| Literature DB >> 31616262 |
Sébastien Ballesta1,2, Gilles Reymond1,2, Jean-René Duhamel1,2.
Abstract
Primates live in complex social environments, where individuals create meaningful networks by adapting their behavior according to past experiences with others. Although free-ranging primates do show signs of reciprocity, experiments in more controlled environments have mainly failed to reproduce such social dynamics. Hence, the cognitive and neural processes allowing monkeys to reciprocate during social exchanges remains elusive. Here, pairs of long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) took turns into a social decision task involving the delivery of positive (juice reward) or negative (airpuff) outcomes. By analyzing the contingencies of one partner's past decisions on the other's future decisions, we demonstrate the presence of reciprocity, but only for the exchange of negative outcomes. Importantly, to display this decisional bias, the monkey needs to witness its partner's decisions, since non-social deliveries of the same outcome did not have such effect. Withholding of negative outcomes also predicted future social decisions, which suggest that the observed tit-for-tat strategy may not only be motivated by retaliation after receiving an airpuff but also by the gratefulness of not having received one. These results clarify the apparent dichotomy within the scientific literature of reciprocity in non-human primates and suggest that their social cognition comprise revenge and gratitude.Entities:
Keywords: action understanding; food-sharing; hostility management; imitation; prosocial behaviour; reciprocation; social neuroscience
Year: 2019 PMID: 31616262 PMCID: PMC6768951 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2019.00225
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Behav Neurosci ISSN: 1662-5153 Impact factor: 3.558
Figure 1Experimental task and analysis to measure reciprocity during social exchanges. (A) Set of outcomes used for non-social and social decisions. Different offers configurations were presented on successive trials from a pre-defined set of Four possible types of decisions, in randomly interleaved order. Each cue shape was associated with a unique set of outcomes to the actor (self), the partner (other) or nobody. (B) Method used to analyze the effect of prior decisions on next decisions. The two monkeys alternated as actor and partner on successive blocks of 30 s. We compared the decisions of an actor monkey depending on the nature of the decisions of the other monkeys towards him on the preceding block of trials.
Figure 2Previous delivery and avoidance of negative outcomes influenced subsequent social decisions. We assess whether prior decisions of a monkey (the partner or the actor) can influence the actor’s subsequent decisions. (A) Reciprocity between the social exchanges of airpuff (Generalized linear mixed effect models, GLME, R2 = 0.57, F = 34.6, p < 0.001). (B) Absence of reciprocity between the social exchanges of juice reward (GLME, R2 = 0.08, F = 1.63, p = 0.21). (C) Non-social delivery of airpuff does not influence social decision involving airpuff (GLME, R2 = 0.04, F = 1.16, p = 0.29). (D) Previous delivery and avoidance of airpuff predicted subsequent social decisions. (Number of airpuff delivered to nobody, GLME, R2 = 0.57, F = 21.3, p < 0.001; Number of airpuff delivered to the partner, GLME, R2 = 0.46, F = 10.3, p = 0.006). (A–D) Actors mean decision rates were normalized so that positive or negative value indicates, respectively, an increase or decrease of the prosocial decisional tendencies of the actor (see “Materials and Methods” section). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM). Gray lines represent individual’s regressions. ***p < 0.001.
Figure 3Persistence of the influence of partner’s social decisions on subsequent actor’s social decisions. We assess whether prior decisions of the partner monkey can influence the actor’s subsequent decisions in timescale longer than two consecutive blocks. The observed reciprocity when partner’s social decisions involved aipuff (p < 0.001) persists until the second actor’s block (p = 0.012). A non-significant trend can be observed on the third actor’s block (p = 0.056) but not on the fourth one (p = 0.74). We did not find any effect of partner’s social decisions involving rewards on same type of next actor’s social decisions (all p > 0.05). Y axis represents the slope of the regression (Beta coefficient of the GLME). X axis represents the number of subsequent actor’s blocks. Note that the two monkeys alternated as actor and partner on successive blocks of 30 s during which it performed an average of 3.14 (±0.9) trials. Error bars represent SE. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001; #p < 0.1.