| Literature DB >> 31520252 |
Jordan Skrynka1, Benjamin T Vincent2.
Abstract
How do our valuation systems change to homeostatically correct undesirable psychological or physiological states, such as those caused by hunger? There is evidence that hunger increases discounting for food rewards, biasing choices towards smaller but sooner food reward over larger but later reward. However, it is not understood how hunger modulates delay discounting for non-food items. We outline and quantitatively evaluate six possible models of how our valuation systems modulate discounting of various commodities in the face of the undesirable state of being hungry. With a repeated-measures design, an experimental hunger manipulation, and quantitative modeling, we find strong evidence that hunger causes large increases in delay discounting for food, with an approximately 25% spillover effect to non-food commodities. The results provide evidence that in the face of hunger, our valuation systems increase discounting for commodities, which cannot achieve a desired state change as well as for those commodities that can. Given that strong delay discounting can cause negative outcomes in many non-food (consumer, investment, medical, or inter-<span class="Species">personal) domains, the present findings suggest caution may be necessary when making decisions involving non-food outcomes while hungry.Entities:
Keywords: Delay discounting; Hunger; Inter-temporal choice; Valuation
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31520252 PMCID: PMC6797630 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-019-01655-0
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Psychon Bull Rev ISSN: 1069-9384
Fig. 1Predictions of the models for a repeated-measures context (control vs. hunger conditions). The x-axis shows the commodity where food is the in-domain commodity, and money and music downloads are two out-of-domain commodities. Music downloads were chosen as an out-of-domain reward with no feasible route to affect hunger state (see text). The y-axis shows predictions in terms of a change in discount rate (increase in discount rate = increased delay discounting) for an individual going from control to fasted states. Bars are schematic only, with changes being determined by model parameters (shown by Greek symbols) to be estimated from the data. These parameters are free to vary within the following constraints: α > 0, β > 0, γ > 0, δ < 0, 𝜖 > ζ > 0, η > 0
Fig. 2Discount rates for different commodities and conditions. The top panel shows the distribution of log discount rates for each commodity and condition combination. The bottom panel shows the distribution in participant change in discount rates from control to fasted conditions. Black points and error bars show the paired mean change in discount rates and 95% confidence intervals, calculated using bootstrap resampling (Ho et al., 2019). The letters “C” and “F” correspond to the control and fasting conditions, respectively. See Supplementary Materials for summary statistics
Formal model comparison results
| Model |
| LL | Δ( | Δ( | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Trait only | 1 | − 365.66 | 47.00 | 0.00 | 43.18 | 0.00 |
| 2. In-domain | 2 | − 347.37 | 12.41 | 0.00 | 10.50 | 0.01 |
| 3. Monetary fungibility | 2 | − 349.16 | 15.99 | 0.00 | 14.08 | 0.00 |
| 4. Negative spillover | 3 | − 347.37 | 14.41 | 0.00 | 14.41 | 0.00 |
| 5. Spillover | 3 | − 340.17 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.99 |
| 6. State-only | 2 | − 348.44 | 14.56 | 0.00 | 12.65 | 0.00 |
LL is the log likelihood of the data given the maximum likelihood parameters. Higher (i.e., smaller negative) values indicate better fits to the data. ΔAIC is the AIC value, relative to the best (lowest) AIC value, similarly for ΔBIC. w(AIC) and w(BIC) are the probabilities of each model being the best. Each model has n parameters, and all models have a scale parameter for the Cauchy-distributed measurement error of change in log discount rates