| Literature DB >> 31500549 |
Maria Eismann1,2, Kène Henkens1,2,3, Matthijs Kalmijn1,2.
Abstract
This study goes beyond a purely financial perspective to explain why single older workers prefer to retire later than their partnered counterparts. We aim to show how the work (i.e., its social meaning) and home domain (i.e., spousal influence) contribute to differences in retirement preferences by relationship status. Analyses were based on multiactor data collected in 2015 among older workers in the Netherlands (N = 6,357) and (where applicable) their spouses. Results revealed that the social meaning of work differed by relationship status but not always as expected. In a mediation analysis, we found that the social meaning of work partically explained differences in retirement preferences by relationship status. We also show that single workers preferred to retire later than workers with a "pulling" spouse, earlier than workers with a "pushing" spouse, and at about the same time as workers with a neutral spouse.Entities:
Keywords: decision-making; gender; marital status; older worker; retirement
Mesh:
Year: 2019 PMID: 31500549 PMCID: PMC6838727 DOI: 10.1177/0164027519873537
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Res Aging ISSN: 0164-0275
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables by Gender and Relationship Status.
| Variables | Men | Women | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partnered | Single | Partnered | Single | |||||
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| Dependent variable | ||||||||
| Retirement preference | ||||||||
| Strong preference working | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.40 | ||||
| Weak preference working | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.13 | ||||
| No preference | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.10 | ||||
| Weak preference not working | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.13 | ||||
| Strong preference not working | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.23 | ||||
| Social meaning of work | ||||||||
| Expectation to miss contacts | ||||||||
| Not at all | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.06 | ||||
| Very little | 0.27 | 0.23 | 0.17 | 0.18 | ||||
| Somewhat | 0.39 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.37 | ||||
| A lot | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.27 | ||||
| Extremely | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.12 | ||||
| Expectation to miss structure | ||||||||
| Not at all | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.15 | ||||
| Very little | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.27 | ||||
| Somewhat | 0.26 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.33 | ||||
| A lot | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.17 | ||||
| Extremely | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 | ||||
| Independent variables of interest | ||||||||
| Single (Reference = partnered) | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | ||||
| Spouse’s work status | ||||||||
| Working spouse | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.58 | 0.00 | ||||
| Nonworking spouse | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.42 | 0.00 | ||||
| Spouse’s preferences | ||||||||
| Pulling spouse | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.42 | 0.00 | ||||
| Neutral spouse | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.19 | 0.00 | ||||
| Pushing spouse | 0.42 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 | ||||
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Age | 62.06 | 1.61 | 62.09 | 1.63 | 61.84 | 1.54 | 62.15 | 1.67 |
| Education (in years) | 13.10 | 3.04 | 12.70 | 3.29 | 13.65 | 2.39 | 13.47 | 2.57 |
| Household wealth | ||||||||
| Below €50,000 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 0.42 | 0.69 | ||||
| Between €50,000 and €100,000 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.22 | ||||
| Above €100,000 | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.09 | ||||
| Net income | ||||||||
| Below €1,500 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.41 | 0.20 | ||||
| Between €1,500 and €2,000 | 0.27 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.37 | ||||
| Between €2,000 and €2,500 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 0.26 | ||||
| Above €2,500 | 0.40 | 0.28 | 0.12 | 0.17 | ||||
| Subjective health | 3.20 | 0.86 | 3.13 | 0.83 | 3.27 | 0.87 | 3.12 | 0.87 |
| Children (reference = no children) | 0.93 | 0.64 | 0.89 | 0.73 | ||||
| Observations | 3,109 | 356 | 1,975 | 833 | ||||
Note. Descriptive statistics are based on original, nonimputed data. Due to missing values, the number of cases might differ per variable.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results of the Social Meaning of Work for Men (N = 3,511) and Women (N = 2,846) Separately.
