| Literature DB >> 31487847 |
Deebak B D1, Fadi Al-Turjman2, Leonardo Mostarda3.
Abstract
With the technological advances in the areas of Machine-To-Machine (M2M) and Device-To-Device (D2D) communication, various smart computing devices now integrate a set of multimedia sensors such as accelerometers, barometers, cameras, fingerprint sensors, gestures, iris scanners, etc., to infer the environmental status. These devices are generally identified using radio-frequency identification (RFID) to transfer the collected data to other local or remote objects over a geographical location. To enable automatic data collection and transition, a valid RFID embedded object is highly recommended. It is used to authorize the devices at various communication phases. In smart application devices, RFID-based authentication is enabled to provide short-range operation. On the other hand, it does not require the communication device to be in line-of-sight to gain server access like bar-code systems. However, in existing authentication schemes, an adversary may capture private user data to create a forgery problem. Also, another issue is the high computation cost. Thus, several studies have addressed the usage of context-aware authentication schemes for multimedia device management systems. The security objective is to determine the user authenticity in order to withhold the eavesdropping and tracing. Lately, RFID has played a significant for the context-aware sensor management systems (CASMS) as it can reduce the complexity of the sensor systems, it can be available in access control, sensor monitoring, real time inventory and security-aware management systems. Lately, this technology has opened up its wings for CASMS, where the challenging issues are tag-anonymity, mutual authentication and untraceability. Thus, this paper proposes a secure hash-based RFID mechanism for CASMS. This proposed protocol is based on the hash operation with the synchronized secret session-key to withstand any attacks, such as desynchronization, replay and man-in-the-middle. Importantly, the security and performance analysis proves that the proposed hash-based protocol achieves better security and performance efficiencies than other related schemes. From the simulation results, it is observed that the proposed scheme is secure, robust and less expensive while achieving better communication metrics such as packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay and throughput rate.Entities:
Keywords: RFID; context aware sensor management systems; de-synchronization; multimedia device management systems; replay; traceability
Year: 2019 PMID: 31487847 PMCID: PMC6766990 DOI: 10.3390/s19183821
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Figure 1A basic system model of radio frequency identification (RFID).
Challenging issues of existing RFID-based authentication protocols.
| Authentication Protocol | Technique Used | Issue Addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Xu et al. [ | Lightweight Authentication Using Physical Unclonable Function | Susceptible to secret disclosure and desynchronization attack |
| Bendavid et al. [ | Lightweight Authentication Using Physical Unclonable Function | Perform frequent execution of setup phase to acquire a new set of pseudo-identity; whereby the back-end server experiences performance deprivation |
| Gope et al. [ | Lightweight Anonymous Based Authentication Using Physical Unclonable Function | |
| Wang et al. [ | Stability Guaranteed Physical Unclonable Function | |
| Benssalah et al. [ | Authentication Using Elliptic Curve Signature with Message Recovery | Incur more communication cost and susceptible to untraceability |
Figure 2Integration of virtual TEDS systems in IEEE 1451.
Figure 3Proposed workflow of the novel hash-based RFID mechanism.
Important notations used.
| Notation | Description |
|---|---|
|
| Identity of the k-th Key |
|
| Tag identity |
|
| Random integer generated by reader |
|
| Random integer generated by tag |
|
| Secret session-key mutually shared between back-end server and tag |
|
| Secret session-key in the k-th session |
|
| One-way hash operational function |
|
| Bitwise |
|
| Expected transmission delay |
| Current timestamps | |
|
| Concatenation operator |
|
| Message format |
Security properties of various hash-based RFID protocols.
| Security Properties | Kim et al., 2012 [ | Kim et al., 2013 [ | Hajny et al. [ | Proposed Hash-Based Protocol |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mutual Authentication | Not Support | Partial Support | Not Support | Fully Support |
| Resilient to Eavesdropping Attack | No | No | No | Yes |
| Resilient to Tracing Attack | No | No | No | Yes |
| Resilient to Replay Attack | No | No | No | Yes |
| Resilient to Man-in-the-Middle Attack | No | No | No | Yes |
| Resilient to De-Synchronization Attack | No | No | No | Yes |
| Untraceability and Tag-Anonymity | Not Provided | Not Provided | Not Provided | Provided |
Comparison cost of computation efficiency.
| Authentication Protocol | RFID | Reader | Server | Execution Time (ms) | Communication Session | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forward Channel | Backward Channel | |||||
| Kim et al. 2012 [ | 2 | 1 | 4 | 0.45 | 4 | 3 |
| Kim et al. 2013 [ | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0.61 | 4 | 3 |
| Hajny et al. [ | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0.57 | 7 | 4 |
| Proposed Hash-Based Protocol | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0.44 | 3 | 3 |
Important parameters in NS3 Simulator.
| System Parameter | Values |
|---|---|
| Operating System | Ubuntu 16.04 LTS |
| Simulation Time | 1800 s |
| Area of RFID devices |
|
| Availability of Readers | 5 Nos. |
| Availability of Tags | 160 Nos. |
| Transmission Range of a Reader | 200 m |
| Transmission Range of a Tag | 20 m |
| Communication Environment | IEEE 802.11 |
| Speed of Communication device |
|
Figure 4Packet delivery ratio vs. number of sensor nodes.
Figure 5End-to-end delay vs. number of sensor nodes.
Figure 6Throughput rate vs. number of sensor nodes.