| Literature DB >> 31540517 |
Abstract
China has established the universal medical insurance system and individual out of pocket costs have decreased, however, the average healthcare expenditure of the Chinese population and the expenses of the whole society have increased substantially. One major challenge which impedes the progress of attaining sustainable development of the social healthcare system in China is that the number of hospital admissions is disproportionate. Superior hospitals are overcrowded, whereas subordinate hospitals are experiencing low admissions. In this paper, we apply the game theory model to coordinate the healthcare supply chain network, which is composed of the government, medical insurance fund, superior hospitals, subordinate hospitals and patients. Especially by taking the reference price effect into account, this paper analyzes different medical insurance reimbursement strategies and their influence on patient choice and the healthcare supply chain network. The result shows that the reference price effect increases the leverage of medical insurance, guides patients' choice, optimizes the allocation of medical resources and reduces the medical expends. In comparison to a decentralized decision- making strategy, a centralized decision- making strategy can stimulate both superior hospital and subordinate hospital's cooperative intentions which benefits the social healthcare system.Entities:
Keywords: game theory; healthcare supply chain network; medical insurance reimbursement strategies; patient choice behavior; reference price effect
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31540517 PMCID: PMC6766012 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph16183479
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Figure 1Healthcare supply chain network.
Notations.
| Parameters | Description |
|---|---|
| reference price of patients | |
| unit service price | |
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| specific time when patient going to the hospital |
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| impact of patients’ memory effect |
| medical insurance reimbursement | |
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| patient’s asset |
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| initial assets of the patient |
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| medical insurance reimbursement effect on the reference price |
| patients consultation demand | |
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| base market size |
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| price elasticity of demand |
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| impact of reference price on demand |
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| average Marginal revenue |
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| cost in medical insurance |
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| reverse measurement coefficients of respective efficiency |
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| utility of patient |
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| patient’s health status |
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| specific proportion coefficient of secondary distribution |
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| profit |
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| corresponding discount rate |
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| actual number of patients’ admission |
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| accompanying variables |
Superscripts ns, ss, cs mean the medical insurance strategy under the Nash, Stackelberg and centralized model of game theory respectively. Subscripts b, h represent the superior hospital and subordinate hospital respectively.
Relationship between superior hospital insurance reimbursement and parameters.
| Parameters | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reimbursement | |||||
|
| ↑ | ↑ | ↑ | ↓ | |
Relationship between subordinate hospital insurance reimbursement and parameters.
| Parameters | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reimbursement | |||||
|
| ↑ | ↑ | ↑ | ↓ | |
Medical insurance reimbursement for superior and subordinate hospital under different reference price effects.
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 61.44 | 40.00 | 61.44 | 50.00 | 99.84 | 104.00 |
| 0.10 | 71.68 | 46.67 | 71.68 | 58.33 | 116.48 | 121.33 |
| 0.20 | 81.92 | 53.33 | 81.92 | 66.67 | 133.12 | 138.67 |
| 0.30 | 92.16 | 60.00 | 92.16 | 75.00 | 149.76 | 156.00 |
| 0.40 | 102.40 | 66.67 | 102.40 | 83.33 | 166.40 | 173.33 |
| 0.50 | 112.64 | 73.33 | 112.64 | 91.67 | 183.04 | 190.67 |
| 0.60 | 122.88 | 80.00 | 122.88 | 100.00 | 199.68 | 208.00 |
| 0.70 | 133.12 | 86.67 | 133.12 | 108.33 | 216.32 | 225.33 |
| 0.80 | 143.36 | 93.33 | 143.36 | 116.67 | 232.96 | 242.67 |
| 0.90 | 153.60 | 100.00 | 153.60 | 125.00 | 249.60 | 260.00 |
| 1.00 | 163.84 | 106.67 | 163.84 | 133.33 | 266.24 | 277.33 |
Figure 2Medical insurance reimbursement under different reference price effects: (a) reimbursement for superior hospital; (b) reimbursement for subordinate hospital.
Patients visiting number of superior and subordinate hospitals under different reference price effects.
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 64 | 142 | 206 | 68 | 143 | 211 | 119 | 142 | 261 |
| 0.10 | 72 | 141 | 214 | 77 | 142 | 220 | 141 | 137 | 279 |
| 0.20 | 81 | 141 | 222 | 87 | 141 | 229 | 165 | 130 | 296 |
| 0.30 | 90 | 140 | 230 | 97 | 140 | 238 | 191 | 122 | 313 |
| 0.40 | 100 | 138 | 238 | 108 | 138 | 247 | 218 | 111 | 330 |
| 0.50 | 110 | 136 | 246 | 119 | 136 | 255 | 247 | 99 | 347 |
| 0.60 | 120 | 134 | 254 | 131 | 133 | 264 | 278 | 86 | 364 |
| 0.70 | 131 | 131 | 262 | 143 | 129 | 273 | 311 | 70 | 381 |
| 0.80 | 142 | 127 | 270 | 156 | 125 | 282 | 345 | 53 | 399 |
| 0.90 | 154 | 124 | 278 | 169 | 121 | 291 | 381 | 34 | 416 |
| 1.00 | 166 | 120 | 286 | 183 | 116 | 299 | 419 | 13 | 433 |
Figure 3Number of visitors with reference price effects under different strategies: (a) Nash strategy (NS); (b) Stackelberg strategy (SS); (c) Centralized strategy (CS).
Total profit of the supply chain under different strategies.
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|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 22,760.82 | 23,128.96 | 25,552.43 |
| 0.10 | 23,163.00 | 23,563.60 | 25,885.91 |
| 0.20 | 23,510.40 | 23,935.21 | 26,012.04 |
| 0.30 | 23,803.02 | 24,243.78 | 25,930.83 |
| 0.40 | 24,040.86 | 24,489.32 | 25,642.28 |
| 0.50 | 24,223.92 | 24,671.83 | 25,146.39 |
| 0.60 | 24,352.21 | 24,791.31 | 24,443.16 |
| 0.70 | 24,425.72 | 24,847.75 | 23,532.59 |
| 0.80 | 24,444.44 | 24,841.16 | 22,414.68 |
| 0.90 | 24,408.39 | 24,771.54 | 21,089.42 |
| 1.00 | 24,317.57 | 24,638.88 | 19,556.83 |
Figure 4Total profit of the supply chain under different strategies.
Total utility of the supply chain under different strategies.
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|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 32,902.73 | 33,221.73 | 36,808.27 |
| 0.10 | 33,461.44 | 33,817.85 | 37,706.09 |
| 0.20 | 33,985.93 | 34,375.26 | 38,480.61 |
| 0.30 | 34,476.20 | 34,893.95 | 39,131.82 |
| 0.40 | 34,932.27 | 35,373.93 | 39,659.73 |
| 0.50 | 35,354.11 | 35,815.20 | 40,064.34 |
| 0.60 | 35,741.75 | 36,217.75 | 40,345.65 |
| 0.70 | 36,095.17 | 36,581.58 | 40,503.66 |
| 0.80 | 36,414.37 | 36,906.70 | 40,538.36 |
| 0.90 | 36,699.36 | 37,193.11 | 40,579.76 |
| 1.00 | 36,950.14 | 37,440.80 | 40,618.86 |
Figure 5Total utility of healthcare supply chain network under the centralized decision.