| Variables | Men | Women | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1a: Expectation to Miss Social Contacts | Model 2a: Expectation to Miss Daily Structure | Model 1b: Expectation to Miss Social Contacts | Model 2b: Expectation to Miss Daily Structure | |||||||||
| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Independent variables | ||||||||||||
| Single (reference = partnered) | .39*** | 1.48*** | .16 | .32** | 1.38** | .16 | −.04 | 0.96 | .08 | .43*** | 1.54*** | .13 |
| Control variables | ||||||||||||
| Age (in years) | .07*** | 1.08*** | .02 | .04* | 1.04* | .02 | .05* | 1.05* | .02 | .03 | 1.03 | .02 |
| Education (in years) | .00 | 1.00 | .01 | .02 | 1.02 | .01 | −.02 | 0.98 | .01 | −.01 | 0.99 | .02 |
| Household wealth (reference = below €50,000) | ||||||||||||
| Between €50,000 and €100,000 | .08 | 1.09 | .08 | −.02 | 0.98 | .08 | −.11 | 0.89 | .08 | .05 | 1.06 | .09 |
| Above €100,000 | .20* | 1.22* | .10 | −.00 | 1.00 | .08 | .15 | 1.16 | .11 | .21* | 1.24* | .12 |
| Net income (reference = below €1,500) | ||||||||||||
| Between €1,500 and €2,000 | −.23 | 0.80 | .14 | .26 | 1.30 | .26 | −.18* | 0.83* | .07 | .10 | 1.11 | .10 |
| Between €2,000 and €2,500 | −.27 | 0.76 | .13 | .14 | 1.15 | .23 | −.18 | 0.83 | .08 | −.08 | 0.92 | .10 |
| Above €2,500 | −.06 | 0.95 | .17 | .16 | 1.17 | .24 | −.36** | 0.70** | .08 | −.05 | 0.95 | .12 |
| Subjective health | .06 | 1.06 | .04 | −.10* | 0.91* | .03 | .07 | 1.07 | .05 | .04 | 1.04 | .04 |
| Children (reference = no children) | .13 | 1.13 | .13 | −.00 | 1.00 | .10 | .42*** | 1.51*** | .16 | .39*** | 1.48*** | .15 |
Note. Standard errors clustered by organization.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results of Retirement Preferences for Men (N = 3,511) and Women (N = 2,846) Separately.
| Variables | Men | Women | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 3a: Retirement Preferences | Model 4a: Controlled for Mediators | Model 3b: Retirement Preferences | Model 4b: Controlled for Mediators | |||||||||
| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Independent variables | ||||||||||||
| Single (reference = partnered) | −.33** | 0.72** | .08 | −0.24* | 0.79* | .08 | −.36*** | 0.70*** | .06 | −.32*** | 0.73*** | .06 |
| Social meaning of work | ||||||||||||
| Expectation to miss contacts (reference = not at all) | ||||||||||||
| Very little | −0.46*** | 0.63*** | .08 | −.05 | 0.95 | .19 | ||||||
| Somewhat | −0.82*** | 0.44*** | .06 | −.50** | 0.61** | .11 | ||||||
| A lot | −1.32*** | 0.27*** | .04 | −.76*** | 0.47*** | .09 | ||||||
| Extremely | −1.05*** | 0.35*** | .07 | −.95*** | 0.39*** | .08 | ||||||
| Expectation to miss structure (reference = not at all) | ||||||||||||
| Very little | −0.14 | 0.87 | .07 | −.19 | 0.83 | .09 | ||||||
| Somewhat | −0.43*** | 0.65*** | .06 | −.54*** | 0.58*** | .07 | ||||||
| A lot | −0.70*** | 0.50*** | .06 | −.89*** | 0.41*** | .06 | ||||||
| Extremely | −0.76** | 0.47** | .13 | −.72*** | 0.49*** | .10 | ||||||
| Control variables | ||||||||||||
| Age (in years) | .36*** | 1.44*** | .03 | 0.40*** | 1.49*** | .03 | .39*** | 1.48*** | .03 | .42*** | 1.53*** | .04 |
| Education (in years) | −.03* | 0.97* | .01 | −0.03* | 0.97* | .01 | .02 | 1.02 | .02 | .02 | 1.02 | .02 |
| Household wealth (reference = below €50,000) | ||||||||||||
| Between €50,000 and €100,000 | .06 | 1.06 | .08 | 0.08 | 1.08 | .08 | .07 | 1.08 | .09 | .07 | 1.07 | .09 |
| Above €100,000 | .21* | 1.23* | .10 | 0.26** | 1.30** | .11 | −.02 | 0.98 | .10 | .05 | 1.05 | .11 |
| Net income (reference = below €1,500) | ||||||||||||
| Between €1,500 and €2,000 | .06 | 1.06 | .17 | 0.01 | 1.01 | .17 | .02 | 1.02 | .09 | .01 | 1.01 | .10 |
| Between €2,000 and €2,500 | .09 | 1.09 | .18 | 0.02 | 1.02 | .18 | −.32* | 0.73* | .09 | −.36** | 0.70** | .09 |
| Above €2,500 | −.48** | 0.62** | .11 | −0.54** | 0.58** | .11 | −.40** | 0.67** | .09 | −.49*** | 0.61*** | .08 |
| Subjective health | −.36*** | 0.70*** | .03 | −0.38*** | 0.69*** | .03 | −.37*** | 0.69*** | .03 | −.37*** | 0.69*** | .03 |
| Children (reference = no children) | −.10 | 0.90 | .10 | −0.09 | 0.91 | .10 | −.47*** | 0.62*** | .07 | −.38*** | 0.68*** | .07 |
Note. Standard errors clustered by organization.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results of Retirement Preferences for Men (N = 3,511) and Women (N = 2,846) Separately.
