| Literature DB >> 31708852 |
Smaranda Boroş1,2, Lore van Gorp3, Michael Boiger4.
Abstract
Members of multicultural groups benefit from developing diverse social support networks. Engaging openly with people who have a different worldview (i.e., given by a different cultural background) broadens one's cognitive horizons, facilitates one's adaptation to new contexts, decreases stereotyping and discrimination and generally improves individual and group performance. However, if this social connection is hindered (either by limiting the number of people one reaches out to or in terms of preferring to connect to similar others), then the diversity advantage is lost - both for the individuals and for the groups. Through two case studies of professional groups with varying cultural diversity (moderate and superdiverse), we investigate the evolution of their members' social support networks (i.e., to what extent and to whom they reach out for support) depending on (1) individuals' habitual emotion suppression and (2) cultural orientation on the individualism-collectivism dimension. Results show that individualistic cultures suffer a double-whammy: when suppressing, their members seek less support (i.e., don't reach out so much to ask for support) and tend to seek culturally similar others for it when they do. Suppressing collectivists are less affected in absolute levels of connectedness, but still prefer culturally similar others as sources of support. Our study offers an emotion-based view of why people stick together with similar others in diverse groups and how learning to better cope with emotions can make us more open-minded toward diversity in professional settings.Entities:
Keywords: emotion suppression; individualism – collectivism; multicultural groups; similarity attraction; social support
Year: 2019 PMID: 31708852 PMCID: PMC6824289 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02431
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Sample characteristics.
| Age | 23.1 (1.2) | 29.2 (2.8) |
| Membership (in years) group t1 | <2 weeks | <2 weeks |
| Gender – male | 37.9% | 63.1% |
| Belgian | 74.1% | 12.3% |
| The Netherlands | 1.7% | – |
| Germany | 3.4% | 3.1% |
| Spain | 1.7% | – |
| India | 3.4% | 13.8% |
| Russia | 3.4% | 7.7% |
| United States of America; Colombia | 1.7% | 6.2% |
| China | 1.7% | 3.1% |
| Australia; France; Hungary; Slovakia | 1.7% | – |
| Romania | 7.7% | |
| Kazakhstan; Taiwan; Greece; South Africa; Georgia; Vietnam; Azerbaijan | 3.1% | |
| Hungary; Thailand; Austria; Peru; Brazil; Cyprus; Ukraine; New-Zealand; Malaysia; Moldova; Indonesia; Chile | 1.5% | |
Descriptive statistics.
| Emotion suppression | 3.31 | 1.24 | 0.81 | 3.72 | 1.41 | 0.82 |
| Collectivism-individualism | / | 3.38 | 1.81 | |||
| Response rate | ||||||
| t 1 | 98.3% | 90.8% | ||||
| t 2 | 100% | 90.8% | ||||
| t 3 | 89.7% | 81.5% | ||||
| t 4 | 93.1% | |||||
| t 1 | 91 | 0.03 | 106 | 0.03 | ||
| t 2 | 222 | 0.07 | 120 | 0.03 | ||
| t 3 | 193 | 0.07 | 153 | 0.05 | ||
| t 4 | 271 | 0.09 | ||||
| t 1-t 2 | 208 | 0.19 | 153 | 0.16 | ||
| t 2-t 3 | 191 | 0.33 | 132 | 0.32 | ||
| t 3-t 4 | 189 | |||||
Explanation and visualization of network effects.
| Outdegree | Tendency to create new support ties to arbitrary others. Outdegree is the effect that indicates how many new ties there are formed to randomly another actor in the network) | ||
| Reciprocity | Tendency to ask for support from someone that asked you already for support. Reciprocity is the indicator showing that if someone asks you for support you are more likely to ask that person for support in the future than a random other person for the group | ||
| Transitive triplets | Tendency of i to ask for support from the support provider of a current support provider. Transitive triplets effect refers to the phenomenon that if A asks B for support and B ask C for support than it is more likely in the future that A will ask C for support than a random other in the network | ||
| 3-cycle effect | Tendency that is asked for support by the support provider of his own support provider. 3-cycle-effects refer to the effect that if A asks B for support and B asks C for support C is more likely to ask A for support than a random other | ||
Dynamics of social support networks in culturally super-diverse and moderately diverse groups – unstandardized coefficients (standard errors).
| Rate period 1 (t1-t2) | 8.02 (1.31) | 8.16 (1.27) | 8.01 (1.26) | 15.25 (3.20) | 15.19 (2.86) |
| Rate period 2 (t2-t3) | 6.01 (0.82) | 6.18 (0.82) | 6.04 (0.81) | 6.94 (0.72) | 6.98 (0.74) |
| Rate period 3 (t3-t4) | 7.38 (0.79) | 7.44 (0.78) | |||
| (t1–t2–t3) | (t1–t2–t3) | (t1–t2–t3) | (t1–t2–t3–t4) | (t1–t2–t3–t4) | |
| Outdegree (density) | −2.32(0.09)*** | −2.34(0.09)*** | −2.35(0.08)*** | −2.19(0.08)*** | −2.20(0.08)*** |
| Reciprocity | 1.74(0.18)*** | 1.74(0.18)*** | 1.73(0.18)*** | 1.80(0.13)*** | 1.79(0.13)*** |
| Transitive triplets | 0.54(0.11)*** | 0.52(0.11)*** | 0.53(0.12)*** | 0.52(0.05)*** | 0.52(0.05)*** |
| 3-cycles | −0.09(0.23) | −0.10(0.22) | −0.08(0.24) | −0.37(0.10)*** | −0.36(0.11)*** |
| Suppression ego | 0.02 (0.04) | −0.01(0.05) | −0.04(0.05) | −0.06(0.03)* | −0.14(0.05)* |
| Collectivism-individualism ego | −0.01(0.04) | −0.04(0.04) | −0.02(0.04) | ||
| Collectivism-individualism alter | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | ||
| Collectivism-individualism sim | 1.25(0.26)*** | 1.30(0.27)*** | 1.33(0.26)*** | ||
| Suppr. ego∗Collectivism-indiv. Ego | −0.07(0.03)* | ||||
| Suppr. ego∗Collectivism-indiv. sim | 0.44(0.20)* | ||||
| Belgian - non-Belgian ego | −0.17(0.11) | −0.19(0.11)+ | |||
| Belgian - non-Belgian alter | 0.09 (0.10) | −0.09(0.09) | |||
| Belgian - non-Belgian same | 0.19(0.09)* | 0.20(0.09)* | |||
| Suppr. ego∗Belgian - non B. same | 0.11(0.06)+ | ||||
| Gender ego (male = ref. cat.) | 0.14 (0.15) | 0.06 (0.14) | 0.15 (0.14) | −0.23(0.09)* | −0.25(0.09)** |
| Gender alter | −0.00(0.12) | −0.01(0.12) | −0.01(0.12) | 0.03 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.08) |
| Gender similarity | 0.12 (0.11) | 0.12 (0.11) | 0.10 (0.11) | 0.25(0.07)*** | 0.25(0.07)*** |
| Age ego | −0.04(0.02)* | −0.04(0.02)* | −0.04(0.02)* | −0.03(0.04) | −0.03(0.04) |
| Age alter | −0.01(0.02) | −0.01(0.02) | −0.01(0.02) | −0.04(0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) |
| Age similarity | 0.35 (0.33) | 0.32 (0.33) | 0.36 (0.34) | 0.11 (0.18) | 0.14 (0.18) |
| 65 | 58 | ||||