ stab | 0.416 *** (0.0411) | |||||||
| log_REG_ quality | 1.170 *** (0.0446) | |||||||
| log_Rule_ law | 0.924 *** (0.0258) | |||||||
| log_Voice_ acc | 1.546 *** (0.0507) | |||||||
| log_Gen_ GOV_exp | 2.347 *** (0.171) | |||||||
| log_Env_GOV_exp | 0.144 ** (0.0552) | |||||||
| _cons | 10.27 *** (0.0175) | 10.07 *** (0.0155) | 10.27 *** (0.0332) | 10.02 *** (0.0226) | 10.12 *** (0.0179) | 10.04 *** (0.0187) | 1.178 (0.648) | 10.18 *** (0.0389) |
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| 479 | 507 | 511 | 526 | 498 | 530 | 634 | 630 |
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| 0.673 | 0.749 | 0.168 | 0.568 | 0.721 | 0.638 | 0.230 | 0.011 |
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N—number of observations; R2—coefficient of determination. Source: Authors’ contribution in Stata.
Results of public administration implications on poverty within the EU, 1995–2017.
| Independent Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | log_POV | |
| log_COR_CTRL | −0.167 *** (0.0116) | |||||||
| log_GOV_effect | −0.357 *** (0.0163) | |||||||
| log_POL_stab | −0.302 *** (0.0175) | |||||||
| log_REG_quality | −0.481 *** (0.0300) | |||||||
| log_Rule_law | −0.271 *** (0.0160) | |||||||
| log_Voice_acc | −0.656 *** (0.0280) | |||||||
| log_Gen_GOV_exp | −0.772*** (0.101) | |||||||
| log_Env_GOV_exp | 0.0295 (0.0348) | |||||||
| _cons | 3.087 *** (0.0111) | 3.155 *** (0.00972) | 3.030 *** (0.0144) | 3.218 *** (0.0127) | 3.135 *** (0.0106) | 3.212 *** (0.0101) | 6.074 *** (0.384) | 3.150 *** (0.0203) |
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| 345 | 364 | 361 | 378 | 361 | 378 | 378 | 376 |
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| 0.377 | 0.571 | 0.452 | 0.407 | 0.444 | 0.592 | 0.134 | 0.002 |
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N—number of observations; R2—coefficient of determination Source: Authors’ contribution in Stata.
Results of public administration implications upon research and development (R and D) support within the EU, 1995–2017.
| Independent Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | log_GERD | |
| log_COR_CTRL | 0.422 *** (0.0239) | |||||||
| log_GOV_effect | 0.680 *** (0.0344) | |||||||
| log_POL_stab | 0.362 *** (0.0392) | |||||||
| log_REG_quality | 0.766 *** (0.0493) | |||||||
| log_Rule_law | 0.586 *** (0.0308) | |||||||
| log_Voice_acc | 1.157 *** (0.0609) | |||||||
| log_Gen_GOV_exp | 2.679 *** (0.151) | |||||||
| log_Env_GOV_exp | 0.0735 (0.0521) | |||||||
| _cons | 0.335 *** (0.0225) | 0.220 *** (0.0210) | 0.306 *** (0.0317) | 0.111 *** (0.0250) | 0.236 *** (0.0225) | 0.119 *** (0.0224) | −10.02*** (0.573) | 0.166 *** (0.0367) |
|
| 478 | 506 | 510 | 525 | 498 | 529 | 633 | 629 |
|
| 0.395 | 0.437 | 0.144 | 0.316 | 0.422 | 0.406 | 0.333 | 0.003 |
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N—number of observations; R2—coefficient of determination. Source: Authors’ contribution in Stata.
Results of public administration implications on multiple socio-economic dimensions within the EU, 1995–2017.