| Variables | Men | Women | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 5a: Spousal Work Status | Model 6a: Spousal Preferences | Model 5b: Spousal Work Status | Model 6b: Spousal Preferences | |||||||||
| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Coefficient |
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| Independent variables | ||||||||||||
| Spouse’s work status (reference = single) | ||||||||||||
| Working spouse | 0.18 | 1.20 | .13 | .27** | 1.31** | .12 | ||||||
| Nonworking spouse | 0.30** | 1.36** | .15 | .37*** | 1.45*** | .15 | ||||||
| Spouse’ preferences (reference = single) | ||||||||||||
| Pulling spouse | 1.21*** | 3.35*** | .41 | 1.14*** | 3.11*** | .32 | ||||||
| Neutral spouse | 0.24 | 1.27 | .17 | −0.00 | 1.00 | .13 | ||||||
| Pushing spouse | −0.62*** | 0.54*** | .07 | −0.59*** | 0.56*** | .06 | ||||||
| Social meaning of work | ||||||||||||
| Expectation to miss contacts (reference = not at all) | ||||||||||||
| Very little | −0.45*** | 0.64*** | .08 | −0.43*** | 0.65*** | .08 | −.04 | 0.96 | .19 | 0.00 | 1.00 | .21 |
| Somewhat | −0.82*** | 0.44*** | .06 | −0.70*** | 0.49*** | .06 | −.50** | 0.61** | .11 | −0.44* | 0.65* | .12 |
| A lot | −1.31*** | 0.27*** | .04 | −1.15*** | 0.32*** | .05 | −.75*** | 0.47*** | .09 | −0.71*** | 0.49*** | .10 |
| Extremely | −1.04*** | 0.35*** | .07 | −0.87*** | 0.42*** | .08 | −.95*** | 0.39*** | .08 | −0.82*** | 0.44*** | .10 |
| Expectation to miss structure (reference = not at all) | ||||||||||||
| Very little | −0.14 | 0.87 | .07 | −0.05 | 0.95 | .08 | −.19 | 0.82 | .09 | −0.19 | 0.83 | .09 |
| Somewhat | −0.43*** | 0.65*** | .06 | −0.29** | 0.75** | .07 | −.54*** | 0.58*** | .07 | −0.48*** | 0.62*** | .08 |
| A lot | −0.70*** | 0.50*** | .06 | −0.56*** | 0.57*** | .08 | −.89*** | 0.41*** | .06 | −0.80*** | 0.45*** | .06 |
| Extremely | −0.77** | 0.46** | .13 | −0.53 | 0.59 | .16 | −.72*** | 0.49*** | .10 | −0.61** | 0.55** | .12 |
| Control variables | ||||||||||||
| Age (in years) | 0.39*** | 1.48*** | .03 | 0.27*** | 1.31*** | .03 | .42*** | 1.52*** | .04 | 0.38*** | 1.46*** | .03 |
| Education (in years) | −0.03* | 0.97* | .01 | −0.01 | 0.99 | .01 | .02 | 1.02 | .02 | 0.03 | 1.03 | .02 |
| Household wealth (reference = €below 50,000) | ||||||||||||
| Between €50,000 and €100,000 | 0.08 | 1.08 | .08 | 0.02 | 1.02 | .08 | .07 | 1.07 | .09 | 0.08 | 1.09 | .10 |
| Above €100,000 | 0.26** | 1.30** | .11 | 0.20* | 1.22* | .11 | .06 | 1.06 | .11 | 0.12 | 1.13 | .11 |
| Net income (reference = below €1,500) | ||||||||||||
| Between €1,500 and €2,000 | 0.01 | 1.01 | .17 | −0.06 | 0.94 | .16 | .01 | 1.01 | .09 | 0.04 | 1.04 | .10 |
| Between €2,000 and €2,500 | 0.02 | 1.02 | .18 | −0.04 | 0.96 | .17 | −.37** | 0.69** | .09 | −0.42** | 0.66** | .09 |
| Above €2,500 | −0.54** | 0.58** | .11 | −0.52** | 0.60** | .11 | −.49*** | 0.61*** | .08 | −0.44** | 0.64** | .09 |
| Subjective health | −0.38*** | 0.69*** | .03 | −0.32*** | 0.73*** | .03 | −.37*** | 0.69*** | .03 | −0.33*** | 0.72*** | .03 |
| Children (reference = no children) | −0.10 | 0.91 | .10 | −0.13 | 0.88 | .10 | −.37*** | 0.69*** | .07 | −0.35** | 0.71** | .08 |
Note. Standard errors clustered by organization.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.