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| log_COR_CTRL | −0.239 (0.159) | 0.0501 (0.0316) | −0.0135 (0.0244) | 0.0726 (0.0387) |
| log_GOV_effect | 0.209 (0.278) | 0.958 *** (0.0552) | −0.284 *** (0.0454) | 0.604*** (0.0679) |
| log_POL_stab | −1.108 *** (0.115) | −0.0601 ** (0.0229) | −0.102 *** (0.0169) | −0.000730 (0.0281) |
| log_REG_quality | 0.539 (0.381) | −0.0101 (0.0757) | 0.0662 (0.0571) | 0.207 * (0.0929) |
| log_Rule_law | −0.290 (0.239) | −0.0204 (0.0475) | 0.0704 (0.0586) | 0.0606 (0.0583) |
| log_Voice_acc | 2.820 *** (0.567) | 0.168 (0.112) | −0.280 *** (0.0774) | −0.326 * (0.138) |
| log_Gen_GOV_exp | 4.513 *** (0.493) | 0.620 *** (0.0979) | −0.342 *** (0.0697) | 1.591 *** (0.120) |
| log_Env_GOV_exp | 0.433 *** (0.122) | 0.0480 * (0.0242) | −0.0843 *** (0.0195) | −0.134 *** (0.0297) |
| _cons | 8.238 *** (1.875) | 7.669 *** (0.372) | 4.410 *** (0.264) | −5.862 *** (0.456) |
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| 461 | 461 | 332 | 460 |
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| 0.391 | 0.811 | 0.613 | 0.690 |
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| log_COR_CTRL | 0.0671 (0.0431) | 0.00193 (0.0159) | 0.0108 (0.00799) | 0.141 ** (0.0438) |
| log_GOV_effect | 0.286 *** (0.0751) | −0.0430 (0.0278) | 0.0465 ** (0.0141) | 0.598 *** (0.0752) |
| log_POL_stab | −0.138 *** (0.0317) | 0.0604 *** (0.0116) | 0.00140 (0.00587) | −0.129 *** (0.0319) |
| log_REG_quality | 0.220 * (0.107) | 0.131 *** (0.0381) | 0.101 *** (0.0193) | 0.242 * (0.111) |
| log_Rule_law | 0.178 ** (0.0659) | 0.0661 ** (0.0239) | 0.0232 (0.0121) | −0.254 *** (0.0665) |
| log_Voice_acc | −0.638 *** (0.164) | −0.372 *** (0.0566) | −0.0952 *** (0.0285) | 0.0864 (0.175) |
| log_Gen_GOV_exp | 0.00803 (0.141) | 0.0125 (0.0493) | −0.0540 * (0.0253) | 0.336 * (0.144) |
| log_Env_GOV_exp | −0.106 ** (0.0342) | −0.0281 * (0.0122) | −0.0276 *** (0.00629) | 0.221 *** (0.0336) |
| _cons | 3.327 *** (0.534) | 4.268 *** (0.187) | 4.424 *** (0.0959) | 9.129 *** (0.546) |
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| 419 | 457 | 438 | 414 |
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| 0.295 | 0.164 | 0.441 | 0.530 |
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N—number of observations; R2—coefficient of determination. Source: Authors’ contribution in Stata.
Figure 4Results of the SEM model for the EU-28 countries, 1995–2017. Source: Own contribution in Stata.
Cronbach’s alpha for the SEM models, EU-28, 1995–2017.
| Test Scale = Mean (Standardized Items) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average EU-28 | ||||
| Item | Obs | Sign | Interitem Correlation | Alpha |
| Gen_GOV_exp | 634 | + | 0.5336 | 0.9115 |
| Env_GOV_exp | 630 | − | 0.6044 | 0.9322 |
| COR_CTRL | 479 | + | 0.4474 | 0.8793 |
| GOV_effect | 508 | + | 0.4359 | 0.8743 |
| POL_stab | 511 | + | 0.4960 | 0.8985 |
| REG_quality | 526 | + | 0.4520 | 0.8813 |
| Rule_law | 532 | + | 0.4243 | 0.8690 |
| Voice_acc | 530 | + | 0.4296 | 0.8714 |
| GDP_cap | 644 | + | 0.4509 | 0.8808 |
| POV | 378 | − | 0.4542 | 0.8822 |
| Total scale | 0.4725 | 0.8996 | ||
Source: Authors’ research.
Wald tests for equations associated with the SEM models, EU-28, 1995–2017.
| EU-28 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Chi2 | df | |
| Log_GDP_cap | 821.04 | 8 | 0.0000 |
| Log_POV | 211.39 | 1 | 0.0000 |
Source: Authors’ research. H0: all coefficients excluding the intercepts are 0. We can thus reject the null hypothesis for each equation.
Goodness-of-fit tests for the SEM models, EU-28, 1995–2017.
| EU-28 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Likelihood ratio | ||
| chi2_ms(8) | 130.724 | model versus saturated |
| 0.000 | ||
| chi2_bs(17) | 708.912 | baseline versus saturated |
| 0.000 | ||
| Information criteria | ||
| AIC | 599.309 | Akaike’s information criterion |
| BIC | 649.854 | Bayesian information criterion |
| Baseline comparison | ||
| CFI | 0.823 | Comparative fit index |
| TLI | 0.623 | Tucker-Lewis index |
| Size of residuals | ||
| SRMR | 0.063 | Standardized root mean squared residual |
| CD | 0.711 | Coefficient of determination |
Source: Authors’ research.
Figure 5GGMs (Gaussian graphical models) for EU-28, 1995–2017: (a) Extended Bayesian information criterion (EBIC) and least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), and (b) Partial correlation (PCOR). Source: Authors’ research in R program.